Technology Day 1995 - "War, Technology, Peace and Change"

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[MUSIC PLAYING]

GRAY: Good morning.

[APPLAUSE]

I'm Paul Gray, chairman of the Institute's governing board, and it is my privilege and pleasure to welcome all of you to this 1995 Technology Day. Before I begin the introductions, however, there's a question I want to put to all of you, or at least to all of you who were at Symphony Hall last night. Wasn't that an evening, huh?

[APPLAUSE]

We have displayed here on the stage, or we had a moment ago, the photographs of Jay Stratton and Jerry Wiesner. And you will have noticed that this Technology Day program is dedicated to the memory of Jay and Jerry, both of whom passed away in this last year, and both of whom were deeply involved throughout their lives with MIT, and in particular with that effort that is the focus of our activities this morning, the Second World War at this institution. And it seemed appropriate for the committee to make that dedication.

The Technology Day program this morning focuses on World War II and MIT. The Institute played important roles in the war effort, and it was profoundly and irreversibly changed by the war, as was the whole fabric of American society. In this morning's program, 50 years, give or take a month or two, from the end of the war, we reflect on the origins of that conflict, on the Institute during the war years, and on the continuing influence of the World War II experience on society, on this nation's universities, and on this special place.

Our principal and keynote speaker this morning is a distinguished biographer and historian whose work has illuminated the American political scene in the 20th century. Doris Kearns Goodwin earned her PhD in government at Harvard, where she was a Woodrow Wilson fellow, and where she served as professor of government for 10 years. In the 1960s, she served as assistant to President Lyndon Johnson, whom she assisted in the preparation of his memoirs.

In the last 18 years, she has published three important, highly acclaimed big books, each of which became a bestseller. In 1976, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream. In 1987, The Fitzgeralds and the Kennedys. And most recently, in 1994, No Ordinary Time-- Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt, the American Home Front During World War II. For this most recent book, she was awarded just a few months ago the 1995 Pulitzer Prize for history.

Dr. Goodwin appears frequently in public affairs programs on television, and has made appearances in documentaries for PBS concerning LBJ, the Kennedy family, FDR, and, as a measure of her breadth, Ken Burns' series on the history of baseball.

[LAUGHTER]

Dr. Goodwin is eminently qualified to put World War II in perspective for us at the outset of this morning's program. Please join me in welcoming Doris Kearns Goodwin to MIT.

[APPLAUSE]

GOODWIN: Thank you.

[APPLAUSE]

Let me say before I begin that it has been my great privilege in these last few months to have two loves of mine come together at the same time. First, more obviously, my love of baseball, reflected in this 18-hour history of baseball that Ken Burns put on the air where he needed an irrational female fan, so he kept showing me over and over again, so that when my book on Franklin and Eleanor came out at the same time, embarrassingly, it took me more years to write the book than it took the war about which it was written to be fought. It did finally come out at the same time, but more people have asked me about baseball than about Franklin and Eleanor as I've wandered around the country.

However, these two loves are not really as separate as they might seem, for I often root my love of history to the day when my father bought me my first big red score book when I was only six years old, and taught me that mysterious and wonderful art of keeping score play by play, inning by inning while he was at work during the day so that, when he came home at night, I could record for him the history of that day's Brooklyn Dodgers game.

And when you're only six or seven and your father thinks you're doing OK as an historian, it's a great impetus to do it later in life. He made it even more magical for me, for he never told me that all of this was actually described in the newspapers the next day. So I thought, without me, he would never know what happened to our beloved Brooklyn Dodgers.

But to the main story at hand, it seems to me that the story of the homefront in World War II is really the story of the transformation of a nation, a nation whose economy in 1939 and 1940 was still paralyzed in depression, with 17% unemployment, a nation in which only one out of four Americans graduated from high school, one in 20 completed college, in which the average worker earned less than $1,000 a year and the majority of citizens lived in small towns stratified along class and ethnic lines.

It is the story of an army which, in 1940, stood only 18th in the world, trailing not only Germany, Britain, and France, but also Belgium, Spain, and Holland, of a military establishment that possessed only 400 combat planes, a mere one-day supply in the current European war, and almost no modern tanks, weapons, or guns.

And yet, following the fall of Western Europe to Nazi Germany, and then the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Franklin Roosevelt was able to mobilize the American people to work together for a common cause against a common enemy, forging an unparalleled partnership between government and business, which provided generous loans and incentives to build new factories to produce the weapons and the planes and the tanks, which stimulated 15 million Americans to leave their hometowns and to congregate where the war plants were in the north and in the west, so that somehow, one year after Pearl Harbor, this democracy was so mobilized that America had not only caught up to Nazi Germany, but was outproducing also the Axis powers combined and all the Allied powers combined, so that our weapons were being used by our allies in all the corners of the world.

It is also the story of the forgotten years of the civil rights revolution, a watershed experience in which the seeds of the protest movements of the succeeding decades were sown. And it is the story of more than 19 million women who poured into factory jobs during the war previously held by men, performing beyond everyone's expectations as truck drivers, welders, riveters, and stevedores, creating new expectations and new problems that would ultimately set the stage for the women's movement in the decades ahead. And it is the story of the GI Bill of Rights, which carried more than two million veterans into college after the war, so much so that 50% of the college enrollment was veterans in the late '40s, transforming higher education, research institutions, and lifting the educational horizons of an entire generation.

It is this story I wish to tell you today, using as my vehicle the remarkable relationship between Franklin Roosevelt and his wife, Eleanor, during the war, hoping that this personal narrative will bring you the larger story of the homefront and bring it to life. Let me say at the outset that, if I have to point to one quality of Franklin Roosevelt's that made and shaped his leadership of the homefront during the war, it would be his absolute confidence in himself, in his country, and in the democratic system of government.

Even in the grimmest days of 1940, after France fell to Germany and England stood alone, Roosevelt had absolutely no doubt that, once the dormant energies of democracy were mobilized, the US would fully meet the German threat, that the uncoerced energy of a free people would inevitably outperform a totalitarian regime. It was this confidence that allowed him to ship our limited supplies to England when England stood alone against Germany, and it was this confidence that allowed him to invest more than $2 billion in a theoretical enterprise to build the atomic bomb.

And more importantly, he was able to communicate his confidence and faith to the American people, helping to energize a massive shift to a wartime economy, and helping to bring about the commitment of the American citizens to working three shifts, 24 hours a day, to produce the unimaginable quantities of weapons that eventually did win the war.

He helped to create the dedication of scientists and researchers and universities like this to produce the groundbreaking discoveries that improved radar, created large-scale production of penicillin, developed plasma, proximity fuses, and the jet engines. His strength came, in my judgment, in leading the people step by step, never getting too far ahead of them, but always moving them forward little by little toward his goals.

And in shaping public opinion, he understood intuitively the importance of rationing his appearances, something our current political leaders seem not to have understood, in order to guarantee and guard the dignity of the office and to ensure that each appearance has a dramatic effect. Thus, he limited his celebrated fireside chats to only two or three a year, only 30 in the entire 12 years of his presidency.

And the result was, as Saul Bellow describes in a recent memoir, he would describe walking down a Chicago street in the middle of the war when one of Roosevelt's rare fireside chats was on the air. He said that every single car had pulled over to the curb to listen, every single house had it on, and you could see inside the windows people sitting in their living rooms, in their kitchen with their radios before them.

He said that it was such a moment that you felt not only connected to Roosevelt's voice, and he said you could keep walking down the street and not miss a word of what he was saying because everyone was listening, but you felt connected to everyone else in the country because you realized they, too, were experiencing that same moment. And when a leader is able to create that sense of connection between the fellow Americans, it's probably the greatest strength that leader has.

I think my favorite Roosevelt fireside chat took place in February of 1942, when we were at one of the lowest depths of the war, several months after Pearl Harbor, losing battles in the Pacific. He asked everyone in the country before he gave his address to get a map out so that they could follow the progress of the war in this far-flung place. Well, suddenly, there was this huge run on maps all across the country, so much so that the New York Times interviewed the guy who ran C.S. Hammond's map store in New York. And he had been there for 25 years. He said he had never sold so many maps in his whole time that he was there. And then he added this wonderful comment, he said, even my wife of 25 years, who hates maps, asked me to bring a map home.

So then I started thinking, what kind of a marriage did these two people have? This is when you go off the track as a biographer. But nevertheless, she's sitting there at the kitchen table like everyone else, listening to Roosevelt talk very soberly about why it will take many months before the tide of the war will turn, explaining to them what the battles are that are going on in the Pacific.

But then he calls on American history to give strength and confidence to the American people. He recalls what it was like for Washington in the winters at Valley Forge, what it was like for the pioneers going over the Rocky Mountains, what it was like in the early days of the Civil War. And he's so certain that democracy will win out over the totalitarian powers that his speech produces thousands of telegrams at the end, telling him that he has to go on the air every day. It's the only way morale will be sustained. But he writes back saying, intuitively understanding, if my speeches ever become routine, they will lose their effectiveness. So he understood that prestige and that majesty, in a sense, of the presidency, and how to time his appearances when they were absolutely necessary.

Indeed, Winston Churchill, the incomparable leader himself of England, fully comprehended the importance of Roosevelt's confidence in mobilizing his people. Churchill once said to encounter Roosevelt for the first time, with all his buoyant sparkle, his iridescent personality, and his sublime confidence was like opening your first bottle of champagne.

Now, this was an extraordinary comment coming from a man long accustomed himself to being the center of attention, but Churchill had come to know and admire Roosevelt greatly, having spent weeks and even months at a time actually living in the White House, spending his time in a room diagonally across from Roosevelt's bedroom, bringing his valets, his stewards, and his habits with him, which included starting to drink early in the morning wine, moving to Scotch and whiskey in the middle of the day and the afternoon, and ending up at brandy before he went to bed at night, and somehow saving England in the process of all this.

He indeed became part of an intimate circle of friends who lived in those small family quarters of the White House with the Roosevelts during the war, including Franklin's secretary, Missy LeHand, who really was, in many ways, his other wife when Eleanor traveled, Franklin's closest advisor and friend, Harry Hopkins, who occupied a bedroom right next to his, Eleanor's closest friend, Lorena Hickok, who helped her to become the First Lady that she was, and lived in a bedroom next to Eleanor's study, Franklin's mother, Sarah, who occupied the best guest suite whenever she arrived, and of course Winston Churchill.

I found myself so intrigued by all these wonderful characters living in such close quarters that I kept imagining the fabulous conversations they must have had at night, and wished so often that I could just see those family quarters, to picture who had lived where 50 years ago. I happened to mention this on a radio program in Washington one night, which Hillary Clinton heard. So she called me up at the radio station and invited me to sleep overnight in the White House so that we could figure out where everybody had slept 50 years ago.

So I had this wonderful night in the White House where, after a state dinner, my husband and I wandered through the rooms with President and Mrs. Clinton, and figured out every single place where everyone had been. And the best part of all was that we realized we were staying in Winston Churchill's bedroom. So there was no way I could sleep that night. I just kept picturing Winston Churchill behind me the whole time.

In fact, one of my favorite stories of the war took place in that very bedroom. In January of 1942, when Churchill was staying there, he and Roosevelt were set to sign a document later that afternoon putting the associated nations, 23 of them, against the Axis powers. But no one liked the word associated nations because it had no rhythm or ring. So early that morning, Roosevelt came up with the idea that he was so excited about to call themselves United Nations, which of course it became.

So he had himself wheeled into Churchill's bedroom to tell him the news, but Churchill had just stepped forth from the tub with absolutely nothing on. So Roosevelt said, I'm so sorry, I'll come back in a few minutes. But Churchill, with that amazing ability to speak spontaneously, said, oh, no, the prime minister of Great Britain has nothing to hide from the president of the United States.

[LAUGHTER]

[APPLAUSE]

So somehow, while Roosevelt describes United Nations, Churchill thinks it's a great idea. He then quotes in full memory from a poem by Lord Byron where the term United Nations was used. So whenever I got into the tub that night, then Churchill was really there.

[LAUGHTER]

Indeed, I believe through all the turmoil of the worst days of the war, a central quality of Roosevelt's character was his capacity to relax with his friends and associates, to cast off his worries and simply enjoy himself, thus replenishing his energies to face the struggles of the following day. Every night, he had the same ritual. He had a cocktail hour with his associates on that second floor, and the rule was you were not allowed to talk about politics. You could talk gossip, you could tell who was involved with whom, you could discuss movies and Hollywood, anything but politics.

When Eleanor was away, his secretary Missy LeHand presided. She listened adoringly to the same old stories and jokes he liked to tell over and over again. When Eleanor did come, she somehow couldn't help herself but bring up slum clearance or civil rights, but most of the time the rules prevailed. And then if he were anxious during the day, Missy would arrange a poker game at night with his cabinet, which he loved to relax, and could again forget the cares of state.

One of my favorite stories is he had an annual poker game on the night that Congress was set to adjourn. And the rule was that whenever the Speaker of the House called to say they were adjourning, whoever was ahead at that moment would win the poker game. On one particular night, he was playing with Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau and several others. And at 9:30, when the Speaker called to say they were adjourning, Morgenthau that was way, way ahead of Roosevelt, so Roosevelt took the phone and just pretended it was someone else on the phone.

So they kept playing, and they kept playing, until midnight when finally Roosevelt pulled ahead, so he asked the aide to bring him the phone immediately. Oh, Mr. Speaker, you're adjourning, that's fine. He brings all the chips, he wins all the money. Everything's great until the next morning, when Morgenthau reads in the newspaper that the Congress had adjourned at 9:30. They said that he was so angry that he actually resigned his post as cabinet member until, of course, Roosevelt cajoled him into staying.

Roosevelt was also able to relax with movies. He loved adventure movies and mystery movies. Again, when Eleanor did choose the movies, it would somehow become The Grapes of Wrath or a documentary on civil rights. And he could relax on long fishing trips in the middle of the war, 10-day fishing trips when he could be out of touch with people. It was on one of these fishing trips, in fact, when, in the midst of Britain's financial crisis, through the solitude and the time, his creative juices came to fruition, and he was able to come up with a brilliant idea of Lend-Lease.

And then, from his home in Hyde Park, where he went 200 times during his presidency, he received the enormous solace of just remembering a root, a place where he had known since he was a child, all of which allowed him, I think, to make the presidency not a burden, as so many other leaders have found it, but rather a continual source of vitality.

And even more importantly, in some ways, this peace, this equanimity that he felt within himself freed up resources, psychic resources, that allowed him to be extremely receptive to the needs of others. He had, the British philosopher Isaiah Berlin once suggested, an exceptionally sensitive awareness, conscious or subconscious, of the desires, the hopes, the fears, the loves, the hatreds of the human beings who composed his democracy. This uncanny awareness, Berlin argued, was the source of Roosevelt's genius. It was almost as if the inner currents, the tremors of human society were registering themselves within his nervous system with a kind of seismological accuracy.

Now, where this uncanny knowledge came from is partly a mystery. As a child, his mother, Sarah, claimed Roosevelt was remarkably intuitive, able to anticipate the desires of his parents even before he was told what to do, able to sense the tensions in the family when his father became an invalid, knowing exactly how to respond. Then, too, his bout with polio undoubtedly made him even more aware of what other people were thinking and feeling, ever determined to make sure that no one felt pity for him.

The polio produced a plowing up of his nature, Frances Perkins, his Labor Secretary, once said. He became much more patient, more tolerant, more warm-hearted, more empathetic to others for whom fate had also dealt an unkind hand. But I think Franklin Roosevelt would be the first to admit that, beyond his intuition and beyond his experience of polio, his extraordinary knowledge of the hopes and the fears and the needs of the American people came as a result of his wife Eleanor's remarkable ramblings around the country, for she was, as he said over and over again after his polio, his eyes and his ears.

Their partnership was indeed unparalleled. She was the first First Lady to travel the country from one end to the other, serving as a voice for people without power, for poor, for migrant workers, for blacks, for women, the first to testify before a congressional committee, the first to write a syndicated column, and the first to hold regular press conferences where she made a simple rule that only female reporters could cover her press conferences, which meant that every newspaper in the country had to hire usually its first female reporter.

[LAUGHTER]

[APPLAUSE]

Now, this partnership was all the more remarkable when one realizes that it was born in the pain of Eleanor's discovery in 1918 that Franklin was having an affair with a young woman named Lucy Mercer. When Eleanor came upon a packet of love letters Lucy had written to her husband, she said that the bottom dropped out of her world. She offered him a divorce at once, but after long discussions, they agreed to stay together. He promised he would never see Lucy Mercer again. And more importantly, this catastrophe in their married life reconstituted the marriage, giving Eleanor the freedom to go outside the marriage to find fulfillment.

She became involved in teaching and settlement housework. She got close to a group of women activists who taught her that she had a whole range of talent she had never known before, for public speaking, for organizing, for articulating a cause. And then her activism became critical when he contracted polio three years later and had to spend weeks and months at a time at Warm Springs, Georgia, desperately trying to walk on his own power again.

She kept his political hopes alive by going from one meeting to the other so that, when he came back and won the governorship, she was there. And then when he became president, her travels multiplied. She traveled 200 days a year, so much so that the Washington Post once had a headline, "Eleanor spends night in White House," exclamation point. Visiting southern blacks, migrant workers, CCC camps, bringing him back an honest appraisal of which of his programs were working and which were failing, the kind of evaluation that leaders rarely get.

Then the war came along and threatened this partnership, which had worked so brilliantly during the Depression, for now the president was spending more and more time with military men, with businessmen, with conservatives, with southern congressmen, and Eleanor felt that she had lost her partner, and in so doing lost her sense of self.

She cycled into one of her periodic depressions, coming out of it only when she realized there was still a critical fight to be fought to try and make the war a vehicle for social reform at home so that, when the soldiers came home at the end of the war, the country would be a more socially just place. It meant she had to become an agitator, often working at cross purposes with her husband, for his sole concern was to win the war. She had to be relentless, often a pest, but he understood the importance of what she was pushing him to do, and his presidency was immeasurably enriched as a result.

Nowhere was her influence greater than on civil rights. At the start of the war, blacks were openly discriminated against in the factories. But through the combination of A. Philip Randolph threatening a march on Washington and Eleanor's negotiations, Franklin Roosevelt agreed to create the first Fair Employment Practice Commission with sanctions to force companies to open their doors to blacks. And by the end of the war, more than two million blacks had jobs at all levels of skills in factories they never would have had before.

I was able to interview one of these men, who became the first black motorman in the Philadelphia mass transit system. And he told me he had scored 95 on the test, and he was so excited his first morning on the job he got to the station, to the bus station, early, but there were no buses running, no trolleys, no trains, no subways. He didn't know what had happened. He went home to discover that the 10,000 white workers had all gone on strike because he, the first black man, was coming to work that day.

So the strike went on for four days, paralyzing Philadelphia's war production system, until finally Roosevelt took decisive action. He issued a very simple statement. He told the striking workers, if they did not come back to work on Monday, they would all be drafted on Tuesday morning. They came back to work. And on Tuesday morning, William Barber became the first black motorman in Philadelphia.

So, too, in the military. Whereas at the start of the war blacks were serving in the lowest level jobs in the Army and the Navy, by the end, through the combination of the growing civil rights movement and Eleanor's agitation, they were serving in every branch of the Army and Navy, as pilots, tank men, doctors, paratroopers, and the number of black officers had grown from five in 1940 to over 7,000 in 1945.

It took so many memos on Eleanor's part on civil rights to poor General Marshall in the War Department, who was trying to create an army, that he finally had to create a separate general just to deal with Eleanor Roosevelt's communications. But her pressure worked. And in many ways, it seems to me that her contributions on civil rights are some of the most affirming moments in the history of the homefront.

But she was also far ahead of her time in championing the movement of women into the factories during the war. Through her speeches and her columns, she countered the early resistance on the part of factory owners to employing women. They never thought the women could operate these complicated machines. They thought women would disrupt the camaraderie at the factory. But once more and more men went off to the war, they had to turn to women. And eventually, by the middle of the war, 50% and 60% of the shipyards and the factories that were making the planes, the jobs were held by women.

And the amazing thing was the productivity went way up. So these factory owners had to do a big study to figure out how it had happened that women had been able to learn to operate these complicated machines. And I love the answer that came back on one of the studies. They said it was very simple. When a woman was asked to operate a new piece of machinery, unlike a man, she would ask directions.

[LAUGHTER]

[APPLAUSE]

I think any of us who have ever driven endlessly around without directions being asked know what that's about. Well then, once Eleanor saw the importance of women to the war effort, it was she who convinced government and business to create a full-fledged partnership to create daycare centers operating 24 hours a day, almost like a Head Start program for the children during that period of time. They worked out a situation where, if you worked a day shift, a hot meal was waiting for you at the end of the day to bring home to your family, all of which allowed that productivity to continue unmatched, and was an example of the unparalleled partnership of Franklin and Eleanor.

Now, to be sure, Roosevelt's sensitive antennae, in part helped by Eleanor, produced occasional problems. So skillful was he in sensing what other people wanted him to say that he often made people feel he was agreeing with them and what they were saying when he really wasn't agreeing at all. Perhaps in the long run, one disillusioned aide said fewer friends would have been lost by bluntness than by the misunderstandings that arose from his engaging and charming ambiguity.

Moreover, so desirous was he of making other people like him that he was unable to fire anyone, neither his isolationist Secretary of War Henry Woodring until the crisis finally occurred in Western Europe, nor his drunken valet who was supposed to help him every morning out of bed into the bathroom, nor the dramatic housekeeper who refused to prepare the meals for him that he liked, saying that she knew better what was good for him.

One must also concede more serious failures of perception and vision that led to his forcible relocation of the Japanese-Americans and the lack of a more decisive response to the extermination of the European Jews. And yet, in the end, I believe Roosevelt's strengths far outweighed his weaknesses. Despite clashing interests and disparate goals, he kept the American people moving forward together through the two greatest crises of this century, first the Depression, and then the war. And always he kept his strength on the side of freedom and his trust in the uncoerced energy of the ordinary citizen.

Through the whole of Franklin's career, Eleanor once said, despite maneuvering and flexibility and some deviousness, there was never any deviation from his original objective to make life better for the average man, woman, and child. Indeed, it was Eleanor's abiding love and deep respect for Roosevelt's great strengths as a leader that allowed her, in the months after his death, to come to terms with the deep hurts in their personal relationship.

During the war, Roosevelt had suffered a series of losses. His secretary, Missy LeHand, though she was only in her early 40s, suffered a devastating stroke, and was never able to speak intelligibly again. Three months later, his mother, Sarah, died at Hyde Park. At that point, he turned to Eleanor and asked her essentially to stay home and stop traveling. He needed her even more as a companion than as a political partner.

It's one of those moments when, as a biographer, you want to reach back in time and say, Eleanor, just do it. I know that you love him and I know he loves you, and I know he won't live much longer. But I understand fully why she couldn't make that commitment. She'd been so hurt so many years before, and had built up slowly a sense of herself in the outside world that she couldn't give up.

So she started traveling more and more, and in his loneliness, he finally brought their eldest daughter, Anna, in to take Missy's place as his hostess in the White House when Eleanor was away. It became complicated for, when Eleanor would return from her trips, sometimes she would feel displaced by her own daughter, with whom she'd been very close. She had confided in Anna early on the story of Lucy Mercer, and Anna had strongly taken her mother's side. But now, in many ways, Anna was now becoming her father's daughter.

Everything got more complicated in that last year of Roosevelt's life, when, in spring of 1944, he was diagnosed with congestive heart failure. He was sent to Bernard [? Baruch's ?] plantation to recuperate for a month, and it was there essentially that he saw Lucy Mercer for the first time since 1918. She'd married a very wealthy older man named Winthrop Rutherfurd, lived in South Carolina not far from [? Baruch's ?] plantation, and Rutherfurd had just died several months before that.

I'm convinced that, in seeing Lucy at this point, it was simply a friendship in his life. It may have rekindled him a memory of what it was like when he was young, before his polio, a memory of what it was like when his body was strong, before the heart disease that was now deteriorating him day by day. But he didn't trust that Eleanor would understand that it was simply a friendship, and must have remembered the pledge that he had made so many years before.

So he realized the only way he could see Lucy regularly would be to have her come to the White House when Eleanor was away. And the only person he trusted with that delicate task was his daughter, Anna. You can imagine the dilemma that Anna found herself in, knowing what it would mean to her mother if she ever found out. But Anna could see that her father was dying in a way that Eleanor never did, and as a result Anna made the decision to allow Lucy to come to the White House six times in that last year of Roosevelt's life, always having dinner with Roosevelt.

And I've checked, and Eleanor was doing what she wanted to at that period of time. She was with women when they won awards for excellence in the factory, with civil rights leaders when the laws came down desegregating the [? PX's ?] in the Army camp. So it all might have worked out with no one being hurt but for the fact that Lucy happened to be in Warm Springs, Georgia when Franklin died.

She knew enough to leave, but when Eleanor flew down later that night, a spinster cousin who was there and always been jealous of Eleanor, always loved Franklin, when asked to describe what had happened in that last day, as you would do at a moment of death, told her that Lucy had been there. And even more, that Lucy had been at the White House many times that last year, and that her daughter Anna had been the one to make those visits possible.

I can't even imagine the dignity that Eleanor was able to muster within herself that allowed her to go with her husband's body on the famous train trip from Warm Springs to Washington DC, never letting the world know the hurt she must have been feeling inside. When she got to the White House, she confronted Anna. All that Anna could say was I didn't know what to do, I loved you both so much and felt caught in a crossfire. And Anna later said her mother was so angry with her that she was sure that their relationship had been destroyed forever.

But then, in the summer of 1945, after his death in April, something happened in Eleanor's heart, as she began traveling the country again. For everywhere she went, people-- porters, taxi drivers, elevator operators-- told her how much they loved her husband, how much better their lives were as a result of his leadership. Blacks shared with her a sense of the mastery of the jobs that they had felt, the pride and the courage they took in the battlefield. Women talked of the new independence they had found during the war, the pleasure and the sociability of the workplace, the feeling of accomplishment.

Though the factories were already firing women to make room for the returning men, though the daycare centers were being shut down unceremoniously as the war was drawing to a close, there had been a permanent shifting away from the women's consciousness, a powerful turning point in the history of women. Work had proved liberating, a new consciousness had been formed, and there would be no going back.

She talked to veterans who were going to college on the GI Bill of Rights, where, despite overcrowding in housing and classrooms, they were determined to make the most of their most extraordinary opportunity. She talked to laborers who took pride in the fact that unions were stronger at the end of the war than ever before, despite Roosevelt's partnership with business that had so worried Eleanor at the start of the war. She'd been fighting him on so many fronts during the war that she had lost sight of the larger picture, but now she realized that the war had indeed become a vehicle for social reform in more ways than she ever could have imagined.

The small-town America where people clung to their roots, immobilized within their ethnic and income class, had passed into history. Between the 50 million Americans who had moved to a different part of the country to find work and the 12 million more who entered the armed forces, more than 20% of the population had participated in what became known as the Great Migration. And the habit of mobility, which would prove both liberating and fragmenting, had become ingrained.

No segment of American society had been left untouched. More than 17 million new jobs had been created. Industrial production had gone up 100%. Corporate profits had doubled. And the GNP had jumped from 100 billion to 215 billion. The society of a few haves and a multitude of have nots had been transformed. A redistribution of income had produced a genuine middle class for the first time. Moreover, the pent-up demand, desire matched by money, would fuel a postwar boom that would expand that middle class still further.

And the American economy had not been merely revitalized, it had been altered. A revised social contract had been defined between government and the business community, a new partnership like the new partnership between the government and the universities that would alter the face of the country in the decades ahead.

As Eleanor began to absorb the extent of all these changes, she began to feel, she later said, in a somewhat romantic image, as if a giant transference of energy had taken place, that at the start of the war Roosevelt was strong and productive and vital, and the country was weak, unprepared, and isolationist. But by the end, through his projection of his energy onto the country, the country had gotten stronger and stronger, while he was drained of energy and got weaker and weaker. And finally, he had died, but the country had emerged stronger and more socially just than ever before.

As she listened to the emotion in the voices of all the people who talked with her about what he had done for them, she was able to reach within herself and to forgive him fully for resuming that friendship with Lucy in the last year of his life. And then, just as the war came to an end, after six long years of struggle, to go to her daughter Anna and forgive her, as well, affording a reconciliation between mother and daughter that re-established a close relationship between the two women that lasted for the rest of their lives.

So in conclusion, as I look at this complex story of the American homefront during the war, I can only say I feel empathy for both Franklin and Eleanor. I'm absolutely convinced they never meant to hurt one another. They were simply trying to get through their lives with the best possible mixture of respect and affection through friendship, work, and love. Sure, it is possible to look from the outside in, as the media would immediately do today, and accuse Roosevelt of infidelity for resuming his friendship with Lucy, accuse him perhaps even of harassment for his close relationship with his secretary Missy LeHand, and accuse the daughter Anna of betrayal of her mother.

But every one of those labels, in my judgment, would totally miss the mark of trying to understand the lives of these large individuals. For in the end, I believe the real challenge of history is to resist the tendency so prevalent today to label, to stereotype, to expose, to denigrate, and instead to bring common sense and empathy to our subjects so that the past can truly come alive, if only for a few moments, in all of its beauty, glory, sadness, and complexity. I thank you so very much.

[APPLAUSE]

GRAY: Doris, thank you so much for that wonderfully insightful portrait of America and of American leadership during the war. Your comments, particularly on the way in which the war and the leadership provided by the Roosevelts changed the social assumptions for blacks and women, I think are particularly important for us to understand. And I hope that many people, including many in the media, listen to your plea at the end to step away from the stereotypes and to express empathy and understanding for those in leadership positions in our nation.

One wonders what the world of 1995 would be like had not Franklin Roosevelt been in the White House in the 1940s, and had not Winston Churchill been at 10 Downing Street. I suspect, Doris, that, as there was a run on maps in February of 1942, there will soon be a run on No Ordinary Time in June of 1995.

[APPLAUSE]

I will now introduce the next four speakers, after which we will proceed without interruption or without further words from me. Because all four are familiar figures at the Institute, I shall be brief in these introductions.

Now, early publicity for this program, including particularly the poster that many of you have seen, indicated that Sheila E. Widnall, Secretary of the Air Force and professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics at MIT, on leave, would be a participant. Unfortunately, the gnomes in the Pentagon concluded that her appearance would somehow constitute a conflict of interest. How that can be devised is beyond me, but in any case, Sheila had no choice but to withdraw. That withdrawal saddened her fully as much as it did all of us who were involved in planning this program.

Our next speaker, Robert C. Seamans Jr., has been associated with MIT for more than 50 years. He earned two degrees from the Institute, a master's degree in aeronautics in 1942 and an [? SCD, ?] a doctor of science, in instrumentation in 1951. During the next 40 years, he shuttled back and forth between Cambridge and Washington. I list just some of his activities in that time.

Deputy administrator of NASA during that key time in which NASA was so involved in the Apollo program. Hunsaker Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics at MIT. Secretary of the Air Force. President of the National Academy of Engineering. First administrator of the Energy Research and Development Agency, which became later the Department of Energy. The [? Lutz ?] Professor of Environment and Public Policy at MIT. Dean of Engineering at MIT. And now, senior lecturer in Aeronautics and Astronautics here. Bob will speak from his personal experience about MIT during the war years.

Now, the speaker following Bob, who will comment on the ways in which the war influenced the Institute, deserves no introduction.

[LAUGHTER]

The third speaker--

[LAUGHTER]

--the third speaker is Lester C. Thurow, Jerome and Dorothy Lemelson Professor of Management and Economics here, dean of the Sloan School of Management from 1987 to 1993, and, as Lester would put it, economics educator. Following his graduation from Williams College in 1960, Lester went to Oxford as a Rhodes scholar, and earned his PhD in economics at Harvard in 1964. After serving a term as a member of the staff of President Lyndon Johnson's Council of Economic Advisers, he taught at Harvard in economics, before coming to MIT to join our faculty in 1968.

Lester is a prolific author, and his four books have received very wide attention. His most recent book, Head to Head-- The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe, and America, published in 1992, describes what Americans must do to regain competitiveness in the world economy. Lester has been on leave from MIT this last year, and it would surprise me if there's not another book in the works. He writes a regular column for the Boston Globe. Lester will speak today about the economic impact of the war on American society.

Our fourth and final speaker is Charles Vest, who needs practically no introduction to this group of loyal alumni and friends. Chuck is a graduate in mechanical engineering from West Virginia University and the University of Michigan, where he served as Dean of Engineering and later as Provost and Vice President for Academic Affairs, before he was called to come to Cambridge in the summer of 1990 to assume the Institute's presidency. Chuck is the 15th president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He will reflect this morning on the future of relationships between the federal government and this nation's universities, relationships forged largely out of the cauldron of the war. It is now my pleasure to invite Bob Seamans to the lectern.

[APPLAUSE]

- Good morning.

- Good morning.

- While I move the podium up, I would like to say that I'm very much in debt to the MIT museum for going through reams and reams of cartons and notebooks and loose photographs in order to come up with the material that I'm going to use here this morning. I should also note that, when you look at these slides, they'll seem rather drab. And of course, you have to realize that, back in the early '40s, Kodachrome was not in wide use.

So now let me see if we can get a slide here. Good. This is MIT prior to World War II. Not too clear the campus. You won't be able to see it too clearly, so I'm going to take you on a walk around it. I will note that MIT started in Boston, so I'll proceed across the Mass Avenue Bridge. And as we come across Memorial Drive, we'll see the main building on the right. We'll see the Graduate House on the left, which is now [? Ashdown. ?] This is followed by the Coop. And then we come to Bexley Hall, then a very nondescript building that had such places in it as Walton's, where you could get somewhat of a luncheon for $0.82, and then the Armory. Directly across from the Armory was the Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory, building 33, which actually had open parking behind it.

[LAUGHTER]

As we stop at the light that's usually red on Vassar Street, we note to the left the Metropolitan Storage, and on the-- almost directly ahead, but somewhat on the right, the Whittemore Shoe Polish Building, which the Instrumentation Lab would occupy very shortly. We head north, we go by lots and lots of empty space. And we could note, if we are history-minded, that it was here that, in 1915, the first building was put on this campus. It was Jerry Hunsaker's wind tunnel, roughly a year before MIT moved across en masse.

Beyond the Main Street, proceed down towards Kendall, turn the corner onto Ames. We go by the buildings, the dormitories on the East Campus, and we end up with Walker Memorial on our right and the president's house on the left. Now, it was in June 1941 that I had completed my studies here, except for a thesis. So one nice, sunny day, rather than go out sailing, I thought I might so go in town and have a chat with Doc Draper to see what I might do in the fall on a thesis when he, said would you like to work on vibration measuring equipment? And I said that'd be fine. Would you like to get paid for it? Well, a new thought. I said that'd be terrific.

[LAUGHTER]

He said, OK, then you've got to start this week. So that's when I started getting paid at MIT. I think my first salary was $1,200 a year. The person I was working with down in the basement of 33, right near where the crash came out, was named [? Barney ?] [? Oldfield. ?] And I noticed he was coming in less and less, and then suddenly I heard that he'd been in the reserve and he was going to the Signal Corps. This is the end of August. And at that point, Doc Draper came around and he said, how would you like to be an instructor? And I said, well, I'd have to go up in front of a class. And he said, well, you may have to.

[LAUGHTER]

But I accepted the challenge. And then there was a custom in those days that, at the first faculty meeting, the new faculty and the new instructors were introduced by Karl Compton. And what I didn't know was each was supposed to stand up and, in one sentence, describe who they were and what they were doing. When it came my turn, I sort of blurted out, I said, I'm nothing but a Harvard man interested in vibration equipment. And about two weeks later, I ran across my father in town, and he said, by the way, do you know that other Harvard man at MIT who has the jitters?

[LAUGHTER]

Now, our world changed dramatically in about two months. In December 1941, President Compton wasn't using that house that I've mentioned as much as he used to. He was traveling a great deal of the time. And here he is touring the South Pacific in his role as Chief of Field Services in the Office of Scientific Research and Development, OSRD.

OSRD was headed by Vannevar Bush, who was the former dean of engineering and vice president of MIT. Van had left MIT before the war to become president of the Carnegie Institution of Washington. And it was from his office there that he ran the scientific and technical effort during World War II, reporting directly to the person we've heard so much about and so eloquently this morning, President Roosevelt.

Compton's presidential report of October 1945 was written while in the field, and is the basis for much of my talk. In the report, he notes the total participation of MIT in World War II. 30% of the staff took leaves of absence, and 25%, a quarter of all alumni from MIT were in the military, including 92 generals and 35 admirals. On campus, there were many special educational courses and 400 research and development contracts. MIT was reimbursed five million by the government for education and training, and 93 million for the research and development. And that was in '45 dollars.

Now, there were many course completion photos similar to this one of postgraduates of naval construction and engineering. Captain Joyce was head of the military training here at MIT at that time, and Professor Manning of the naval architecture in the foreground. I myself ended up with 13 such photos, each time with Captain Joyce and 50 V12 officers who had taken my course in aircraft instrumentation. These are six-week courses that ended on Friday. The following Monday, the next group would come in. And so it went for 13 times.

Now, the scope of what went on at MIT and in education is really hard to get across. This is sort of an attempt, a photograph taken from inside MIT looking out on the Killian Court. And you can see large numbers, in this case of enlisted men who went through training here. All told, there were 2,300 in the Navy V12 and Army specialized training groups, there were 7,275 in the Army and Navy who attended the radar school down Atlantic Avenue, and there were nearly 1,000 in meteorology and weather forecasting.

Now, MIT, of course, was more than the classrooms. Interest in aeronautics expanded during the '20s and '30s, with such notables as Donald Douglas and Jimmy Doolittle receiving their doctor's degrees. Dr. [? Hunsaker ?] returned to MIT in the mid '30s as head of mechanical engineering and of the new aeronautical engineering department. He had much to do, obviously, with the construction of this much larger wind tunnel than he had first built on the campus.

This slide is from the roof of the Aero building facing towards MIT's main building. And the design of this wind tunnel and so on came out of the leadership of Professor Joe Bicknell. The tunnel was put in operation in 1939. The 400 government contracts I mentioned earlier did not include the 275 orders specifically for wind tunnel work. The tunnel operated on two shifts throughout the war, seven days a week, testing many of the aircraft designs used in World War II and weeding out many that should not have been built.

Now, while at MIT, Vannevar Bush did a lot of things. Here he is second from the left in this slide. Among other things, he developed the first differential analyzer used to solve differential equations. It was made from gears and shafts and mechanical integrators. It was called the Great Brass Brain.

He's leaning on the main console of the second analyzer of his design. In this design, the gears and shafts were replaced by amplifiers and servos. This machine, called the Rockefeller Differential Analyzer, was used to compute range tables and tenor patterns, and many designed equations and so on. For example, for Doc Draper's fire control systems.

The photo also includes Professor [? Phillips, ?] head of math, on the left, Professor [? Hazen, ?] head of electrical engineering, and then Professor Caldwell on the right, head of the Center of Analysis. Not shown is the person you worked with when you used the machine, named Frank [? Rizzu. ?] You'd go in the room and it would be operating, and there are typewriters-- that's how you got the data out-- clacking away, clickety click. And all of a sudden, you'd find that the machine had stopped. Frank would meet us all over the place, consoles everywhere. He'd go over to one machine, look at it carefully, kick the bottom panel, and away the machine would go again.

[LAUGHTER]

Now, I seem to have slid a slide. I wish that time permitted a full discussion of all the special facilities pressed into service during World War II. Professor Evans, [? Rob Lee ?] Evans, cyclotron was used to produce radioactive tracers from medicine and metallurgy as a means for preserving [? whole ?] blood. In the Laboratory for Insulation, Dr. von Hippel developed insulating and dielectric materials for operation in high-frequency electric fields.

In 1940, MIT had plans for a new building for the chemical engineering department, but no funds. Under an agreement with the Army, the building was constructed and used for chemical warfare services during the war in the leadership of such individuals as Professor Whitman and Gilliland. Deadly devices, such as flamethrowers and incendiaries, were tested here, as well as production processes for phosgene and mustard gas. Such work was done in a specially protected area inside the building, with some of the space well below ground.

Now, shortly after the war, much of MIT's effort was revealed to the public. Here's a flamethrower operating on MIT's campus behind the Smith House, one of the eateries we had on Memorial Drive. I'm told extra oil was added to the fuel to provide a little more smoke for demonstration purposes. I'll make no comment on whether an environmental impact statement would have allowed this to have taken place today.

The Radiation Lab at MIT was the national center for work on radar and other devices that relied on electromagnetic wave propagation. There were similar centers for other such areas at other universities throughout the country. The lab was started in 1940, well before the war. At its peak, it had 1,200 staff and 2,700 support personnel, and occupied 15 acres of floor space on campus, and many outlying facilities here and abroad.

Sir Robert Watson-Watt was the inventor of the magnetron, the key element, of course, in radar systems. There are two such magnetrons, shown in this slide, one held by Sir Henry [? Tizard, ?] who headed the British mission that brought the secret of the magnetron and the magnetron to this country in 1940. He's shown here at MIT's mid-century convocation, with [? Leto ?] [? Bridge ?] on the right, who directed the laboratory, and Alfred [? Loomis, ?] chairman of the OSRD-affiliated microwave committee that had government oversight of the laboratory's program.

Now, I'd like to first just run quickly through the process that took place in this laboratory. It had to start with ideas, with analyses and design studies. And next, as you can see in this slide, you had to build up breadboards. And these are being inspected by two very key players, Professors [? Zacharias ?] and Hill.

Next, you had to run tests to see how the equipment is working. And when I ran across this slide, I thought it was terrific. I've never seen such a kludge of equipment in my life. It's appended to the side of one of the radiation lab temporary buildings. And building 20, which you can see if you want to take a look at it.

[LAUGHTER]

Now, this has a big pendulum underneath, which could be swung around, and the stabilization device was riding on it. And with the mirrors up above, you could tell whether stabilization was taking place or not. The laboratory had a plethora of radomes protruding from many rooftops. Properly designed, they were transparent to the microwave equipment inside, and so it was possible to test the equipment with signals coming from either the ground or from overhead flights.

Now, the laboratory's output could be in the form of reports, design drawings, trained personnel, or hardware delivered to test sites or often to the front lines. And so I thought this was a pretty revealing slide. It shows actually eight trucks loaded to the gills ready to take equipment, possibly out to Bedford, possibly other places in the United States. Maybe over to be shipped-- maybe over to the harbor to be shipped overseas.

Now, here you see a van, on top of which is Lee Davenport and [? Evon ?] [? Getting ?] with the project officer, Colonel Warner. They're on top of a van for the SCR-584. This set was produced by GE, Chrysler, and Westinghouse. It was used for tracking, for fire control of incoming targets, incoming enemy targets. The dollar value of the SCR-584 production I'm told exceeded the cost of Boulder dam. It was used on many theaters of the war.

The antenna of the microwave early warning radar, MEW, is shown here with B-24s overhead. Five sets were built by MIT prior to industrial production. Several days after the first installation in southern England, American heavy bombers were somewhat off course. They were detected 250 miles to the south of England. But they were detected with this equipment, and were brought back to their proper bases in England.

Now, to make use of this equipment, there had to be some place where the information could be received, could be analyzed, and could be dispatched where it was needed. This happens to be the Eighth Air Force MEW control room, where enemy aircraft could be detected and tracked by observing the radar scopes, and then, as required, plotted up on maps and used by the controllers to vector friendly aircraft into position for attack.

This is Loran ground station. They often had to be placed in remote, unfriendly places, such as this one. A navigation fix was obtained by receiving simultaneous signals from three of these, one master and two slaves [INAUDIBLE] appropriately to such places as Greenland and Iceland and so on. The system proved useful for both aircraft and ships at sea. The Navy's convoys found this system particularly advantageous when zigzagging on the northern routes in adverse weather with submarines in the vicinity.

Luis Alvarez headed the radiation lab team that developed the ground control approach, GCA, for landing aircraft in fog and haze, of which there was plenty in England. The ground controller could see the aircraft's deviation from the approach path, and could so advise the pilot. He could talk him in to a blind landing.

This slide shows a B-17 located out at the Bedford airport, part of the radiation laboratory's installation there. You can see the radome coming down under the nose of the B-17, just aft of the gunner's turret. This so-called H2X navigation system that was installed there was coupled with a Norden bombsight permitted bombing through the overcast.

The first 12 installations were built and installed by radiation lab personnel on B-17s like this one here at the Bedford airport. General Eaker sent 12 of his most experienced crews to MIT to train and test this equipment. They then flew the aircraft to England to serve as pathfinders on all major raids into Germany from November 8, 1943 to March 15, 1944.

During World War II, Doc Draper was director of the instrumentation lab, and later became head of the Aero Department. The key to the fire control system was not the magnetron, it was the single-degree-of-freedom gyro that he's holding in his hand. The first breadboard fire control system was built for the British, prior to America's entry into World War II. With our declaration of war, all property of the United States became part and parcel of our own military. And they took over this piece of equipment, which was put in a black box. It was called the shoe box.

Our own Navy wanted to see how it operated. It was out at the Watertown Arsenal. And the night before it was to be demonstrated, somebody made a mistake and put the wrong damping fluid in the gyro, so as the target, which was on a cable, went across one side of the arsenal, and the 20-caliber started firing with somebody looking through the site, the Navy was very impressed that all the bullets seemed to hit the target. What they didn't find out until much later was that the person who was doing the firing had done it enough beforehand so he didn't have to use the site.

[LAUGHTER]

It was non-operational.

[LAUGHTER]

This design evolved into the Mark 14 Gunsight, which was mounted directly on 50-caliber and 20-millimeter guns. 50,000 were produced by the Sperry Gyroscope Company and its associates, including [? Dole ?] [? Cam, ?] a local company that evolved from a machine shop during the war.

The gunsights were updated as the enemy became more proficient and skillful. Radar ranging was added first, and then the gunsight was redesigned to include a six-power telescope. This new sight, the Mark 15, is shown in this slide. It's on the roof of the Whittemore Shoe Polish Building, looking across at the warehouse.

The sight is off-mounted away from the gun on a hand control pedestal. Better to aim the sight. The gun mounts move with a pedestal using drives engineered in part by Gordon Brown and his servomechanism laboratory. This [? director ?] system was used with 20 and 40-millimeter quads and three-inch 70 guns. Kamikazes particularly learned how to spook the system by attacking with the sun behind them. Late in the war, radar signals were introduced into the sight so the firing could take place without visual tracking, when the target could not be observed, either because of the sun or because of smoke from gunfire.

Unfortunately, time doesn't permit my doing justice to all of the research and development underway at MIT during World War II. Aircraft propulsion was the province of Eddie and [? Faye ?] Taylor, who specialized on liquid and air-cooled internal combustion engine. Work was conducted at MIT on hiding important facilities by camouflage, as well as ferreting them out at night with airborne flash photography, pioneered by Doc Edgerton.

Food processing and packaging was important to all of services. [? Bernie ?] [? Proctor ?] and [? John ?] [? Sluter ?] developed pre-cooked frozen foods that could be thawed out during a long flight in a B-17. Professor Van de Graaff developed and built five high-voltage generators for the Navy used for inspection of castings and munitions.

Other areas of activity listed on this chart include work on metal extraction, new alloys, surgical sutures, synthetic rubber, vitamins, and long-range weather forecasting. It was also Professor [? Holland ?] [? Williams' ?] work on fuels and combustion and Professor [? Keyes ?] and [? Collins ?] on liquid oxygen, its production, transportation, and storage on submarines and aircraft and for use in welding and in hospitals.

It's important to note that MIT was not working in any way on the atomic bomb. That is not listed on this chart. As President Compton stated in his 1945 report, the great commitment to radar obviated the opportunity to participate in the most portentous scientific program in all history.

This final slide shows MIT post World War II. The open area along Vassar and Main Street has been filled with temporary buildings used by the radiation lab during World War II. After the war, they were used to great advantage, as the MIT student body dramatically expanded. Many of these students were supported by the GI Bill. Temporary housing was added on the West Campus, as you can see, to accommodate the large number of married students, many with children.

I hope I've made it clear to all of you that MIT contributed to America's war effort in many, many ways, in many, many disciplines. Let me conclude by quoting from Karl Compton's presidential report. "The performance of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology through our alumni, staff, and organization has demonstrated more vividly than ever before the essential soundness of her conception, the public value of her work, and the justification for her continued endeavor to pioneer in the oncoming lines of technological progress. It is in times of stress that strength is proved, but God grant that our future demonstrations of strength may be made with full effect under the stress of a strong urge to be useful in peace, and never again under the dread compulsion of war." And he--

[APPLAUSE]

--and now, as I try to figure out how to lower the podium for our next speaker, because he may have a little difficulty looking at his notes, here it goes down. The next speaker would not introduce himself. I'll tell you who it is. It's Dr. Paul Gray. And he's going to tell us about MIT's response to World War II. Paul?

[APPLAUSE]

GRAY: Thank you very much, Bob. This is approximately the halfway point in the program, so before I begin, let me invite everyone to stand in place for about a one-minute stretch, OK?

[INTERPOSING VOICES]

GRAY: Thank you very much. Before I begin my remarks, I would like to express my appreciation to three people who helped enormously in putting this material together. First is Helen Samuels, the Institute archivist who guided me in a search through for materials in the archives. Second is Michael Yates of the MIT Museum, who helped in providing me with some slides, some photographs I will use this morning. And third is Lydia Snover of the MIT Planning Office, who assembled some of the data I will show, and also prepared those illustrations. I'm indebted to all three of them.

The 134-year history of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology is marked, I believe, by three discontinuities, transformations which, in scale or character or import, made all the difference in shaping the future of this place. First, the move in 1916 from Copley Square to Cambridge liberated the Institute, then known as Boston Tech, from its constrained physical environment, and permitted expansion of its programs and its facilities. That move, made possible by the extraordinary support of a very small band of loyal alumni, and by the generosity of George Eastman, also marked the first steps in MIT's transformation from a commuter college to a residential environment.

Second, the appointment in 1930 of Karl Taylor Compton as president began the transformation of the Institute from an undergraduate college focused on engineering, architecture, and technology to a science-based university by strengthening greatly the sciences. KT knew that the future greatness of MIT depended on developing first-rate programs of education and research in science and applied science. And he acted on that conviction.

The third discontinuity is, of course, the one on which we focus today, the Second World War and its effects on the Institute. The war-driven transformation of MIT, and of essentially all American universities, began early in the 1940s with the mobilization of scientific and engineering talent in the interest of national defense, as Bob Seamans has just described.

It was appropriate that Bob gave so much attention to the radiation laboratory, which in a way was the largest, most prominent, but certainly not the only activity of that kind. The radiation laboratory developed in so many forms radar as an important tool of warfare. It was said after the war by I.I. Rabi, I believe, that, while the atomic bomb may have ended the war, radar won it.

While the radiation laboratory was the largest and most prominent war-related activity here, engaging nearly 4,000 individuals at its peak in 1945, it was not the only such effort. As Bob has shown, work in support of the war took place across the Institute, involving almost all the academic elements. These activities, running under forced draft in an atmosphere of crisis and deep commitment, changed MIT fundamentally and irreversibly.

Karl Taylor Compton put it this way in the 1945 report of the president. And I quote, "the term epoch is not customarily used to designate so short a period as five years, yet in many ways the term is appropriate to these war years. In these five years, the Institute spent on its war contracts as much money as it had spent on its normal activities during the previous 80 years of existence. This is a sobering thought. It makes one wonder what tremendous things could be accomplished in peacetime if the same energy, determination, and resources were marshaled to fashion a better world." End of quote.

Now, you understand that I had no personal experience with the World War II years at Tech. When I arrived in 1950, the nation was focused on two other wars, one hot and one cold. However, as I've tried to understand the consequences of the war for MIT, it has seemed to me useful to think about the effects of that period as principally of three kinds.

First, the war and the GI Bill it produced expanded and changed, democratized the MIT student body. Second, the wartime problems presented intellectual challenges which were vastly different from the knowledge base of pre-war engineering education and practice, thereby creating a mandate for great change in engineering curricula. Third, the significant benefits that flowed from the wartime partnership between educational institutions and the federal government led to the creation of peacetime partnerships and to the evolution of the research universities for which MIT is a paradigm.

In the time remaining to me this morning, I shall briefly describe these three effects. First, growth and change in the student body. In the years just before the war, the number of students at the Institute was around 3,100, of which about 2,400 were undergraduates and 700 were graduate students. Not surprisingly, the number of matriculated students decreased sharply during the war years, reaching a low of about 1,200 in 1944-45.

Where'd we go? There. This starts over here 1939, runs across to 1950. Little over 3,000 in the pre-war years. Dropped in '44, '45, down still in '46, but then up above 5,000 in those years starting in 1947. The enrollments never again fell below the level of 5,000, except for one year during the Korean War. More importantly than these numbers, these students were sharply different from their counterparts of the pre-war years. KT says it best in his report of the president for 1945-46, the first full academic year after the end of the war.

I'd like that picture, please, of Compton in slide number two. Next one. There we are.

These are KT's words from the 1945-46 president's report. "If you were to introduce yourself to a student whom you chance to meet while walking through the Institute corridors, the probability is that he would be an undergraduate, older by two to four years than a pre-war student of the same class. He would explain to you with courtesy and poise borne of military experience that he is a veteran, and that his objective here is to secure a first-class professional education as quickly as possible. If you were to express an interest in his personal situation, you might discover that he is one of the married veterans-- more than 30% of the veterans are married-- and that his family includes a youngster."

"If you inquire about his studies, you will find that his attitude is mature, serious, and hard-headed, and his grades high. Since the educational expenses of the veterans are financed largely by the government, applicants have not been restricted by financial considerations. The students, therefore, come from all walks of life, and for the first time we have a student body for which ability, preparation, personality, and character have been the only requirements for admission."

Now, it's notable that, while 20 years would pass before the concepts of [? need-blind ?] admissions and student aid sufficient to meet full need would emerge here at MIT, KT laid out the rationale for those ideas in his 1946 report, at a time when this place was much enriched by the greater social and economic diversity represented by the veteran students.

Treasurer's report data show that, for the year 1946-47 and 1947-48, more than half of the tuition receipts of the Institute originated with the Veterans Administration. And that fraction remained quite high through 1952.

If Dr. John Horton is in the audience, there is an emergency page for him. Would he please call 201-425-6937. 201-425-6937. Dr. John Horton.

The increased number of students at MIT in these years required increases in the faculty, as well, and the count of professors of all ranks rose from fewer than 300 in the immediate pre-war years to 400 in 1947, and to 500 by 1953. The Institute struggled in the years just after the war to find space to accommodate the sudden increase in educational and research activities. Of course, the temporary buildings thrown up to house the radiation laboratory were pressed into service.

We're going the wrong way here. I'll get it straight before I'm done.

One back, please. There we are.

Building 20 is still there on Vassar Street, full of academic programs and research activities.

[APPLAUSE]

I say to you, though, if you have a particular affection for building 20, and if your pattern is to return to MIT only every five years, go walk around today, because it may not be there in five years.

[LAUGHTER]

Building 22, in the left foreground of this photograph, was converted to a barracks, where 100 freshmen lived for periods ranging from days to months. It, happily, is long gone. To meet the needs of married veterans, the Institute built, in 1946, with its own funds, the village known as Westgate, which housed 100 families. Here in the foreground, it was the first veterans project undertaken by an American college.

These changes in the MIT student body that resulted from the war and the GI Bill were, I submit, preamble to the further democratization of this place, which began 20 years later, and which is so evident today. Now, 2/5 of the undergraduates and a quarter of the graduate students are women. African-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, Asian-Americans, Native Americans, and large numbers of foreign citizens study at MIT. The human face of the Institute reflects ever more fully the society and the world in which we live.

I come now to the revolution in engineering curricula. The applications of technology to the defense effort led engineers into new fields of engineering science and technology-- microwaves, waveguides, feedback control systems, analog computation, and radar technology, to mention just a few. Many engineers educated in the '20s and '30s found such topics enormously challenging. The underlying physical and mathematical foundations necessary for effective work in these new areas were not there.

Further, the increased pace of technology development, driven by the war effort, resulted in the introduction of much quite new technology in the years just after the war. The invention of the transistor in 1948 changed everything for electrical engineers, as did the widespread use of jet engines, and the transition to supersonic flight for aeronautical and mechanical engineers.

These changes in applied technology led the engineering faculty at MIT and elsewhere to undertake dramatic revisions of programs for engineering education, shifting the emphasis to engineering science and more mathematics. At the Institute, this revolution was led principally by Gordon Brown, who served as head of the electrical engineering department from 1952 to 1959, and as dean of engineering from 1959 to 1968.

Gordon, who headed the servomechanisms laboratory during the war, held strong views about the changes necessary in the undergraduate education of engineers. Out went the electrical machinery laboratory and the steam laboratory, in came new core programs emphasizing the underlying physical and mathematical foundations, the newly developed technology, and engineering design. Any who knew Gordon in those years will remember that he liked to say the only thing constant around here is the rate of change. And he was a major contributor to that change.

It is, I believe, fair to say that the engineering school at MIT, which was in the vanguard in these revisions, set the pace for engineering education in the United States throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and in fact in many other nations, as well. Now, 40 years later, the engineering departments here are again looking closely at the structure and content of the degree programs, and listening to the perceived needs of the employers of our graduates. The recently introduced masters of engineering programs in the school are one manifestation of that effort, as was the program called Leaders for Manufacturing, introduced by engineering and Sloan a few years ago.

I come now to the third element of the transformation, the partnership between universities and government. The war clearly demonstrated the benefits that flowed out of government support of research and development, conducted largely by university-based people. Vannevar Bush, an electrical engineering graduate of the class of 1916 at MIT, was a central figure both in the coordination of wartime efforts and in the shaping of an ongoing relationship between the federal government and the universities.

Bush had served during the 1930s as dean of engineering at MIT, and was vice president of the Institute in a time in which there was but one vice president. And later, he was president of the Carnegie Institution of Washington. Van was an advisor to six MIT presidents, including this one.

During the war years, Van Bush served as Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, the federal agency which coordinated the forced draft research and development efforts undertaken to aid in prosecution of the war. In November 1944, more than nine months before the end of the war, Bush was asked by President Roosevelt to consider the nature of the government-university partnership in the postwar period.

FDR's letter to Bush stated the challenge in these terms, and I quote. "The Office of Scientific Research and Development, of which you are the director, presents a unique experiment of teamwork and cooperation in coordinating scientific research and in applying existing scientific knowledge to the solutions of the technical problems paramount in war."

"There is no reason why the lessons found in this experiment cannot be profitably employed in times of peace. The information, the techniques, and the research experience developed by OSRD, and by the thousands of scientists in the universities and in private industry, should be used in the days of peace ahead for the improvement of national health, for the creation of new enterprise, bringing new jobs, and for the betterment of national standards of living." End quote.

Van Bush brought together a panel to undertake this broadly stated task, and they made their response to President Truman in the form of a report dated July 5th, 1945, entitled Science-- The Endless Frontier. This report expressed two priorities. I quote again. "First, we must have plenty of men and women trained in science, for upon them depends both the creation of new knowledge and its application to practical purposes. Second, we must strengthen the centers of basic research, which are principally the colleges, universities, and research institutes. These institutions provide the environment which is most conducive to the creation of new scientific knowledge, and least under pressure for immediate tangible results." End quote.

Van understood instinctively, and expressed in Science-- The Endless Frontier, the importance of tying together, completely tying together graduate education and front-line research. He recognized that both prospered best when they were done in the same environment by the same people. An extremely important proposition.

Science-- The Endless Frontier provided the basis for ongoing federal support in scientific research, and for the growth and development of the research universities. It led to the establishment by the Congress of the National Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation, two agencies which are now in the vanguard of research and student support in higher education. And to the encouragement of continued research support by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Agency.

It promoted the development of policies and practices which permitted the reimbursement of institutions of higher education for the research which they undertook on behalf of the government. Support of university and college-based research took two forms, fellowships and traineeships, in some cases entirely portable, awarded on the basis of intellectual merit, and direct support of research programs on the basis of contracts and grants, including considerable support of a highly discretionary nature. Bush's report set the stage for federal patronage of research in colleges and universities, and for graduate education in science and engineering. And the support which it produced grew steadily.

Colleges and universities found their development during the 1950s limited by the scarcity of support for facilities which their expanded mission required. It took another war, one of a different kind, to enable a new phase in the development of this relationship, one in which the need for facilities was addressed. Before the end of the 1940s, the shape of the coming conflict between the Western democracies and the Soviet bloc nations became evident. In a speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, in 1946, Winston Churchill described the nature of what he called the Iron Curtain, which divided Europe.

The Soviet attempt to starve the Allies out of Berlin in its blockade of all surface transportation from the West to the partitioned city marked the first of many East-West confrontations and tests of power, which were to characterize the Cold War of the next four decades. It was soon followed by the war in Korea, in which a UN force, with the United States in the vanguard, opposed the North Korean invaders who were surrogates for the USSR and the People's Republic of China.

For most of the 1950s, the leaders and the people of this nation assumed that the technical and military superiority demonstrated during the Second World War would prevent any significant heating up of the Cold War, and would, in any case, permit the Western democracies to prevail. This smug, self-congratulatory assuredness was shattered in October 1957, when the Soviet Union put Sputnik, a grapefruit-sized Earth satellite, in orbit.

The disillusionment was enhanced when two American efforts to follow suit ended in spectacular explosions on launchpads. Suddenly, it seemed to many in this nation that we were only second best in the competition with the USSR in space, perhaps in Cold War weaponry, as well, and possibly in science and engineering education to boot.

Within days of the launch of Sputnik, President Eisenhower appointed Dr. James Rhyne Killian Jr., then president of MIT, as his science advisor, and the first presidential science advisory mechanism, the President's Science Advisory Committee, PSAC for short, was formed. Several efforts to improve the teaching of mathematics and science in the schools were created, and, in due course, the physical science study committee curriculum, the new math, and new versions of biology and chemistry appeared.

The Congress, in the National Defense Education Act, created and funded programs of student aid intended to draw more young people into the study of science and engineering in college. The sense of hazard created by the technical achievements of the USSR, and by a few episodes of the Cold War, including the erection of the Berlin Wall and the crisis over Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, produced an astonishing period of growth for higher education. Funds for sponsored research in colleges and universities increased by more than a factor of five in constant dollars during the decade from 1958 to 1968, as shown in this figure.

The ordinate here is on a logarithmic scale, so that exponentials become straight lines. And you see essentially exponential growth from 1958 to 1968. The slope of that line corresponds to a growth rate of about 18% per year. The support of graduate students through fellowships and traineeships grew strongly, as did grant and loan programs in support of undergraduate students. Most important, federal agencies made grants for the construction of research facilities, and for major items of equipment, which enabled the remarkable expansion of the research universities.

At MIT, the partnership with the federal government produced very rapid growth on several dimensions. The volume of sponsored research, including work done at the Lincoln Laboratory and the Instrumentation Laboratory, which became the Draper Laboratory in 1970, as well as on this campus, increased in constant dollars by a factor of almost three from 1958 to 1968, as shown here.

The top line is total federal research and development at MIT, about $300 million. These are all 1994 dollars, by the way. It seemed sensible to me to put all of these numbers in current dollar terms. 1994 dollars, about 300 million total in 1958, up to just over 700 million in 1968. The red line shows campus research support. This is research done principally on the campus by graduate students and faculty, up by a larger fraction, of course, over that time. And the defense laboratories, Lincoln and Instrumentation, taken together, the blue line.

By 1970, the number of enrolled students at MIT had increased to 8,000, approximately half of whom were graduate students. The faculty of the Institute grew to just over 1,000. Many academic facilities were added to the campus, with a peak of research-related construction activity in the 1960s, which saw the construction of the Space Center. Here is the Space Center on Vassar Street, just coming out of the ground. The physical plant, central steam plant in the background. And the Center for Materials Research and Engineering, building 13, behind the great dome. Occupying yet another parking lot.

The American presence, military presence, in Southeast Asia, which began early in the 1960s, accelerated rapidly in the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson, from 1963 to 1968. By the late 1960s, military expenditures were in continuous and severe conflict with LBJ's programs for the Great Society, in which he envisioned an end to poverty, homelessness, and all avoidable human misery in America. That conflict, which was intense by 1968, led to an abrupt change in the growth of federal support of higher education in that year, as is evident here.

We got it upside down, I'm afraid.

[LAUGHTER]

There we are. This, again, logarithmic scale on the ordinate. 1954 the first year, over to 1994. 40 years of federal support of university-based research. This is the total federal support of all universities in the United States. And again, it's constant 1994 dollars.

You see here this period of 15 or so years' duration of very rapid growth, double-digit growth, exponential growth during that period, an abrupt change in 1969, 1970, essentially flat during the Nixon and into the Carter administration, turning up a little at the beginning of the Reagan administration, growing here again exponentially, but at a much lower rate, 6% or 7% a year, and then flat or turning down a little in these most recent years.

While support was flat in real terms in the 1970s, college and university-based research enterprise continued to grow in size and complexity. There was no resumption of real growth in federal support or research in colleges and universities until early in the Reagan administration, and growth from 1983 to 1989 was about 7% per year, which has not been matched in these recent years.

The conflict in federal priorities not only reversed the trend of federal support of research, they also set the economy of the nation on the course of steadily growing inflation. This pattern, which lasted until the early 1980s, produced cost pressures on colleges and universities which were intense, and which led to a decade or more of large increases in tuitions and fees. These pressures, coupled with a steady decline in real terms of federal support for student aid, has led to the present severe demand for the use of institutional discretionary funds in support of scholarships.

Now, clearly the interval from 1950 to 1968 reflected a period of extraordinary growth not approached in the decades since. Many in the research university community think of the 1960s as the golden years, a decade in which the partnership between the federal government and higher education achieved a real rate of growth of research support, which, while obviously not sustainable over the long term, might be regarded as a standard against which other efforts could be measured.

Many informed persons in government regard this decade of remarkable growth as the exception, rather than any kind of rule, as a unique interval which resulted from the sense of unlimited possibilities that was so characteristic of the 1950s and early 1960s. They regard it as an aberration unlikely ever to occur again.

With the end of the Cold War, and the threats and unifying theme it presented, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and now with a new Congress in Washington, we are seeing the beginnings of a conflict of a different kind, a war on the federal deficit. And the associated conflicts and reassessment of national priorities will have consequences for higher education, which will be, I believe, fully as significant as the consequences of World War II and the Cold War.

While my purpose in these remarks has been to sketch out the several dimensions of what has been a transformation in the character and scale of MIT, a transformation over these last 50 years that was a consequence of World War II and the Cold War, which followed hard on its heels. With the Cold War ended, we face security threats of very different kinds-- small-scale, increasingly violent conflicts, as in the former Yugoslavia, growing gaps between the haves and the have nots of the world, and of this nation, terrorism, and the nightmare of potential nuclear weapons proliferation.

None of these threats appears to our government to require or to justify the support of education or university-based research, which was so evident during the Cold War. And the struggle to reshape the federal budget, a struggle so evident in these last weeks, seems all too likely to force dramatic changes in support of education and basic research.

35 years ago, Glenn Seaborg and his colleagues on PSAC, the President's Science Advisory Committee, put it this way, in a report entitled Scientific Progress, the Universities and the Federal Government. And I quote, "whether the quantity and quality of basic research and graduate education in the United States will be adequate or inadequate depends primarily on the government of the United States. From this responsibility, the federal government has no escape. Either it will find the policies and the resources which permit our universities to flourish and their duties to be adequately discharged, or no one will."

"The federal government at times seems to those of us in universities to be a fickle, untrustworthy, unreliable, and unsympathetic partner, set on regarding higher education as just one more special interest group, and given to construing the research partnership as similar in nature to the procurement of combat boots or Jeeps. And I know, because government officials and members of Congress have from time to time explained it quite forcefully to me, that the universities seem at times to be arrogant, imperfect, unreasonably demanding entities, remarkably insensitive to political and fiscal realities."

"And there's much truth in both perspectives. Nevertheless, the partnership is vital to the national welfare, and its accomplishments over the past five decades have been both extraordinary in scope and of great benefit to the nation. The productivity of the relationship is evident in all those areas anticipated in 1944 by President Roosevelt in his charge to Van Bush-- improved health, new industries and new jobs, and improvements in living standards."

As Seaborg put it in that same report in 1960, with all their irritating faults, universities are essential agencies of our national hopes, and they must be treated accordingly. The federal government, with all its contradictions, surprises, and persistent myopia about the longer term future is the sine qua non for the universities and colleges. Making the partnership work better is in the national interest, and deserves our unstinting, steadily applied best efforts, for on that partnership depends the well-being of higher education and the nation it serves in the next century. Thank you very much.

[APPLAUSE]

I now invite Lester Thurow to the lectern.

[APPLAUSE]

THUROW: If you think about a major war, what a major war does is shake the system. And it shakes the system in one fundamental sociological way. And that is people are willing to do things that they're not willing to do in any other circumstance. And if you look at World War II, it's important to put it together with the fact that, in the 1930s and the 1940s, the American social system was grievously shocked by two earthquakes. The first, of course, was the Great Depression, and the second was World War II.

And those two events did not accelerate economic change, although they may have done that, and accelerate social change, although they may have done that. They set the system off in a completely different direction. And it's important, if you look at the economics of wartime and what happens afterwards, is people never go back to the status quo ante.

19 million women went to work, as Doris mentioned. At the end of the war, they went back a little bit, but very quickly the employment of females was back up to 19 million. And today, if you go to America's law schools and medical schools, you will find that more than half of the students are female. That simply would not have happened without the double shake of the Great Depression and World War II.

It's also important to remember that, in the Great Depression, Karl Marx came very close to being correct. We could be here today in a world where capitalism does not exist. And it would be very easy to happen. You remember that he predicted that capitalism would collapse in a great financial crisis. He was right. Capitalism did collapse in 1929 to 1932. And in December 1941, when World War II began for the United States, essentially there was one and a half capitalist countries left in the world, the United States and a gravely weakened, about to be defeated Great Britain. Everybody else was a colony, fascist, or communist.

And they were that for very good reasons. In 1939, there was not a single shred of evidence that the United States would be able to recover from the Great Depression. As Doris mentioned, the unemployment rate was still 17%, and there was no recovery light at the end of the tunnel. And the country was becoming radicalized. The conservatives didn't like it that Franklin Roosevelt was using the phrase "the malefactors of great wealth." The little town that I lived in in Montana in 1937 elected a communist city government, and they were not alone. It was a mining community. The radicals of the wobblies were still there.

With a few missteps in the 1930s and after World War II, we could be living in a very different world today. And if you say, what did the Great Depression and World War II do for us, it gave us a completely different vision of what was important and what was unimportant. In 1932, at the end of the Hoover administration, the then head of the Federal Reserve Board, appointed by Mr. Hoover, stood up and, if you can imagine this, in 1932, when unemployment was 25% and prices were falling by 10%, said the most important problem in America is fighting inflation.

Think about that. Think about that. Because the problem is, in normal circumstance, the past, and the problems of the past, have a lock on the present and the future. And what happens in wartime is that lock is broken. And then the question is what direction do we go. And that's the place where I think Roosevelt and Churchill played a remarkable role, because they didn't go with the flow, they created the flow.

Somebody once remarked, how many times in the morning when you woke up do you think that President Truman, the first thing he did was consult a public opinion poll? The answer is Harry Truman never did that.

[APPLAUSE]

Because that's what leadership's all about. And of course, the problem in the modern world is every politician has an easy alternative. Public opinion polls are so good that you can basically figure out where the public parade is going, jump to the front of it, and look like a leader, when in fact you're a follower. But at this period of time, partly because of the nature of the people leading our countries, and partly because the public opinion polls were not so good, you had to create the parade. Otherwise, it would never be behind you. You couldn't find it.

And the question is, what kind of a parade was created? One of the interesting things, of course, is we think of the United States as a middle class nation. It wasn't a middle class nation in 1936, '37, '38. It was a nation divided into very poor people and very rich people. And it's important to remember that.

One of the things that was done in World War II, you remember that we had wage and price controls. The people running wage and price controls had to set wages. What did they do? They felt, correctly, that, since we were fighting in a war, and you were asking 12 million people to take the risk of dying, that was inherently an egalitarian problem, and that therefore they would very severely narrow wage differentials as they were setting wages and prices in their wage and price controls.

And they did that. And the interesting thing about those narrow wage differentials is, first of all, that they maintained themselves after World War II. And secondly, if anything, they contributed to productivity, as opposed to subtracting from productivity, because before the war everybody would have said, if you make wages that equal, everybody will quit working. In fact, they worked harder, they invested more in themselves, and they became a better workforce with a more egalitarian wage structure, rather than a worse workforce.

Second thing we did is we said that capitalism has a defect. We started to practice Keynesian economics, because what we learned at the beginning of World War II is, if you have a Great Depression and the government simply goes out and pushes demand into the system, it is, in fact, possible to bring everybody back to employment. And at the peak of World War II, instead of having 25% of the population unemployed, we had less than 1% of the population unemployed.

We also learned in World War II that science pays. That's what the atomic bomb taught us. Long-run research pays off, and it pays off in a very simple way. Harry Truman was told that a million people would be casualties if the Japanese islands were invaded. In fact, with technology, none of those deaths were necessary on the American side. Science, in some sense, became the black box out of which good things came.

And our support for science came out of that effort, because it was probably true, in 1939, if you were told as a scientist that you had to give up your subscription to the German Physical Review or the American Physical Review, you would have given up your subscription to the American Physical Review, because in the '20s and '30s, the leader of world science was not, in fact, the United States. It was Germany. That's where graduate students went to study if you were really smart, not coming to the United States.

We also learned in World War II that it was possible to engineer a rapidly growing economy. Growth was the goal. And we learned something that has a double message. We learned you can collect taxes and the world doesn't fall apart, because it's important to remember that the tax system was built in World War II. In the 1930s, the maximum tax rate in the United States was 10%, and very few people paid it. During World War II, the maximum tax rate was 90%, and lots of people paid it, and the world didn't fall apart.

And what that allowed us to do after the war was build the social welfare state, which I'll come back and talk to in a moment. So if you think of the big picture that we learned in World War II, we learned that you could make a very different world work than the world we had in the 1920s. And we also came out of that experience, of course, if you had been running the federal government in 1945, as the war was winding down, what was your big worry? The Great Depression was going to start again, because that was a real fear inside the American government in 1945, that the war would simply be a blip in the United States economy, and would promptly collapse immediately after the war was over.

Now, if you look at the vision we had after World War II, it is a vision that came out of World War II. And in some sense, the last 50 years is, if you'd like to think of it, the half life of World War II. It's a vision that we lived on. And as I shall point out in a few minutes, it's a vision which has now dissolved, and we're going to be asked to create a new division.

What was that vision made out of? First of all, the vision for the post World War II economy was made out of the experience in World War II is we can and we will run a full employment economy. Government will not allow the economy to slide into a Great Depression with a 25% unemployment rate and financial collapses. And if you look at the recessions that occurred after World War II until we get into the 1990s, each and every time you see government running to the rescue. These same thing's true with incipient financial crises. The stock market crash of 1987 was not allowed to continue.

In the foreign policy, area we essentially shifted from the fascists to the communists, and we instituted a policy of containment. We remembered Munich. We remembered that you have to contain aggressors. At the end of World War II, you remember that people sat around expecting economic growth to occur and capitalism to reestablish itself in countries like France, Germany, Great Britain, where either it had been severely weakened or it had not established-- had been run out of business by the fascists earlier. It didn't happen.

In 1948, three years after the war was over in Europe, there was no recovery in France, there was no recovery in Germany, and the British economy was, in fact, an incipient collapse. And it was the incipient collapse of the British economy that led to the formation of the Marshall Plan, of putting capitalism back together again, because we came to the conclusion that it wouldn't happen automatically by spontaneous combustion.

Now, today, Americans, in real dollar terms per capita, are two and a half times as wealthy as they were in 1948. But think about what we were willing to do in 1948. In 1948, we put 3% of the American GNP into the Marshall Plan. In today's dollars, that would mean giving foreign aid of more than $200 billion a year. What do you think we Americans actually do in terms of economic foreign aid today? Less than $7 billion. For all practical purposes, nothing. We give $8 or $9 billion worth of military aid, but almost no economic foreign aid.

World War II led to the end of the colonial empires. When I was a student in the '40s and '50s in school, they still had the old maps where, other than Europe and North America, everything was either green or red-- red if you were in the British Empire, green if you were in the French Empire. If it hadn't been for World War II, those empires might be there today. They certainly would have lasted a much longer period of time.

It's interesting, the whole concept that poor people can get rich came out of World War II. The word foreign aid never left anybody's lips before World War II, because the purpose of the Third World was to make the First World rich. India was supposed to make Britain rich, not vice versa. Now, there's a big argument among historians about whether the British put more money into India or took more money out of India, but there is no argument about what the British were trying to do.

[LAUGHTER]

[APPLAUSE]

The purpose was to take Third World countries and use them to make yourself rich. And the whole concept that everybody in the world could, in fact, become rich, and that the rich people might even help them a little bit to become rich was something that came out of this period of time. The same thing is true of the social welfare state. And whatever its current problems is, what the social welfare state basically said is, when you're sick, when you're old, when you're unemployed, you will not be thrown off the ship of state. You will be allowed to live.

Because there were people prior to this time, and people now, who are basically practicing what is called survival of the fittest capitalism. And I'll remind you a bit of history. Darwin did not invent the phrase survival of the fittest. It was invented by a 19th century economist by the name of Spencer, who believed it was the duty of the economically fit to drive the economically unfit into starvation and out of the economy. Spencer is having a revival today, but he was not popular in the 1940s and the 1950s, because people remembered the '30s and the '40s, and they remembered that too many people would be thrown off the ship when they became old, when they became sick, when they became unemployed.

We also had a decision to make at the time of the Marshall Plan. Does the United States want to retreat back into isolationism, or does the United States want to create a world economy. Partly because of the challenge of the Soviet Union, where there was a world vision of communism conquering the world, the United States was forced to become international. And in 1944, before the World War was over, up here north in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire we created the GATT Bretton Woods system, which is the system we've lived with for the last 50 years in the world.

That was a system which said that the great open market for the world would be the United States. And every single country in the world that's become rich in the last 50 years has gone through a period of time when at least half their exports came to the United States. That was true of Europe in the '50s, Japan in the '60s, and in the '80s that was true of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and in the '90s it's true of communist China, the PRC. We would be the locomotive for the world. If the world economy slowed down and threatened to slip into a recession, it was our responsibility to engineer a recovery. We would be the manager for the system, taking responsibility to give it leadership.

One of the problems, of course, with this is we sold a whole set of things as anticommunism, and then the question is, do you buy them when communism goes away? One of the things we sold as anticommunism was basically creating the middle class. The GI Bill was central in creating the middle class. As I mentioned, there was no middle class in the 1930s.

The wage and price controls of World War II and setting a new structure of wages was essential in committing the middle class. And with a combination of unionization and social pressure, we basically created what I would call the post World War II social contract between business and labor. And what that social contract said is, if you're running a company, and your profits go up and your sales go up, you will share some of that gain with your employees. That's what created the middle class.

We also sold investment as anticommunism. It's important to remember that the interstate highway system wasn't sold as a highway system, it was sold as a system necessary because we were going to move mobile missiles around the United States, and all the bridges had to be high enough to get the missile trucks under them. And if you go back and read the original legislation in 1957, the words national defense appear in the act for the interstate highways.

It was already mentioned the National Defense Education Act. Many of us who got our PhDs in the 1960s got them on the National Defense Education Act. The space program, one of the most exciting things human beings have ever done, had to be justified as a military race with the Russians. And we probably wouldn't have played in that race unless we thought it was a military race with the Russians. We sold internationalism as anticommunism. That was why it was correct for Americans to intervene elsewhere in the world to try and preserve democracy and keep communism out.

And so if you look at World War II, I would argue to you that it had the most profound effects on the American social and economic system, and it had a half life of about 50 years, where we are today. Because where we are today, of course, is with the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, is all of the anchor points have gone. There is no enemy out there. The United States is threatened by no one. There is no military threat to us.

And the question is, in this brand-new world, what is our vision, and what do we want to do? The one third of humanity who used to live in the communist world has basically said we want to join you. And of course, the problem is that, when they join us, it isn't just they that will have to change, it is partly we who will have to change.

In many parts of the world, it's important to understand, in the post World War II, borders move very seldom, because the one thing America and the Soviet Union could agree on is never move a border between any two countries, because it was too likely that one was our ally, the other was their ally, whoever would lose would call his big brother to help, and there was this fear that the missiles would fly from Moscow to Washington if you moved a border in Africa. In most of human history, borders move. And we're entering an era where borders are going to move everywhere.

15 countries in the old Soviet Union, seven countries in the old Yugoslavia, two countries in the old Czechoslovakia. Every border in Africa is going to move, because they're simply where the British and French armies met in the colonial era, and they make no sense in terms of economics, no sense in terms of ethnic or language results.

India is a big country, which of course has never been one country, except when conquered by an outsider invader, the Moguls or the British. And it's already split into three countries and threatening to split into more. And even north of our border, we may end up with two countries, Quebec and the rest of Canada.

We have a very simple problem. The problem is the post World War II period is over. The impetus of World War II is over. The question is, what is our vision for the future, and can we march to get that vision? When I was dean of the management school, I always used to tell our students that it's very easy to be a manager in a crisis, because it's in a crisis it's obvious you've got to do something. It's not obvious what you have to do, but that's usually pretty easy to figure out. The hard thing is to persuade people to do something. And the crisis does it for you.

The problem at the moment is there is no crisis. The question is, what is the vision? And the answer is we don't know what the vision is. And that's our problem, of course, in Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, and lots of other places in the world. Does this call for an American response and American leadership, or does it not call for an American response and American leadership? And you can't answer that question until you know what the vision is.

The same thing is true when you come to American science policy. What's the vision? Does America want to be the world's science leader, or does it not want to be the world's science leader? What are the benefits and the costs of those two options? And in some sense, I would argue that today's political leadership has a much more tough task than those in the 1930s and the 1940s, because there is no crisis. Can we change without a crisis, and can we create that new vision without a crisis? And that's what we're going to be tested on in the next 10 to 15 years.

At the height of imperial Rome, one of the people who lived in the Roman Empire but was not a Roman said the following about the Romans. "The Romans are not the smartest in the world. The Greeks are smarter. The Romans are not the most numerous in the world. The Spanish are more numerous. The Romans are not the strongest. The Germans are stronger."

"The Romans are not the wealthiest. The North Africans are wealthier. The Romans have not a single piece of military equipment that every army in that world doesn't also have. The Romans have one and only one virtue-- they have a vision, and the ability to march toward it." The question is, do we have a vision and the ability to march toward it? Thank you very much.

[APPLAUSE]

VEST: Not only do I have the unenviable task of being sandwiched between that least dismal of all economists and a flyby of World War II aircraft, which, by the way, has been postponed a few minutes, so don't fear, but I also have the uncanny feeling that Dr. Goodwin has been listening in to the dinner conversation at the Vest household. Males driving endlessly around for fear of asking directions? Imagine that.

[LAUGHTER]

Technology Day is traditionally a showcase for cutting-edge work of this university, a great institution dedicated to shaping the future. This morning, however, you have been invited to look back, to think about the intersection of MIT with the world's most cataclysmic war, and to ponder the reverberations of that [? collision ?] over the past half century. This wide-angle focus, this attention to the lessons of history could not be more timely, as has just been pointed out.

The years represented by the classes of 1945 and of 1970 were periods when universities were integral players in a tumultuous world and national events that modified our agenda and transformed our nature. It appears to me that the closing years of this century will be another such era, a time when remaining aloof from the public arena will be neither appropriate nor possible. The relationship between the American people and their government is changing. Partnerships of every kind between branches of the federal government and involved constituencies are coming under the budgetary axe. And that most certainly includes our research universities.

It's ironic that the threat to our research effort and to our ability to provide affordable education to an undiminished stream of gifted students comes at a time when tremendous breakthroughs are within grasp in countless areas of science and technology. The spirit of the Radiation Lab is not dead. It is the thought of opportunities that may be missed that fuels our concern.

The parties in power in the White House and on Capitol Hill have changed many times since World War II. The concern of the university community is not so much which party holds the reins, but whether Washington decision-makers have the political will and insight to serve society's long-term need for new knowledge, new technologies, and, above all, for superbly educated young men and women. So my message this morning will be twofold, that MIT's future can be just as exciting and adventurous as in the past, and that real and immediate threats could cause us to fall far short.

First, let's look at some indicators of excellence. MIT continues to recruit the most gifted and committed young faculty. Their work is of the first rank. They've transformed our knowledge of the oceans, created the first self-replicating synthetic molecule, observed the wave function of a single atom, gained deep insight into the pervasive tumor suppressor gene notated P53, and created the worldwide web that has electronically connected people and information throughout the world in a simply astounding manner.

The excitement of such work informs their teaching, and it certainly engages their students, which is not to say that we have achieved all our goals with respect to the faculty. We still have difficulty hiring the numbers of women and minority faculty that we need to better reflect and serve a changing America, and our efforts to support a greater portion of faculty salaries from General Institute funds so that they are less dependent on the fluctuating research support still involve a lot of heavy lifting in the fundraising arena.

The second indicator of our promise, of course, is the most important, namely our students. Applications for admission to our undergraduate programs have increased by 25% during the last two years. The attraction of an MIT education has never been greater. In fact, we were caught off-guard by a sudden increase in the fraction of students admitted to this year's freshman class who've accepted our offer. Response is so great, we are likely to end up with a bit of crowding in our dormitories in the fall. But that's a high-class problem.

And the third indicator is the spirit of innovation and inventiveness that permeates our academic programs. We have led the nation, as Paul pointed out, in designing new five-year integrated bachelor, masters engineering curricula, thereby defining a new master of engineering degree, as the first professional engineering degree. The Sloan School's MBA curriculum has been fundamentally restructured, restructured for a new era of global, technologically intensive business organizations.

Implementations will begin this September of a radical new pedagogical approach to undergraduate education in mechanical engineering. We've just established molecular and cell biology as a core degree requirement, and the faculty recently approved our first truly interdisciplinary minor program, one in biomedical engineering.

New information technology, such as computer simulation, interactive CD-ROMs, hypertext educational materials, and instructional uses of the worldwide web are being applied in subjects ranging from language learning to astronomy. If MIT is to remain a world-class institution, this inventiveness, intellectual leadership, and absolute excellence are necessary conditions, but they are no longer sufficient ones.

The present threat to the viability of our national research effort did not suddenly burst upon the scene last November. For the last decade, as Paul has discussed, forces have been chipping away at the partnership created by Vannevar Bush. The process was accelerated by the end of the Cold War, whose military needs and culture of superpower competition had created a climate of support for advanced education and for research. We won a cold peace, but the supportive climate for research universities has eroded.

And then, on the economic front, global competition hit us like a ton of bricks. In a span of 50 years, the United States has moved from producing more than half the world's gross domestic product to producing just about 20%. The drop was as much a blow to the national psyche as it was to the national balance sheet.

There were many factors behind the problems in American industry. The university certainly must accept their share of the blame. In our academic programs, we forgot to pay enough attention to process, to manufacturing, to improving product quality, to systems perspectives. Our engineering schools grew too distant from the realities of industrial practice. Our management schools forgot to pay attention to production, and to the understanding of customers.

At the same time, our costs and our tuitions were growing out of control. This year, we began moving aggressively to improve our own customer service, if you will, and to begin to re-engineer ourselves into a leaner, more modern enterprise. But we were too long getting off the starting blocks. Outside our walls, more trouble was brewing. As the economy became stressed, we witnessed the development of a populist distrust of institutions and groups that aspired to excellence.

Elite became a pejorative term. Gone was the spirit that infused the nation in the aftermath of Sputnik, and that sense that we will not be outdone. Communities that once were proud of their educational systems dumped society's problems at the feet of their ill-prepared teachers and shamelessly sliced into the muscle and bone of school budgets, as aging populations turned their back on the young. Politicians found they could make headlines by attacking the country's most distinguished universities.

Any one of these changes alone would have created a degree of difficulty for us, and any one of them could be handled without doing major damage to our system of research universities. The real difficulty stems from the cumulative effect this damaging cascade of policy and budgetary change. But beyond financial matters, this darkening climate has spawned three disastrous policy errors that threaten our nation's continuing achievement in science and technology.

The first is an inaccurate, unhelpful, and somewhat partisan categorization of research as basic, on one hand, or applied or strategic on the other, and the setting up of an adversarial relationship among these categories. Second is the separation of the goals of research and education in university funding, and third is a failure to recognize research funding as an investment.

Each of these errors has a history of accumulated political baggage, and a set of disturbing consequences. Early in the Clinton administration, the federal government was caught up in a debate about what was called strategic research. The term referred to projects which had clearly foreseeable commercial value. Its supporters in Congress believed that the nation's research establishment had a responsibility to provide direct aid to industries that were being clobbered in the international marketplace. A number of funding agencies dramatically shifted their focus to proposals that involved industrial partners, together with universities that might have a rapid commercial payoff.

But only two years later, just two years later, the pendulum is at the other end of its swing. Many of the most powerful members of the House now declare that the proper function of the federal government is only to fund basic university research. They see things called applied research as the responsibility of industry alone. Collaboration between corporations, government, and universities suddenly is being discouraged.

There is an implicit threat to education and research in the field of engineering in all of this discussion. What money is left in the research budget is to be focused on more fundamental science, which, though of course absolutely essential, should not be the entire portfolio of any nation that desires a vibrant future.

What's wrong with this picture? For one thing, it's predicated on the notion that research enterprises can be turned around on a dime. Today we make better toasters, tomorrow we decode the human genome. I don't need to belabor for this audience how absurd this idea is. Science, technology, and advanced education cannot be turned on and off at will, nor can they undergo major changes of direction every two years.

Research and development is a continuum, of course. Indeed, research, development, and product commercialization is now a very different process than it once was. Its nonlinear workings will not be enhanced by artificial partitioning of research, especially when our parallel objective is educating scientists, engineers, and managers who have the integrated perspective needed for the next century.

Now, this leads me to the second, and really most fundamental, policy error, one that truly could sabotage our future, I believe. And that's the separation of education and research in federal funding policy. Preparing the next generations of scientists and engineers has long been a central feature of the American research university. As Paul so eloquently pointed out, Vannevar Bush envisioned a system in which every dollar invested in university research did double duty. It met the scientific or technical goals of the project, and it supported the education of our graduate students.

Bush's vision and policy was spectacularly successful at MIT. The graduate enrollment grew from 1,600 in 1950 to 5,300 this year. Under this policy, the involvement of graduate students, and indeed of undergraduates, in research has become a defining element of MIT's institutional excellence. And yet, since the late 1980s, the government has been withdrawing from its long-term commitment to pay the full costs of research, which include those expenses incurred by graduate research assistants.

The size of federally funded graduate stipends, and even of prestigious fellowships, has dropped below any pretense of covering the real costs of graduate support. Just this last week, the director of the National Institutes of Health said flatly that NIH is about research, not about education.

The view now holding sway in Washington that the country's requirement for new knowledge can be met over time by providing only the cost of current projects is myopic in the extreme. What could be more efficient and more cost-effective than the double value of research and education that can be credited to each federal dollar spent in an American research university. Continuing to talk about the value of research while making inadequate provisions for graduate education simply amounts to eating our seed corn.

The third policy error I see is the increasing tendency to define research and development as a cost. Research is not a cost. It's an investment. It's an investment with a remarkable financial return, even beyond its payoff in human resources. Even the General Accounting Office, after reviewing the modest literature of the subject, agrees that the annual return on federal investment in research and development is of the order of 25% to 50%.

Michael Dertouzos, head of our laboratory for computer science here at MIT, makes a very persuasive case, that we have realized a 3,000% return to America on the federal investment in computer science and technology of $5 billion over the last 30 years. A look at the federal budget proposals that are emerging from the Congress and from the administration show little appreciation for facts like this.

What are we to do about this dramatic change in our climate? One thing we cannot do is to sit by waiting for our fate to be decided. More than at any time since World War II, my colleagues in the faculty and staff and I are working to make our case in Washington, our case that research universities in general, and MIT in particular, represent not a drain on the national purse, but an investment in the nation's future well-being.

It is not enough for us to just declare our value to the nation, however. We of course have to demonstrate it. We are speaking in every possible forum about the current research at MIT, and about the promise that it holds. We need your help in delivering and demonstrating this message. It's up to us, to all of us, working with our colleagues in other universities, the national associations, and in business and industry to communicate with our legislators, with the press, and with the public at large. We must persuade them that knowledge, knowledge and a population skilled in its creative use, are America's most important resources for the 21st century.

Members of Congress still listen most closely to their own constituents. Talk to them personally. With your help, MIT and the nation's other leading public and private research universities will continue their tradition of creativity and leadership and service to our society. The late 1990s will be a time of reinvention and redefinition of the research university, for all the reasons that Lester has pointed out. I'm confident that we will emerge from this troubled time rededicated to serving our nation and our world.

I'm not pleading for the status quo. Rather, I challenge you, as alumni and alumnae, and I challenge our federal government, and especially I challenge our industries to join with us in a reinvigorated and redefined partnership. This partnership must establish a new national R&D system and a new national innovation system to meet the challenges of the coming economic competition.

The next round, I believe, will be based on excellence in design and innovation, and on successfully addressing broader social and environmental issues, just as the competition of this last decade required us to learn new ways of manufacturing at low cost, high quality, and decreased product cycle times.

So let us affix our seals to a new social contract for education and the advancement of human knowledge and capability. Through this new partnership, with your guidance and your financial support, MIT will continue leading the revolution in molecular biology, and advance the promise of biotechnology. We will come to understand the workings of the human brain and the nature of intelligence, of learning, of memory.

We will bring the MIT quality of mind to assessing and ameliorating the impact of humankind on the Earth's environment. We will secure the advances of computers, communication technology, and the information marketplace for the social good. We will combine the aesthetic, the humane, and the technical in the design of the physical environment and the creation of more livable cities.

We will better understand organizations and businesses, and how to make them more effective in building vital and sustainable 21st century economies. And we will enrich the liberal, visual, and performing arts that, in large measure, define what it is to be human. In sum, with your help, and with a new partnership secured, we can be confident that education and research at MIT will contribute to our nation and to the world a future that is more secure, prosperous, and exciting than any we have known. Thank you very much.

[APPLAUSE]

And now, I have the pleasure to invite all of you to step outside for an event I'm sure you're anticipating, possibly after a rapid stop at the restroom. And that will be the flyby of six vintage World War II airplanes. They will be led by a B-25 similar to the one flown by MIT's own general Jimmy Doolittle. The planes will fly down the Charles River, circle over Boston Harbor, and then return back up the Charles.

This event is not a celebration of military hardware, even of antique military hardware. Rather, it is a tribute. It is intended to be a tribute to all the members of this community who have given their lives in service to their country. We've been told that the best view of the aircraft will be from the grassy area between the auditorium and the parking lot. Between the auditorium and the parking lot, or also from the parking lot itself.

Now, after the planes have completed their loop over the Charles, please adjourn to the Johnson Athletic Center. I remind you that serving lunch to 1,200 people is a task requiring an almost military organization, although I'm sure the veterans among us will attest that the food is hopefully a little better here. Your cooperation by being in your places somewhere around 12:45 when lunch service begins will be much appreciated. My understanding is that the flyby now is scheduled for 12:20, so we have time to make our way orderly out and get in position. Thank you again very much.

[APPLAUSE]

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- And here they come. I see airplanes.

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- And the Massachusetts Institute of Technology remembers World War II 50 years later. Stay with us.

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- This is New England Cable News.

- It was a day back in time, some 50 years in time, yesterday in Boston. Eight World War II aircraft flew over the campus of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. New England Cable News reporter Tom Melville has the story of the commemoration of MIT's war effort half a century later.

- At Hanscom Field in Lincoln, Massachusetts, a worker fueled up a sparkling collection of American technology from World War II. Engines revved, and then the planes roared into the sky over eastern Massachusetts for a flight back in time, a flight to honor the World War II efforts of the students and faculty of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

148 MIT alumni died serving the United States in World War II. This flight of eight World War II planes in formation remembered them.

As the formation passed over MIT's Cambridge campus, hundreds of alumni gathered on the ground, looked up, and remembered their classmates.

- This is a shining moment for MIT, and in commemoration of all those men who gave their lives, and in commemoration of the men like Frank Reintjes here.

- Professor Frank Reintjes stayed on the ground. During World War II, he stayed at home. But he and others at MIT helped win the war for the Allies. Reintjes taught at the MIT Radar School from 1943 to 1946.

- We trained 3,000 Navy officers, Air Corps officers and men, and Signal Corps officers and men.

- Radar technology developed at MIT helped the United States and its allies.

- Radar, as operated by the British, was vital to the protection of London, because they could see German aircraft rising on the mainland long before these were visible.

- The flight, for those who flew it and those who watched, highlighted MIT's role in the development of a number of wartime technologies.

- During World War II, MIT was involved in several new technologies, and was very critical to the war. The radar development, which allowed the bombing to be taking place through smoke and fog and clouds, and also materials technology that ultimately resulted in the jet engine turbine blades.

- MIT also developed the Draper gun sight, which allowed aircraft-mounted guns to hit moving targets, enemy aircraft. B-25 bombers used the sights. This B-25 flew in the formation. This was the type of bomber used by General Jimmy Doolittle, the MIT grad who led the first bombing runs over mainland Japan, and turned the tide of the war. What a joy to fly a B-25 in peacetime, half a century after the war.

- I just wonder why I had the absolute best seat. I was in the [INAUDIBLE] position, so I could see everybody around. I could see the two fighters off on either side. And it was just spectacular. And coming around Boston as they did, it was just unbelievable.

- This brings it home to you. If you were in one of those airplanes and flying, and feeling like you're flying this thing and you're in the turbulent airwaves behind it, you know, the air turbulence, being shot at all at the same time, it brings it very close to home.

- So much of the technology developed during World War II is still in use today. This DC-3 aircraft served in both the European and Mediterranean theaters in World War II. On D-Day, it trailed gliders carrying US servicemen into battle. After the war, it became a corporate aircraft, and it still is.

This flight through sunny blue skies over a nation at peace, over the green patchwork that is greater Boston, celebrated technology, celebrated a school's efforts toward victory, remembered a school's gift of its sons to a nation. Tom Melville, New England Cable News.

- Now, Chad Curtis, Natalie Jacobson, meteorologist Dick Albert with weather, and Mike Lynch on sports. This is NewsCenter 5 at 6:00.

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- But first, we'll tell you why a bit of history was soaring over MIT today.

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A rare glimpse at history today in the skies over Boston. Six World War II military planes flew in formation over the MIT campus just after noon in recognition of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II. On the return flight, they did the traditional missing man formation, in tribute to those who died in the war. Alumni of MIT contributed to much of the technology used to win the war.

- It was an absolutely perfect backdrop for those planes today.

- It was beautiful.

- Really was.

- Finally the sun was out.

- What a view today, as several World War II planes soared across the sky. At 1,000 feet, this bird's eye view of Cambridge. In recognition of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, six military planes took part in a flyby over MIT. The school contributed to the war with technologies such as radar and long-range weather forecasting systems. Also quite a sight for those of us on the ground looking up.

- All right. Finally, there was a spectacular display over the Charles River today, commemorating the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II.

- Several World War II airplanes flew past the MIT campus, a tribute to the MIT technology that helped win the war. And as we take a look at this, we say goodnight. And have a great weekend, everybody.

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