Scott Ritter, "Cause for War? Assessing the Bush Administration's Case Against Iraq” - MIT Technology and Culture Forum

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MCCREATH: Good evening. My name is Amy McCreath. I'm the coordinator of the Technology and Culture Forum at MIT, and it's my pleasure to welcome you to this very special event this evening. As someone remarked when they were arriving tonight, this is an unfortunately timely event. And I'm glad that the Technology and Culture Forum is able to present it to you this evening.

I'd like to thank our co-sponsors for this event, without whom we could not have put this together. They are the Science, Technology and Society Program at MIT, the Department of Political Science at MIT, and the Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts.

I also want to thank a few students who came to us in late August and put a bee in our bonnet and said, you have to do something on this topic. And they were right. And they are Julia Steinberger, Stephanie Wang, and Eric Downs. So thank you to you.

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I also want to draw your attention to the fact that, next week, the Technology and Culture Forum begins two series of forums that will continue throughout the fall. One is on the politics and technology of motherhood, and the other is on energy, the environment, and global politics. And you can find out more about both of those series by going to our website. And the website is listed right behind me.

Our focus at the Technology and Culture Forum is on addressing the critical issues of our day. And I think that you will agree with me that the issue that we'll be addressing this evening is the critical issue of our day. Simply a glance at the newspapers in the last few weeks has made it clear that the critical question before not just our nation but the whole world is do we have cause for war against Iraq. And that's going to be our focus tonight, taking a look at that question.

Our format is that we have a moderator, who will begin the evening by giving us an overview of the question and the situation at hand. And then he will introduce the two speakers, both of whom will offer their remarks. And following that, we hope to have plenty of time for questions from you. And we hope that you will feel free to ask your questions. We'll probably have some mics that we can bring up the aisles to get people's questions so that you can be heard.

And I'm very glad to be able to introduce our moderator to you. He is Kenneth Oye. Ken is an associate professor of political science at MIT, working in the fields of American foreign policy, international political economy, international relations theory, and technology policy. A former director of the Center for International Studies at MIT, he has also served on the faculties of Harvard University, the University of California, Princeton University, and Swarthmore College. And he has been a guest scholar at the Brookings Institute.

He has edited and contributed to a series of four volumes on US foreign policy-- Eagle in a New World-- American Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era, Eagle Resurgent-- The Reagan Era and US Foreign Policy, Eagle Defiant-- US Foreign Policy in the 1980s, and Eagle Entangled-- US Foreign Policy in a Complex World. So I'm very happy to hand this event over to Ken Oye.

OYE: Thank you very much.

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Our topic tonight is cause for war, assessing the Bush administration's case against Iraq. It's a difficult task that we have before us, both to lay out the elements of the Bush administration's case and to then probe and assess point by point some of the key assumptions, some of the logic behind their strategy. We're very fortunate indeed to have Scott Ritter and Steve Walt to help us in this task. And I'd like to first ask you to join me in welcoming them to MIT.

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They have unusual attributes or skills that they bring to this enterprise. As most of you know, Scott was the Chief Inspector on Iraq. Between 1991 and 1998, he spent how many trips to Iraq?

RITTER: Over 50.

OYE: Over 50 trips going back and forth, assessing and evaluating weapons capabilities, the status of weapons of mass destruction. I should also note that he probably has had more firsthand experience dealing with Saddam Hussein than any and all people in this room, indeed probably most of the administration added up together. And these attributes and skills cause him to be an extremely useful asset as we probe these issues this evening.

Now, Steve Walt, of course, comes out of the world of the academy. And you might assume that that would not prepare him to adequately assess or evaluate the difficult and controversial and dangerous topics that we have in front of us. But I should note that, in addition to writing-- and he has a wonderful book on the origins of alliances and on revolutionary regimes and war that we'll turn to in a second-- but his real qualification for this is that Steve is a new academic dean at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

And anyone that can survive the interplay of conflicting forces when you look to students and faculty and central administration in that setting is probably as skilled and as adept at dealing with problems like these as anyone in the world. So I think you're both equally qualified for the task tonight.

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Although I'm not sure whose job is the more dangerous.

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WALT: I am.

OYE: Now let's move into a quick review of the issues. And I don't want to take too much time on this, because we obviously want to allow time for our speakers. But to set the stage for this, let's go back a few years. If you go back to 1998, at the time when Scott was last in Iraq conducting inspections, one set of issues or concerns is what did you know then, and how did you know it, with reference to weapons of mass destruction, biological, chemical, and nuclear capabilities. And even more critically and centrally, from your experiences as an inspector at that time, what can you now tell us about the current status of Iraqi biological, chemical, and nuclear systems.

This is now four years after the inspections stopped. And the questions at hand here-- and they're central to the Bush administration's case against Iraq-- are with reference to chemical. To what extent, in those intervening years, have the Iraqis managed to put together either a small or a large chemical weapons capability, with reference to mustard gas, tabun, sarin, VX? And they obviously have the capacity to produce. To what extent, in the absence of inspections, is there reason to be concerned, and in what quantities?

With reference to biological, there are plenty of dual-use systems that can and are oftentimes used for the production of biological agents, something as simple as fermentation and on through the various laboratories that one could find perhaps on the MIT campus. Certainly on the MIT campus. And the question here is, again, given what was going on way back in 1998 and the capabilities that they probably have had in the interim period, to what extent have they been able to, or do you believe that it's possible that they have developed stabilized and weaponized strains of biological agents.

With reference to nuclear, it's been a few years. There's a pretty rigorous regime in place externally, but the issue of the extent to which, through black market means, 20 to 30 kilograms of highly enriched uranium could have been obtained, or whether centrifuge technologies could have been used, or other technologies used to separate and create fissile materials for weapons programs at home, whether those are, in your view, likely or unlikely, possible or impossible. And if fissile materials are available, to what extent is Iraq capable of fashioning them into an implosion or gun device.

Now, these technical issues-- and they're largely technical issues-- based in part on assessment of the status of Iraqi economic and technical infrastructure, as well as the credibility of external efforts to limit access to critical sources of supply, are obviously only part of the picture. The technical concerns start us in our evening, but obviously it doesn't take us to all the answers.

There's also the issue of what capabilities are-- and when I say tolerable, I don't mean tolerable in the sense of being welcomed, but tolerable in the sense of producing or yielding significant security threats. Zero is a very hard number to defend or justify when you're talking about biological and chemical. And in current context, with an administration that has been focusing oftentimes on terrorism and unconventional threats, to what extent are relatively small quantities of chemical or biological agents something for the United States to fear?

Now, a second big question-- and it's an extremely large question-- centers on the issue of inspections. The alternative-- or one alternative, I should say-- to going to war is to turn to and rely on an updated or modified version of the inspection regime that Scott was part and parcel of back in 1998. And the question, simply put, is how effective will inspection, or would inspection be, with what levels of cooperation on the part of two presidents that may not be entirely enthusiastic about inspections?

Saddam Hussein was not entirely cooperative during your last vacation periods in Iraq, and I daresay that George Bush is not wildly optimistic or enthusiastic about inspections. And this matters, and it matters because the character and the quality of intelligence provided by the US administration might be useful, or critical, in terms of conducting inspections in an effective way. So a second issue, to Scott and to Steve, is really the extent to which inspections present a viable means of addressing and improving US national security.

A third set of issues and concerns really would focus on economic and political instruments. And this is something that isn't much discussed in current context, but we have out there in the real world a variety of programs, some of which are underfunded and neglected, that are designed to try to advance American security not through military means, but through other channels. Nunn-Lugar, for example, is a program that aims at purchasing, buying up, securing black market uranium and plutonium, and thereby limiting access to fissile materials.

There is a sanctions regime in effect. And here, I'm not talking about sanctions against Iraqi water chlorination equipment, but limitations on access to critical military technologies. And so one set of issues or concerns would be the extent to which economic and political instruments might, particularly taken in conjunction with inspection, produce a viable path to limiting or eliminating Iraqi capabilities.

Finally, we turn to the administration's chosen instrument, preventive war and regime change. And let's sit back and examine and talk about this. Let's talk about it and analyze it in terms of upside and downside. What is the best case that they're advancing to us that we hear day after day and week after week, but also what are the downside risks associated with turning, in relatively short order, to a military option? What are the risks to American troops? What are the risk to Israel of potential attack if, in fact, we succeed in pushing Iraq to the wall? What would the Israeli response likely be if they were attacked with chemical or biological agents?

And what are the risks to us of potential terrorist use of small quantities of weapons, in the event that the situation spins out and people's backs are pushed to the wall? Are we talking here potentially about the threat of terrorist use of biological agents as a self-fulfilling prophecy, where the actions that are undertaken by the administration yield the result that they most dread?

And finally, to look beyond the Middle East, to look to the broader structure of American foreign policy, to what extent is this new doctrine of preventive war, which has been advanced with such fervor by the administration, something which is disturbing in terms of the precedents that it sets for US foreign policy? Had we adopted or acted on these precepts or principles toward China, for example, we would have probably launched, or wiped out, elements of China back in the '60s. India might well have destroyed Pakistan. But some discussion, systematic discussion, of what happens. Should preventive war become our doctrine and become accepted as a principle in international relations? Where does that take us?

Again, we're fortunate that we have both Scott, with his experience in inspection, and Steve, with his extensive writings on alliance politics, a key issue in terms of the responses, and on radical and revolutionary regimes, with insights into Iraq, as our panelists this evening. Scott, why don't we begin with you. And we'll go, again, for about 20 to 25 minutes with each, and we'll go for questions and answers afterward.

RITTER: I guess out of a-- not out of any sense of superior, I've been told I need to speak from the podium.

OYE: Well, while you're moving to the podium, if you wish to follow up on this between 10:00 and 11:00 tomorrow, Scott will be appearing on The Connection on WBUR. We should probably make arrangements for Tom and Ray on Car Talk to conduct the interview.

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WALT: Different kind of inspection.

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RITTER: Well first of all, I want to say just how appreciative I am to have the opportunity to be here tonight to speak with you because, as it's all too obvious, we truly live in a very dangerous time, where we are speaking about our country going to war. And you've outlined some extremely important issues that need to be addressed. Let me start off by explaining where I'm coming from as I talk about this.

If you check out my resume, you aren't going to find nuclear physicist, biologist, chemist, or rocket scientist anywhere in that resume. So I seem to be the most unlikely of people to sit here and talk to you today about the technologies of weapons of mass destruction. What you will find is intelligence officer, operator, leader, Marine. That's my perspective. My perspective was going into Iraq and doing a task.

I viewed myself as someone sort like a beat cop, out there on the street implementing and enforcing the law. And this is an important concept, because I think it's going to underscore everything I'm going to talk about tonight, and how I answer every one of your questions that you put forward. Law. Law. Why do we do what we do? Why was I in Iraq to begin with? Because the Security Council passed a resolution saying Iraq can't have weapons of mass destruction. That's why.

Now, what gives the Security Council the authority to pass that resolution? The United Nations charter, of which the United States of America is a signatory. And what makes the United Nations charter so important to us as Americans? Because it's an agreement that we've entered to as a nation, and our Constitution says that, when we enter into an international agreement, into treaties, those agreements carry the force of law here in America.

So I'm coming down to the basic issue here that underscores everything I'm going to talk about-- the Constitution of the United States of America. And it has to play a role in everything we discuss vis-a-vis Iraq. Vis-a-vis Iraq. Now, in 1998, what was the situation? The situation was the international community said Iraq must be disarmed to 100%, that they can have no chemical, biological, nuclear, or long-range ballistic missiles.

Now, by 1998, we had achieved a very advanced degree of disarmament. These aren't my words. These are the words of Rolf Ekéus, the Swedish diplomat who ran the program from 1991 to 1997. He says that, by 1996, Iraq had been fundamentally disarmed, that we had accounted for 95% of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. And this included all the factories that were used to produce weapons of mass destruction, all the associated production equipment, and the vast majority of the product produced.

But the law says 100%. Therefore, fundamental disarmament isn't enough, according to the law. It says 100%, and we have to force that issue. We have to find the unaccounted for material. And that's what I and other inspectors were seeking to do, find out the final disposition of the unaccounted for material.

What was unaccounted for? No weapons factories were unaccounted for, not that we knew of. I mean, you could always throw out the hypothetical of, well, Scott, you say you got them all, but what about the ones you don't know of? That's an important factor. I say we got all the production equipment. Well, Scott, wait a minute, what about the production equipment you didn't know about? That's a good issue. That's a good point.

And I say that we accounted for most of the product produced by these factories, but I just acknowledged there could be factories and production equipment that we didn't know about, so what about the product they produced that you don't know about? Good point. All good points. Now we come to one of the issues talked about. How good are inspections?

How good are the inspections? Especially when you are confronted with the situation that we ran into in Iraq, where the Iraqis made a decision from the very beginning to lie about their weapons capabilities, to fail to declare entire nuclear programs, biological programs, under-declare their chemical programs, under-declare their ballistic missile programs. It made the task of disarming Iraq, already a difficult task from just a basic scientific and technical perspective, extremely difficult, because now we had to go into a nation which was not cooperative, and which was we had to conduct operations in a hostile environment.

And again, this would seem to degrade confidence in what we were able to achieve. But as I told you, I'm not a physicist, a biologist, chemist, rocket scientist. I'm an intelligence officer, and I'm a Marine. And I love challenges like that. And I'll tell you what, all the inspectors that work for the Special Commission, we love challenges like that, too. Our job was to implement the law, to hold Iraq fully accountable to the rule of law as set forth by the Security Council. And that meant that we were going to find out what these capabilities were regardless of Iraq's obstruction. And we prosecuted the case in that manner.

Now, I need to stay right up front that myself and the other inspectors prosecuted the case against Iraq not only in terms of holding Iraq accountable to the law, but ensuring that we ourselves did not deviate from the rule of law in doing our job. I should underscore from the very start that our mission in Iraq revolved around disarming Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear, and long-range ballistic missile capabilities. That's what the law said, resolution 687.

The law also said that economic sanctions imposed on Iraq in August 1990 when they invaded Kuwait, and continued through resolution 687 in April 1991, were linked to-- the lifting of which were linked to Iraq's compliance with its obligation to disarm, that if Iraq was found to be in compliance, these sanctions would be lifted. That's the law. You will not find any law, in terms of a Security Council resolution, that talks about regime removal. You simply will not.

Furthermore, you will find that the concept of regime removal is in itself a violation of international law as set forth by the United Nations charter, which clearly states that no nation has the right to pick the leadership of a sovereign state. That is the sole prerogative of that nation. Regime removal is not part of these resolutions. And yet, from the very beginning, as this beat cop out there doing my job in trying to hold Iraq accountable for the law, our process of investigation was corrupted by the fact that the United States had a policy of regime removal in place from the very beginning.

The United States, a member of the Security Council who passed this resolution, went on record through their then Secretary of State, James Baker, in 1991, who said, even if Iraq complies with its obligation under international law to disarm, economic sanctions will never be lifted until which time Saddam Hussein is removed from power. So from the beginning, we didn't have just obstruction on the part of Iraq, but we had this inherent pollution of the process of investigation imposed by my own country, the United States of America, which said that we don't care what the law says, we're going to hold Iraq accountable to a different standard, a standard that is unilateral in nature, which deviates from the rule of law.

This complicated our process, as well. Imagine me and other inspectors stand before the Iraqis and saying you have to comply, you have to comply. And they said, why? We're damned if we do, damned if we don't. It complicated our task. It complicated the integrity of the process of investigation. But we still did a good job. We broke through the walls of Iraqi deceit. We brought to bear the powers of determination, intelligence, science, and just darn good police work in breaking through and finding out what the Iraqis had.

Let's understand, when we talk about weapons of mass destruction, we're not talking about a magic show. You don't pull a weapon of mass destruction out of thin air like you do a white rabbit out of a black hat at a magic show. It just doesn't work that way. Weapons of mass destruction are a product of science and technology. You don't produce them in a hole in the ground, you don't produce them in a basement. You produce them in an industrial facility. Now, these industrial facilities can be small, they can be big, whatever, but there is science and technology involved.

They have to procure equipment, the Iraqis have to procure equipment. That means there's a trace of this procurement effort. They have to have scientists who work on the equipment. That is also a piece of evidence that can be investigated. What I'm getting at here is that, through the process of a detailed forensic investigation, similar to what a policeman would do at a crime scene, we were very capable of cutting through Iraq's deceit, through their lies.

I'll make a statement of fact. After the summer of 1991, weapons inspections never found a single weapon of mass destruction in Iraq. Never found one. And yet, Scott, you just said you had fundamental disarmament, 95% accountability. We got to where we got in regards to accounting because the Iraqis were compelled to confess, in the same manner that a criminal confesses to a police officer when confronted with overwhelming evidence.

We went to Europe, the nations that sold Iraq this technology. We got the bills of lading, the letters of credit. We got the invoices, and we confronted the Iraqis with these. And they had to confess having capabilities that they had denied having. We confronted them with the inconsistencies in their testimony, when we would interrogate them for hour after hour. We confronted with the inconsistencies until they were compelled to confess. We blanketed Iraq with inspectors equipped with the highest technology, who went forward and collected forensic evidence which was used to confront the Iraqis and compel them to change their story.

In this manner, we got Iraq to admit having a nuclear weapons program, although they said they'd never had one. In this manner, we got Iraq to admit having a biological weapons program, although they said they'd never had one. In this manner, we got Iraq to admit having advanced chemical weapons capability, VX nerve agent, although they said they'd never had one. In this manner, we got Iraq to admit that it had indigenous ballistic missile manufacturing capability, although they said they'd never had one.

Ladies and gentlemen, we did a good job as inspectors. We did a darn good job. Not good enough, though. The law said 100%, and 95% didn't hack it. And at the end of 1998, we were attempting to achieve that final closure on that remaining 5%. But understand what we're talking about here-- unaccounted for material, not retained material. You will not find a single United Nations document pertaining to weapons inspections that says that Iraq retains prohibited capability, or Iraq is known to retain a weapon of mass destruction.

We have documents that say that we cannot account for everything. But because we can't account for it does not automatically translate into retention on the part of Iraq. Big difference. And you mitigate this further when I tell you that, from 1994 to 1998, weapons inspectors in Iraq monitored, with the most intrusive capable on-site inspection regime in the history of arms control, monitored Iraq's industrial infrastructure 24 hours a day, seven days a week with no notice inspections, remote camera, sensors, et cetera. And we never once detected retained prohibited capability or efforts by Iraq to reconstitute.

So we had Iraq pretty much bottled up. There was unaccounted for material, which is of great concern, but we had put an umbrella of monitoring inspections over Iraq, which meant that if they ever tried to do something with this unaccounted material, the likelihood of our detection was quite high. Quite high. And yet, that wasn't good enough.

And the reason why that wasn't good enough, that I come back to the concept of the pollution of the integrity of the process, because the United States didn't care about the disarming of Iraq. The United States cares about the elimination of Saddam Hussein from power, and that the inspection process is only convenient to the United States in so far as it facilitates the containment and destabilization of Saddam Hussein, leading to his removal from power.

But the second the inspection regime starts to come up close to that concept of compliance, it becomes a threat to the United States because compliance means that economic sanctions have to be lifted. Compliance means that containment is broken. Compliance means that Iraq comes back into the fold of the international community with Saddam Hussein still at the helm, which of course is the last thing the United States wants.

So the United States killed the inspection process by using the inspectors to deliberately provoke a crisis that led to the triggering of a military action, Operation Desert Fox, in December 1998, which then went after Saddam Hussein using data collected by the inspectors about the security of Saddam Hussein. We were there to collect data about weapons of mass destruction, not the security of Saddam Hussein.

The American government ordered the inspectors out two days before they began bombing Iraq in December 1998. There's a lot of mythology out there that somehow the Iraqis kicked the inspectors out. Think again. The United States ordered the inspectors out, and Iraq has said the inspectors are not welcome to return. And they haven't been there for four years.

So now comes the question, what has transpired in those four years? I told you there's a lot of concern about unaccounted for capability. Frankly speaking, don't worry about that. For people to point back and talk about Iraq's anthrax capability, and say because we couldn't account for everything in 1991 on they have an anthrax capability today, this is false. Iraq produced liquid bulk anthrax. The factory that produced it was eliminated. And even if they held on to liquid bulk anthrax, within three years it germinates and becomes sludge.

So the only way Iraq could have anthrax today is if it reconstituted a manufacturing base since the time inspectors left, since December 1998. Can they do that? Yes. They have inherent indigenous capability that can be reconfigured to produce small amounts of biological agent. Should we be concerned? Yes. Very concerned.

Chemical weapons. We destroyed the huge Muthanna State Establishment and other chemical facilities that were used to produce chemical weapons. Iraq did not have a capacity in 1998 to produce chemical weapons, thanks to the inspectors. You remove the inspectors, Iraq, in a period of two weeks, can reconstitute a mustard production capability. Iraq, within a period of two months, can reconstitute a sarin and tabun nerve agent production capability. Iraq, within a period of four to six months, can reconstitute a VX nerve agent production capability. Should we be concerned? Yes. Very concerned.

Nuclear weapons, completely different proposition. We eradicated Iraq's ability to enrich uranium. Eradicated it. And for Iraq to reconstitute it would require an investment of time and money and reacquisition of technology that, frankly speaking, cannot be accomplished without detection. That's my assessment. Even if they had acquired this, to actually rebuild it and get it up and functioning again undetected in a manner which would produce highly enriched uranium would take a considerable amount of time. So in terms of an Iraqi nuclear threat and regarding any reacquisition of highly enriched uranium capability, production capability, don't worry about it. Should we be concerned? No. Not at this point in time.

Concerning Iraq's ability to produce a nuclear device minus a fissile core, ladies and gentlemen, they solved that problem. They had that problem solved in 1991, and they have all the means and materials today to build a nuclear device minus the fissile core. So if we're worried about a nuclear weapons capability in Iraq, we should be focused on the concept of fissile material. This is where the Nunn-Lugar issues come up. How could Iraq acquire fissile material? Should we be concerned about it? Absolutely. Absolutely.

Ballistic missiles is another issue. Can Iraq do things to reconstitute a long-range missile force? Yes. Should we be concerned about it? Not too much, because a missile doesn't work unless they test it. And if they test it, we'll find out about it. And to date, no one has detected a test of a long-range ballistic missile. So minimize that concern. But we should be very concerned about a biological, chemical, and nuclear capability in Iraq today. Inspectors haven't been there for four years.

Now the question is, does this concern translate into a cause for war? Do we go to war because we're concerned about Iraq having this capability? I would say to you that, if Iraq continued to refuse to allow inspectors to come in, we would have more reason to be concerned and more reason to consider the prospect of military action to bring to an end this issue of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

But that has all been mooted by the fact that Iraq has recently said we will allow for the unconditional return of inspectors and give them unfettered access. Do I believe they will? No. But it doesn't matter what I believe. They're on the hook. They've committed. And there's not going to be a second chance. This is it. Saddam's used his nine lives.

So now, when I talk about biological weapons, chemical weapons, and nuclear weapons that are of great concern-- and I share this concern-- how do we resolve this issue short of war? And I would put forward that sending inspectors back in, especially given the record of effectiveness that the inspectors had from 1991 to 1998 in disarming Iraq, is the best venue to come to closure on the weapons inspections issues.

We were the best forensic investigators the world has ever seen. If Iraq has done something of a proscribed nature in the four years since inspectors been out, I'll put my reputation on the line to say we'll find it. We'll find trace evidence of it. That they couldn't hide every trace. So let's get inspectors in and give inspectors a chance to do their job, because it does allow us an alternative to war to resolve this issue.

If Saddam Hussein chooses not to cooperate, I think we would be right to presume ill intent, and therefore treat him as a pariah leader at the head of a rogue nation deserving of harsh punishment from the international community. But as someone who wants to prosecute a clean case against a criminal named Saddam Hussein, we cannot prejudge this situation. We must run a clean investigation of Saddam Hussein, and the inspectors are the vehicle, as set forth by international law, to do this. So let the inspectors in. Let them have their chance.

But in addition to Iraq's obligation to disarm, to do what the world community says, to be held accountable to law, we must likewise understand that the previous inspectors had been corrupted. They're bad cops. Can't trust them. Can't trust the inspection process. What are we going to do to ensure that future inspectors don't again deviate off course?

The first thing is to address the issue of regime removal. This American policy of regime removal. What's its legality? What's its viability? How does it damage the issue of arms control? Because if the United States still promotes a policy of regime removal above disarmament, then ladies and gentlemen, I would tell you that the issue isn't Iraq's weapons of mass destruction or any threat coming from their weapons of mass destruction, the issue is rather the ideology behind the concept of regime removal to begin with, an ideology that has been further defined by an American national security strategy document put out last week which talks of unilateralism, American unilateralism.

I would say that Iraq is the case study, the first case study for implementation of this policy of unilateralism. And this has to call into question everything we just talked about, because going to war with Iraq, if it's about the threat posed by Iraq, about the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, then shouldn't we give inspections a chance to resolve that? If we're not willing to give inspections a chance, then why are we talking about going to war? What is the threat posed by Iraq?

These are questions I think have to be asked, have to be addressed, especially when we consider our role as American citizens. And I'll bring up as I close the concept of the Constitution of the United States of America. We are a nation of laws. We are a nation of laws. We the people of the United States cannot sit by while our government implements a policy in our name which operates outside the framework of law. And I'm afraid, right now, in talking about Iraq, that is indeed what the case is. Thank you very much.

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WALT: That was terrific. I feel a little bit sheepish or guilty being here, because this event has been co-sponsored by at least two institutions that I've disappointed in my life. The first is MIT, because MIT first admitted me to graduate school and I went to Berkeley instead, and then the political science department offered me a job, and I went to the University of Chicago instead. The other institution is the Episcopal Church, in which I was raised. And let's just say my attendance for the past 27 years hasn't been very high.

OYE: Amy will be taking this up with you shortly.

WALT: Yeah, Amy can take this up with me later. I'm, despite my misgivings, delighted to be here, because I'm delighted to see people taking this issue as seriously as they are. I think nationwide, and especially in Washington, the absence of real debate on what we're up to as a country has been quite striking, despite the importance of this issue. This is not the sort of decision we should make blindly, that we should stumble into, or that we should be led into by a rather small cabal within the administration. And I want to lay out sort of why I think that it's not a good idea as briefly as I can.

Let me start by just making it clear, you know, my biography, or at least where I come from, I am not a pacifist. In the international relations world, I'm regarded as a realist. I think the world is, in fact, a nasty, dangerous place, and that sometimes using military force, even in large quantities, is justified. So in some circumstances, I think it's the right thing to do. But I don't think it's always the right thing to do, always prudent, and always in our best interest, and it should never be used casually or carelessly.

And let me lay out one other introductory point, and then I'll lay out why I think it's not a good idea in this case. The overarching point I want to make to all of us here is basically an argument about humility. I believe, and I'll say why in a moment why I think a war against Iraq is a very bad idea. But we all ought to start by recognizing we could be wrong about this. War itself is inherently uncertain, and it's possible that a military campaign would go very well.

It's possible the cost would be low for us and for Iraqi society. It's possible that, after such a war, Iraq would stabilize rather quickly, a reasonably effective and just regime might emerge. It's possible that that would trigger reform throughout parts of the Arab world. It's possible that the rest of the world would see this display of American principle and power, and then be even more willing to help us fight terrorism or other things. And it's possible, of course, that this would also hasten the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian struggle on fair terms.

[LAUGHTER]

I can't be certain that all of those things won't happen. It's also possible-- and I mean this sincerely-- it's possible that not acting now could lead to something very bad. It's possible that he might get, say, a nuclear weapon at some point in the future, and then do very bad things with it. So all of those things are possible. But there's a lot of uncertainty about all of those things I just said, and our task as citizens is to use what we know and use our reason to try and figure out what we regard as most likely, what the alternative courses of action are. Reasonable people may disagree about some of these issues, but we all ought to start by recognizing we could be wrong. We don't know.

All right, now having said that, let me lay out my views on why I think it's a bad idea. The debate here is not about whether Saddam Hussein is an evil man, evil leader, or whether Iraq has defied prior UN resolutions. I thought the president's speech in the United Nations was very convincing on both points. He's a bad guy and he's defied the UN. I'm convinced.

But this is not news. Most governments and most people around the world I think probably share that view. Neither point makes him unique. And the real question, the real question before us is whether going to war with Iraq is the best thing to do right now. In other words, is it in our national interest? Will it leave us better off in the future than we are today? Do we have alternatives that look better? I think we do, so I'm going to give you six big reasons why it's a bad idea.

Reason number one. There is no credible evidence of a link between Iraq and al-Qaeda. There have, in the last 48 hours, been a couple of fresh accusations, one from Donald Rumsfeld and one from Condoleezza Rice, suggesting that, in fact, there is a link, we've got the goods now. The timing of this revelation is somewhat suspect.

[LAUGHTER]

And the word that people love to use now is link, right, that there's a link between al-Qaeda and Baghdad. Well, there are links between the United States and every government on the planet. They're called diplomats. They meet all the time, right? Link is a very vague word. What you'd be looking for is deliberate and willful and active cooperation between these two things. And no credible evidence has yet been presented.

I regret to say that governments that want to go to war are often very good at putting things together and fabricating things. And unfortunately, if you look at American history, the American government, Democratic and Republican, are no exceptions there. Governments do lie, or governments convince themselves that they have evidence when they really don't. So no link between Iraq and al-Qaeda. And boy, have they looked for it.

Reason number two. Even if Saddam Hussein had large quantities of weapons of mass destruction, and even if he got a nuclear weapon down the road-- sort of worst case-- he could not use them without triggering massive American or, conceivably, Israeli retaliation. That's why he couldn't use them, as some fear, to intimidate others, or as an umbrella for conventional war. We can defeat any conventional force he could possibly put in the field today. Any threat he might have to escalate, use this handful of weapons he might get would be deterred, of course, by our threat to retaliate. They're still not usable.

And remember, we have a pretty good track record of deterring other murderous tyrants in the past. Joseph Stalin had nuclear weapons. Never did anything with them. People in the United States worried a lot that Mao Tse-tung, a mass murderer, was going to get nuclear weapons. And we even contemplated preventive war in the 1950s and the 1960s worrying about both of those. It turned out that both of those tyrants were deterrable, as well. It's also worth remembering that Saddam Hussein has never used weapons of mass destruction against anyone who could retaliate. He has always used them against people he could be quite confident would not.

So I don't see the big threat there. I don't like the idea of him with nuclear weapons, but I don't consider it a sufficient fear to warrant going to war today. Remember what Bismarck said about preventive war, it's committing suicide for fear of death.

[LAUGHTER]

Reason number three. War with Iraq could trigger serious regional instability, including by creating a power vacuum within Iraq itself, by spilling over into the Kurdish regions in Turkey and Iran. One can invent other scenarios for how instability might spread. And this is, it's important to remember, a major reason why the first Bush administration didn't, quote, go to Baghdad, unquote, in 1991. They understood that that actually might cause us more trouble in the long run than leaving Saddam Hussein in place. As much as we dislike the Iraqi regime, taking it apart could leave us worse off.

Reason number four. We will almost certainly win a war against Iraq, but he does have some options. And those options could make it much more expensive than we think. For example, if he does have any weapons of mass destruction that he's able to use, there's no reason for him not to use them if we've invaded his country with the purpose of overthrowing his regime, and probably killing him in the process. It's the one circumstance where it's quite credible for someone to use weapons of mass destruction. The most likely scenario for any government to use such weaponry would be when it's about to fall, when it's about to collapse. And after all, if he's as much of a bloodthirsty tyrant as we have been led to believe, It's hard to believe he would feel restraint at that moment.

Second point is he has some military options even at the conventional level. And I'm not sure what he's planning, but one obvious possibility is simply take the troops that might be loyal to him-- and there's good reason to believe that some of them would be-- put them in Baghdad, and say, no one goes out and no one comes in without a fight.

That gives the United States some interesting options. We can bomb Baghdad and let that be watched worldwide on Al Jazeera and CNN. We can starve out the population and let that get watched worldwide. Or we can go in and wage urban combat, which is very difficult, even for a military as competent as ours is, and of course tends to kill a lot of civilians if they're in the neighborhood, as well.

Would he do it? I don't see why he wouldn't. Now again, we may have some clever strategy we've worked out to defeat that problem. I'm only suggesting here is he does have military options he might be able to use that would complicate our efforts considerably. Oh, and by the way, remember we've sort of sacrificed the element of surprise here.

[LAUGHTER]

Which means he's had a lot of time to get ready and consider possibilities. Reason number five. Once we win, we have no exit strategy. Everybody remember how long we were going to be in Bosnia? 12 months. Oh, I'm sorry 18 months. That was six years ago. And Bosnia is a very small country, when you think about it.

Iraq has a history of instability, beginning prior to the revolution there in 1958, then a series of coups and revolts from 1958 to 1970. The Gulf War itself, once we had blown away part of his ruling apparatus, was accompanied by lots of internecine fighting between different groups within Iraq. Civil society in Iraq has been largely decimated by his rule.

And as I think we should be learning in places like Bosnia, Afghanistan, and a number of other places, it's much easier to get into these places than it is to get out, and putting societies back together after a war or after large periods of dictatorship when there are deep divisions within the society, on both ethnic and religious lines, is not easy. Furthermore, this is just not a society we understand particularly well. So the belief that we can blow the regime apart and then design a government that will work or pick the people that are likely to lead it well I think is overly optimistic.

One final point on this. Our presence in this part of the world helped create al-Qaeda in the first place. And do we really want to increase the long-term American military presence in large chunks of the Arab and Islamic world? My view would not if we can help it. And that leads me to reason number six. A war on Iraq will distract us from the more serious challenge of al-Qaeda.