Technology Day 1998 - "Creating Wealth: Knowledge, Skills, Capital, Resources"

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[MUSIC PLAYING]

BILL HECHT: Could I ask you to please take your seats for this Saturday morning class? Now to those of you who are young men and young women-- that's defined by the way by my standard which is you're younger than I am-- many of you don't remember the great pleasure that MIT invested on all of us who are my age and older, which was Saturday morning class.

Typically, these were laboratory classes. They were hard to get to, they were harder to be in, and they were usually impossible to perform. In fact, frequently, one got a whole new sense of appreciation for men like Michaelson and Morley who produced experiments which were totally irreproducible. I'm convinced they threw out all the data except the one that fit their theory. But, of course, their theory was correct, so it doesn't make any difference, as they say.

My name, for those of you who don't know me is Bill Hecht. I'm a member of the class of 1961. I was a Sloan fellow in 1976. And 18 years ago, I took this job for five years and somehow or other have lost the capacity to count or enjoy myself a great deal. I'm executive vice president of the association and your senior employee. It's my great pleasure to welcome you all back to technology day this year.

I usually don't start with an apology, but as many of you know who were here yesterday, we had this visitor who seemed to cause untoward and unconscionable distress among many people-- largely by causing traffic jams on every major and minor artery in Cambridge-- closing an airport here or there, having helicopters land on Briggs Field, and giving a major address at commencement.

The most distressing thing, to me at least-- and, as you all know, I am an MIT loyalist-- was looking at the evening news while I was shaving to go to dinner with a class last night and recognizing that some rock promoter named Don Henley got more press coverage than his MIT commencement speech. But, oh, well. I guess that's more a comment on the media than it is on substance.

It's my great pleasure this morning to kick off this program. I think we have a great one, as we always do. And it's always a special treat to introduce my good friend Chuck Vest. Chuck came to us from the University of Michigan following, by the way, in the tradition of another MIT president, Jerry Wiesner, who came from the University of Michigan.

And Chuck has become very much a part of MIT. And those of you who were at Pop's on Thursday night know that we made his wife an honorary alumna following Chuck. So we now have a first family, both of whom are honorary alumni and alumnae-- Chuck Vest.

CHUCK VEST: Thank you, Bill, and good morning everyone. On behalf of the students, faculty, and staff of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, I'm absolutely delighted to welcome you back to Cambridge and to welcome MIT back to some semblance of reasonable calm and normalcy after yesterday's commencement exercises.

I know that many of you were not able to be in Killian Court, but I opened my part of the program by telling the assembled graduates and families that last week, a faculty member had said to me that she really thought I was a model president. And I was very proud and pleased and sort of floating on top of the ground until I went home and looked in the dictionary and discovered that a model is a small replica of the real thing.

And we had the real thing with us yesterday-- together with a very distinguished scientist and graduate of our joint health science and technology program with Harvard-- Dr. David Ho. I'm told that it's good to tell inside stories about the President of the United States while I have my chance. So I'll tell you what he wanted to share with our students yesterday.

We had an opportunity for Mr. Clinton to spend about 20 or 25 minutes together with Paul and Priscilla Gray, Alex and Brett D'Arbeloff, Becky and myself, and about 14 of our undergraduate student leaders-- all of whom admitted to me later that they were so awed by the presence of the President of the United States they forgot most of the questions they had planned to ask.

But he opened by telling us that he had recently visited a grade school and that a very, very young person there-- a first grader or so-- after everybody had asked lots of things looked at him very seriously and said, are you the real president of the United States? And he said, yes, I am. And the toddler looked at him and said, then why aren't you dead?

As many of you know, this was the first time that we've had a sitting US president address an MIT graduating class. And although our staff carried off the entire event with their usual great skill and aplomb, I must tell you, we were absolutely astonished by the logistical complexity of this undertaking.

As they sometimes say on television ads-- do not try this at home. In fact, I'd recommend that we not try it again for another 10 years or so. As I told the class of '58 last night, the statistics of this undertaking were astounding. We had 300 police officers on campus yesterday. We had a commencement speaker arrive with motorcade consisting of 40-- 4-0 vehicles. And we had snipers on the roof, buildings shut down, and unfortunately, as you know, a lot of traffic congestion.

But one of the things I was really proud of and also pleased to note that a lot of the TV channels picked up, at least yesterday morning, was this typical MIT approach of creating a big group of MIT ambassadors, which were literally a hundred or so of our very dedicated and devoted staff, some of whom are from the Association of Alumni and Alumnae who just simply wandered the crowds, keeping everybody happy, answering questions, solving problems as they rose. And it's those touches that I think make this such a magnificent institution to be a part of.

So I therefore want to take this opportunity to thank the entire community-- and, as I said, including many in this room-- for helping us really put our best foot forward on a day when the whole world was watching-- as indeed it was. The address was run at least once last night on C-SPAN, as well as being broadcast live on the internet.

In one sense, however, I would suppose you could argue that the entire world is always keeping an eye on MIT. Our institution's reputation for excellence in academics and research is exceeded only by our graduates' reputation for innovative entrepreneurship.

The world looks to MIT and its graduates for the ideas and the technologies that enrich our lives and drive our global economy. Whether the topic is the digital transformation of society, or the complex interplay of human activity with the global climate, ocean, and other natural systems, or the amazing growth of biomedical knowledge, or the breakthrough developments and chemistries and material science, or the latest discoveries on the frontiers of physics and astronomy-- you will never find MIT very far from the absolute center of the action.

The world looks to us and to our graduates for innovative leadership in many dimensions. For nearly one and a half centuries, we have done our best to provide just that. The topic for today's discussion is a natural extension of the way the world looks at MIT.

The Institute is seen, and rightfully so, as pragmatic, productive, and energetic as a university. A university that engages directly in the world of commerce, industry, and public policy. The MIT ethos recognizes and, indeed, celebrates the value of entrepreneurism.

Nothing could be more fitting than that we invite our alumni and alumnae to join us today in a discussion entitled Creating Wealth, Knowledge, Skills, Capital, Resources.

We're going to spend the day talking about just how value and wealth are created through the development of new knowledge, through prudent investment in education and training, through the development of skills and expertise needed to bring new products, services, and technologies into the marketplace and into society.

Before we go too far down that road of entrepreneurism, however, we should take a moment to reflect on the fact that the value of an institution like MIT certainly cannot be measured solely-- and definitely not primarily-- in terms of its impact on society's financial bottom line

Our impact on the economy is one of the qualities that distinguishes us among our peers but we should be very clear to ourselves and to the communities we serve that this is only one of the roles which shape our activities and define our reputation.

In recent years, technology day has explored the role of MIT in World War II, the arts at MIT, the oceans as a new frontier, and even the role of technology in athletics and entertainment. MIT is proud of the impact of its graduates and of our faculty on the world in many dimensions. What we do to fuel a vigorous economy is the means to the end of higher quality of life and health throughout the world.

As we begin our discussions, then, let us recall that the best way to celebrate entrepreneurism at MIT is to see it in the larger context-- the Institute's deep and abiding commitment to fundamental inquiry and scholarly discourse-- to the creation and to the sharing of knowledge. That is the real secret that underlies our entrepreneurial success.

When we talk about wealth and MIT, we are talking not simply about economic or monetary abundance. We're also talking about the beauty and inherent worth of the quest for knowledge. We're talking about the transforming power of ideas and insights which enrich our intellectual lives, expand our lifespans, preserve the goodness of our natural environment, help us to understand the mysteries of our own behavioral and social problems, and light our path forward in the great adventure of human existence.

This is at the core of what we do and why we do it. Some of life's greatest rewards come not when we seek profit, but when we seek understanding, knowledge, and wisdom. Along the way, however, we often find that these discoveries have the power to transform our economy and our fortunes as well.

All this was, in fact, forecast by William Barton Rogers, our founder, when he conceived of his original plan for MIT-- a kind of educational institution that emphasized-- and I'm quoting Rogers-- "the value of science and its great modern applications to the practical arts of life, to human comfort and health, and to social wealth and power."

That is what we are here to discuss this morning. So let's get on with it. To address this broader concept of wealth and value, we've assembled an exceptionally engaging group of speakers to lead off this morning's panel. I'm going to introduce all of them now and then ask each to simply come up and speak in turn. And then, as I will indicate in a moment, we will open up for questions and answers.

Our first distinguished speaker will be Dr. Tony K. Tan-- the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of Singapore. Dr. Tan holds honor-- excuse me-- holds an honors degree in physics from the University of Singapore, a 1964 SM degree from MIT, and a PhD in applied mathematics from the University of Adelaide.

He first won election to Singapore's parliament in 1979 and was appointed as minister of education in 1980. After serving in several ministerial posts throughout the 1980s, he moved back to the private sector where he served as chairman and CEO of the Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation. Dr. Tan returned to government service in 1995.

Dr. Tan will be followed by Judith C. Lewent-- senior vice president and Chief Financial Officer of Merck and Company. Judy Lewent came to MIT as a graduate student at the Sloan School following her graduation from Goucher College with a BS in economics. Equipped with an SM degree in management in 1972, she went forth to conquer the business world where her financial and managerial skills led her into a series of senior positions in the international pharmaceuticals industry.

She has held her current position at Merck since 1992. Judy is also a member of the board of directors of Motorola and of Quaker Oats. In addition, she serves as a trustee of the Rockefeller family trust and, to our good fortune, as a member of the MIT Corporation and its executive committee. And she also chairs the corporation's visiting committee for the MIT Sloan School of Management.

Now Judy is a tough act to follow, but Professor David H. Marks will try. In fact, like myself, Dave will try anything if it's for the betterment of MIT. Dave is the crafts professor of civil and environmental engineering here at the Institute, and I suspect has more than a few students in today's audience.

A member of the MIT faculty since 1969, professor Marks founded the Institute's program for environmental education and research in 1992. His pioneering initiative has since evolved into the internationally renowned center for environmental initiatives. As that center's director, professor Marks plays a leading role in the continuing worldwide effort to bring interdisciplinary cooperation, education, and research to the challenge of environmental analysis, planning, and policymaking. Few modern scientific missions are more important than that.

Finally, we will round out the opening remarks with comments from Lester C. Thurow, who currently holds the Jerome and Dorothy Lemelson professorship of management and economics and, of course, as the former dean of the Sloan School.

Lester Thurow graduated from Williams College in 1960, took his MA degree at Oxford's Balliol College as a Rhodes scholar, and earned a PhD in economics at Harvard in 1964. He has been an honorary alumnus of MIT since 1991.

Lester served on the President's Council of Economic Advisers during the administration of Lyndon Johnson. He came to MIT in 1968 and has gone on to achieve a global reputation as a prolific and respected scholar, commentator, author, and teacher.

Professor Thurow is an expert in entrepreneurism. And, believe me, he practices what he preaches. Taken together, these four speakers embody the strength and diversity of the richness of the MIT experience and I therefore should not keep them from you any longer. Dr. Tan.

TONY K. TAN: President Vest, ladies and gentlemen. I woukd first like to thank President Vest and the Technology Day committee for inviting me to speak to you this beautiful morning. Indeed, since leaving MIT some 34 years ago in 1964, I have not known the weather in Cambridge to be so beautiful as today.

The topic of my speech this morning is creating national wealth from the perspective of my country, Singapore. My speech will be in three parts-- I will first describe briefly how Singapore developed from a small fishing village to the modern metropolis that it is today. I will then speak on the current situation in the Southeast Asian region. And then I'll conclude with some remarks on how Singapore sees the way ahead.

But let me begin with the year 1865 when MIT opened classes in Boston with an enrollment of 15 students, bringing to realization William Barton Rogers' years of work to organize an institution of higher learning which would be devoted to scientific and technical training.

In that same year-- 1865-- the island of Singapore, which is roughly the size of the city of Chicago, was already in its 46th year as a British trading settlement at the southern tip of the Straits of Malacca. Could I have slide one, please? This is what Singapore looked like at the time.

By some accounts when sir Stanford Raffles first landed in Singapore in the year 1819 and acquired the tiny island for the British East India company, the population of the island numbered about 150 living in a few shabby huts and dependent on fishing for their livelihood.

But in the months and years to come, the news about the establishment of the free port of Singapore would attract many traders and adventurers to our shores in search of profit and a new life. Slide two.

When the news of Singapore reached the southern parts of China, Chinese traders who had previously traveled to places such as Malacca, Brunei, and Manila found it safer and more profitable to visit Singapore instead. Chinese junks brought with them goods and large numbers of immigrants. The news of a trading center in Singapore also reached the Indian subcontinent, and Indian traders and immigrants soon came to the island in large numbers. Slide three.

So at a time when MIT first started holding classes across the Charles River in Boston, on the other side of the world, Singapore was starting to flourish as an important trading post in the East for the British empire.

In 1916, MIT moved to its present campus here in Cambridge. And about the same time, Singapore, which is still a British colony, continued to grow as an important trading port. But Singapore's success was not without problems.

The British had encouraged immigration, but did not pay enough attention to the basic welfare needs of a rapidly growing population. As you can see, immigrants faced poverty and bad living conditions. Then came war in 1942 to 1945. And Japanese occupation of Singapore during World War II demonstrate the inability of the British forces to protect the people of the colonies.

And, understandably, the return of British rule after the war met with demands for independence. And in time, these demands became too strong for the British to resist. That's the proclamation of independence in Singapore in 1965.

A union of Singapore with independent Malaysia in the early 1960s-- from '63 to '65-- proved to be brief and unhappy. And after a few years as part of Malaysia, Singapore left the federation and became an independent, sovereign state in 1965 under the shadow of racial rights, unemployment, poverty, and ethnic strife.

It is not surprising that many commentators confidently predicted, at a time of separation in 1965, that Singapore, in view of its lack of natural resources, could not survive as an independent state. But the island weathered the difficult years after separation, established its own national identity, and became a thriving metropolis.

Today, Singaporeans enjoy the second-highest standard of living in Asia after Japan and Singapore is an integral part of the world's trading and economic system. How this was achieved and how Singapore created national wealth from inauspicious beginnings is the focus of the next part of my speech.

When Singapore became independent in 1965, the British left the island with a relatively well-developed legal system, a functioning civil service, and a good port. Together with a strategic geographical location, these assets led to the commerce and trading sector becoming the pillar of growth for Singapore at that time.

But dependence of the Singapore economy on trade had its limitations. A rapidly growing population increased pressure on the capacity of the Singapore economy to meet their needs. Unemployment was common. The physical infrastructure of the island was inadequate and under tremendous stress.

Housing was poor. Slums were abundant. And this was only 34 years ago. Slide 10. Poverty plagued the majority of the island's population. the. Absence of a domestic market or hinterland because of the separation from Malaysia compounded the economic problems that Singapore faced in those early years of our nationhood.

But worse, there were signs that the inter-port trade on which Singapore, then depended to earn a living was stagnating. New ways of leveraging on the inter-port trade to create new economic growth had to be found.

The withdrawal of British forces from Singapore in 1968-- three years after Singapore gained independence-- was not only a major economic blow to Singapore, but also created a security vacuum for the island. Consequently, the first tasks of the newly independent government in Singapore was to build a defense capability base or national service because of our small population which could secure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the new nation.

On the economic side, the withdrawal of British forces and the closure of British bases cost Singapore one-fifth of its GDP. So newly-independent Singapore had to quickly overcome the major problem of unemployment.

The way the Singapore government went about this was to aggressively build infrastructure. We had a massive public housing program in order to house Singaporeans. We built roads, bridges, ports, airports, telecommunication facilities, and all of these proceeded at great haste.

And at the same time, a unique tripartite partnership between employers, trade unions, and the government was established which allowed Singapore to mobilize its domestic labor resources quickly and effectively. Next slide.

The government also placed great emphasis on education and training, because we were an island with a small population. We provided places in school for every child of school-going age. We created technical colleges to impart the technical expertise required by the newly-established companies in Singapore.

We also established universities. This is the Nanyang Technological University which was established in 1980 and which MIT has been very much involved. And these universities were created to ensure that bright Singaporeans could attain the highest academic qualification.

Fortunately, all this happened at a time when the world was experiencing rapid expansion in trade. World trade grew at more than 8% per annum between 1963 and 1973 compared to 5% per annum in the preceding 10 years. Increasing numbers of investors from industrialized countries were seeking low cost production bases overseas to supply the world market. As world trade boomed, Singapore rode the boom and was able to revitalize its economy.

I'll go on to the next phase now, which lasted from about 1965, from the time Singapore became independent, to the early 1980s. When Singapore became independent, many countries in the developing world looked upon Western, multinational corporations-- or MNCs-- as unwelcome remnants of a previous imperialist era.

But Singapore, which was desperate to create jobs for a growing population, actively and deliberately courted MNCs, attracting them to locate operations in the new industrial estates which had quickly been established.

An economic development board was set up which adopted a multifaceted approach to investment promotion involving coordinated industrial policy, identification of new business opportunities, manpower development, and active industry development. The aim of the Singapore government was to create a liberal and investor-friendly investment regime which would allow MNCs freedom and corporate ownership in the repatriation of profits.

Ultimately, our aim was to create, within Singapore, first world operating and living conditions-- but essentially at third world costs. And our success in attracting MNCs was a key to Singapore's rapid growth as a manufacturing center for export-oriented industry.

This shows the GDP growth. Consequently, Singapore's real GDP growth rates averaged a phenomenal 13% per annum in the years from 1966 to 1973. With the success of industrialisation, Singapore not only achieved full employment by the 1980s, but was importing increasing numbers of foreign workers to ease a growing labor shortage.

Rising wages and inflation became concerns for Singapore's economic competitors. We had to, again, restructure our economy. But this time, consciously moving away from labor-intensive activities towards capital-intensive industries that favored high wage, high value-added jobs.

While Korea and Taiwan were aggressively targeting technological development to their own indigenous companies, Singapore continued with the MNC partnership strategy-- encouraging multinational companies to evolve from a predominantly manufacturing role to one that encompasses product development and design responsibilities. The growth of seaport, airport, telecommunications, financial, and tourist services strengthened Singapore's economy.

This is a pie chart of our economy last year with manufacturing accounting for 23% of our GDP-- the highest would be in financial and business services-- 29%, transport and communication 10%, commerce 18%-- which is a significant change, because this sector would have been the major sector when Singapore became independent. And other sectors, 12%.

And so by 1997, the Singapore economy had become a multifaceted economy, which has standed us in good stead when the economic crisis hit the region last year.

By the late 1980s, Singapore had joined the ranks of the newly industrialized economies and had built up a diversified economy where trade was supplemented by manufacturing, transport and communications, banking and finance, and tourism. Can I have the next two slides, please? This is a picture of our central business district today in Singapore. That's our new MRT line which was built a few years ago.

The success of Singapore's ability to create national wealth and to improve the standard of living of its people in the 33 years since our independence in '65 can be seen by comparing some social indicators from the 1960s to the present time.

These are some of the social indicators-- let me take the first one, which is life expectancy. Life expectancy increased from 67 years in 1965 to 77 years by 1997. Home ownership in 1965 when it became independent, only 29% of Singaporeans owned their own homes. And by 1995, the ratio had increased to 91%.

This shows the number of telephone lines-- so put in a different way, the number of telephone lines increased from 17 persons sharing one line in 1965 to just two persons sharing one line in 1997.

35 years ago, less than half of all Singapore households would order television sets. Today, there is at least one television set in every home. Infant mortality dropped from a high 20 per 1,000 births in 1965 to a low 3.3 per 1,000 births today.

And finally, university education-- in 1965 only 3% of every cohort entered university in Singapore. And by 1996, this has increased to 22%. What I've described so far is what has happened to Singapore up to now. I think what is more important is what will happen in Singapore from now on. And to answer this question, we have to look at the present situation not only in Singapore, but also in the Southeast Asian region.

Much has been said and written about the causes of the economic and financial crisis in Southeast Asia and East Asia. We started with the devaluation of the Thai currency-- the Thai baht-- in July 1997.

Within a period of one year, enormous wealth has been wiped out from the countries in Southeast Asia and the extent of devastation in the Southeast Asian economies can be seen from the movements in the Southeast Asian currencies and stock markets-- could I have chart one, please?

This shows the drop in the currencies-- the worst hit, of course, has been the Indonesian rupiah, which has dropped to about 23% of its value compared to July '97 within the course of one year. The others would be the Thai baht, the Malaysian ringgit, and Korean yuan. Singapore itself has depreciated by about 15% since July 1997, but we have been relatively unaffected compared with our neighbors.

In addition to the currencies, the falls in the regional stock markets were just as severe and, in some cases, even more. Can I have chart two? Since 1st of July, 1997, the stock indices in the regional stock markets in Southeast Asia have fallen by between 30% to 60%. This shows a drop in the stock markets in our part of the world.

If you combine the stock markets together with the fall of currencies in terms of US dollars, the falls have been in the order of 80% to 90%. And I'm told that today the market capitalization of a single large American company like IBM or Microsoft would be more than the combined stock market capitalization of Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Korea-- which is an indication of how much wealth has been wiped out from the region in the space of one year.

The severity and the protected nature of the Asian crisis caught everyone by surprise. After all, East Asian countries had good macroeconomic fundamentals. We had high GDP growth, low inflation, and high savings. But it turned out that good macroeconomic fundamentals alone were not enough.

For example, high savings alone were not enough. These high savings had to be intermediated efficiently by sound domestic banking systems. And, in general, East Asia institutions have not kept up with the rapid pace of growth in their economies in the last few years.

One example is that Southeast Asian banking systems were not equipped to handle the large inflows of capital into their economies in the 1990s. Could I have chart three?

This shows the net private capital inflows into Asia and into the developing countries. The top line shows the total net capital inflows of all developing countries. And this is the one that shows a flow of capital to Asia.

In the six years between 1992 to 1996, the flow of capital from industrial countries-- such as the United States-- to emerging markets increased five times from $40 billion US in 1992 to $200 billion US in 1996. And developing Asia absorbed almost half of all net private capital flows into developing countries in 1994 to 1996. And when confidence ebbed, East Asia saw large outflows of capital within a very short time.

The end of the economic crisis in Southeast Asia and the restoration of economic growth can only come about with the establishment of properly regulated and well-supervised banking and financial systems. This will take considerable time and effort to achieve.

But if the governments in the region have the necessary will and determination and are assisted by multi-national agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank, I am confident that the regional economies can return to the path of sustainable growth within a period of three to five years.

In the meantime, the main worry is Indonesia, which has seen violent turmoil in recent months. It is a great relief that a smooth, peaceful political transition has taken place in Indonesia with President Habibie taking over from President Suharto. And we, of course, hope that political and social stability can be quickly restored in Indonesia so that economic progress will be possible.

With Indonesia occupying such a large and important role in Southeast Asia, a prosperous and stable Indonesia will be beneficial for the whole region. Let me now focus my remarks on Singapore.

Although Singapore has largely escaped the economic storms which have affected Southeast Asia, we have not been totally unaffected. Our commerce and financial services sectors have been more severely affected by the regional downturn. Tourism and tourism-related industries, for example, have been hit by the plunge in tourism rivals as tourists from the ASEAN countries and the newly-industrialized economies account for about half of our total visitor arrivals.

Growth in our exports has also moderated due partly to weaker regional demand. However, the impact of the crisis on Singapore has been cushioned by the strength of the US and European economies. For example, based on 1996 data, more than half of Singapore's electronic exports go to the US and the European Union. Today, Singapore is the largest manufacturer of disk drives.

And the bulk of Singapore's foreign direct investments also come from developed countries such as the United States, Japan, and Europe-- and most of our manufacturing products are exported to the OECD markets. We will continue to strengthen our civil and business institutions in Singapore and make sure that resources flow into productive areas.

For example, Singapore took steps in May 1996 to prevent the type of asset bubbles-- particularly in property prices-- which has added to the problems of our neighbors. This shows the property prices and the measures taken by the government in 1996 in order to slow down the growth, which has shown a gentle downturn, but not a collapse. This has happened in Indonesia, Malaysia, and in Thailand.

So, as a result, asset prices in Singapore have not taken a large fall which would otherwise have had a devastating effect on the Singapore economy. The exposure of Singapore's companies and banks to the region-- although not negligible-- have also not been large enough to be destabilizing for the Singapore economy.

So let me sum up by saying that in spite of the regional economic crisis, Singapore's macroeconomic fundamentals and institutions remain sound. Singapore has large foreign reserves, positive current account and fiscal surpluses, and no external debt. We also have a sound banking sector and strong institutions and a stable government.

To prepare for the longer term and to guard against a slowdown in business, Singapore has to watch its business costs carefully to ensure that we remain competitive. At the same time, we are enhancing our capabilities and accelerating the building of good physical infrastructure. When the countries in the region resume their growth, as they will one day, Singapore is well-positioned to continue its traditional role as the gateway to the regional southeast Asian countries.

Although the strategy of developing Singapore as a multifaceted manufacturing and services hub has been successful, this does not mean that Singapore can afford to rest on its laurels. I believe that it was Andy Grove of Intel, which made the remark that only the paranoid survive.

And the truth is that we have to take cognisance of fundamental changes in the world's economy, particularly for a small country like Singapore, and adjust our economic strategy from time to time in order to continue our growth and progress. So I'll conclude my speech now by describing how Singapore sees the way ahead.

We believe that in the 21st century, the world will be dominated by knowledge industries with technology and information processing spurring growth. I think that President Clinton referred to this in his commencement speech yesterday.

And for Singapore to further progress, we must transform our economy to a knowledge-based economy which stresses skill and creative people as a main pillar of growth for the economy. This means that a good education and training system covering not only the pre-employment stage in schools and universities, but also the in employment stage in companies-- as well as the ability to acquire, process, and create new knowledge-- will be a country's key competitive advantage.

In the years to come, Singapore's economic growth will come from our ability to leverage on our human capital and to enhance the skills of our people. To develop a knowledge-based economy in Singapore, we are undertaking three initiatives.

First, we are revamping our school curriculum, taking steps to enhance thinking skills and innovation in our schools under the slogan, thinking schools, learning nation. Our aim is to promote a learning culture within Singapore. And at a tertiary level in our universities, we are revamping the curriculum in order to enhance broadening of outlook and skills as recommended by an international academic advisory panel which met in Singapore in August last year. Indeed, Robert Brown is a very valuable member of the panel.

We have also taken advantage of our links. We've established universities overseas to review our curriculum. The MIT School of Engineering, for example, is finalizing a yearlong review of education curriculum in the universities in Singapore, which will result in large changes.

The second initiative is that we are formulating a strategy for lifelong learning so that people who are doing work will continue to be trained. For a person to remain employable throughout his working life in the 21st century, he or she will need to change his or her career several times. And this means that people must be prepared to learn new skills throughout their lives.

The Singapore Ministry of Manpower and the Ministry of Education are implementing a national strategy to ensure such lifelong learning and to encourage our workers to continue to upgrade themselves continuously.

Third, we will continue to liberalize our economy and open our markets-- including the markets in services like finance and tele-communications and encourage a more entrepreneurial spirit in Singapore. In the years to come, we see economic growth in Singapore coming not only from large companies, but also increasingly from small, nimble companies which can spot emerging trends and react more quickly than large organizations.

To foster entrepreneurial activity, we are making changes in the structure of our economy, like taxation and regulation. And these have to be implemented expeditiously but without lessening the prudence and efficiency which have made Singapore attractive to investors both domestically and worldwide.

Finally, crucial to Singapore's success in the coming years will be a welcoming attitude to foreign talent who can supplement Singapore's indigenous talent pool and help to enhance our competitiveness and further strengthen our economy.

Like the United States, Singapore is ultimately a country which has been built by immigrants who come in search of a better life. And so long as we open our doors to able people who want to live and work in our country, so long will Singapore continue to thrive and prosper.

Ladies and gentlemen, during last three decades, Singapore has grown from a poor, underdeveloped country with high unemployment and a per capita GDP of less than US $500 to become a nation city-state of three million people with full employment and a per capita income of US $18,000 last year.

From the start, we had come to a simple and clear realization that Singapore is a small, fragile nation with almost no natural resources. It had to plug itself firmly to the global economic network to survive. And we owe a special debt to the United States for your leadership in resisting protectionism, championing free trade, and keeping international markets open.

Fortunately, years of heeding the discipline of the markets have prepared us to handle the present uncertainties in the region calmly and deliberately. The creation of wealth is an ongoing process which requires constant attention, effort, and development.

The present economic crisis, which is sweeping East Asia, shows how easy it is for prosperity-- which has been built on unstable foundations-- to crumble to dust. Vision, hard work, entrepreneurial skills, and sound leadership have been responsible for Singapore's success. And these are the same qualities which have made MIT the leading university in the world today in science and technology. Thank you and I wish all of you a happy and enjoyable day.

JUDITH C. LEWENT: Good morning. Let me echo the sentiments expressed already about how pleased I am to be part of this very distinguished panel. And, clearly, to be honored to be part of a very exciting alumni weekend. Clearly the topic at hand here in terms of building wealth is equally relevant and important.

And I just want to express before I get into the core of my comments the extra significance to me personally of MIT and the clear and strong links that MIT has to another institution which means an awful lot to me, and that is Merck. And in thinking about that, I think I could capture that in a very brief way.

To echo what Chuck reminded us about-- which is the founding mission of MIT-- and that rests on the linkage of the practical application of research to industry. And when I think about that and I think about Merck, I would say it's epitomized by the 138 graduates of MIT who participate at Merck predominantly in our research laboratories and in our manufacturing enterprise. And also the great pride and great expectations that we carry at the inception of a five year, $15 million research collaboration that we have instituted between Merck and MIT.

But now, let's get down to the topic and talk specifically about building national wealth through investment and innovation. And I'll start with the premise that pharmaceuticals, compared to many other industries, is actually not a capital-intensive business, yet it does take significant investment in financial and physical capital to get our job done.

Actually at Merck, if you add up what we have on our books today in property, plant, and equipment, it totals about $12 billion. But our industry's wealth is created primarily through intellectual capital. And here, we are ahead of the curve. And you'll hear in my comments an echoing of the presentation that just preceded.

Because in today's information age, financial and physical capital no longer are the key assets. The only strategic imperative is knowledge. And for this reason alone, the knowledge-based pharmaceutical industry serves as an excellent case study in building wealth.

Our success is a function of let's try three P's-- people, patents, and patients. They are the keys to how we build wealth through investment and innovation. People-- our employees-- drive our ability to leverage knowledge effectively. Patents are the pharmaceutical industry's mechanism for protecting and promoting discovery. And our relationship with our patients-- the real benefactors of our innovation-- is what ultimately builds social and economic wealth.

Given these insights, what are the factors that have propelled the US pharmaceutical industry to be a global leader? And how can other US knowledge-based industries use these same factors to strengthen the national economy? Let's begin with investment.

The US pharmaceutical industry leads all other industries in research and development investment. US industry in general overall invests less than 4% of sales in R&D. In contrast, America's research-based pharmaceutical companies will spend more than 19% of sales-- or $20 billion dollars-- on R&D in this year alone, which also represents a tripling of the amount spent only 10 years ago.

Now what may seem counterintuitive at first glance is that the industry's sustained this high level of investment despite the inherently risky nature of our R&D process. To cite one example, only one in about 5,000 compounds screened in our research labs becomes a prescription medicine.

From discovery, to lab testing, to animal testing, to human testing, to regulatory approval takes about $400 million on average and 12 to 15 years. And with all of that, only three out of 10 marketed prescription medicines actually recoup the cost of this investment.

So many skeptics are right to ask, why bother? Actually, the odds are better in Vegas. And, as a matter of fact-- returning to my economic roots-- there exists a concept in the world of economics that's called gamblers ruin. And, simply stated, what it means is that as long as you get an adequate return, you can stay at the table despite the fact you're playing with high stakes. But the catch is that you better understand the risks or you may lose everything.

And herein lies the paradox of pharmaceutical R&D. The way to deal with high risks is to invest more. Now, ironically with all of this, people only see the big payoff from a breakthrough drug, but they aren't there in our labs as I have been when compounds fail. And they don't witness the many products that actually fail commercially.

It's actually sort of like assuming that all movies are box office successes like Jurassic Park-- and for those of you who have any memory of a great failure, that none of them are Waterworld. But in both cases, people miss the investment paradox.

Now let's move on to innovation. Maybe the best way to shape this discussion is, again, to pose two questions. First, on a micro level-- what conditions have to exist for an individual pharmaceutical company to be successful as an innovator? And then on a macro level-- what conditions enable industry overall to contribute to economic growth through innovation?

Again, with our MIT heritage, I want to cite Dr. Rebecca Henderson, who shed light on these macro level issues by asking the following-- is it enough to invest large amounts of money in R&D and assume innovation simply will follow? Her answer was, no. Innovation needs to be managed.

Those companies that remain innovative over time first keep connected to the scientific community, second, allocate scarce resources effectively and third, manage organizational design appropriately. So let's look a little closer.

First-- keeping connected to the scientific community is critical because innovative pharmaceuticals require more than industry can do alone. Without an historic research partnership with government and academia, our US pharmaceutical industry would not be nearly as productive as it is today.

At Merck, we pride ourselves in having strong, in-house research capabilities, but that doesn't preclude us from having our scientists go outside to publish in scientific journals, attend conferences, and collaborate with scientists and leading universities-- as I indicated earlier. And it's through this peer review that scientific knowledge advances. One term that we use to refer to this is external R&D spillover.

Now turning to allocating scarce resources effectively. This, too, is critical, because the road to drug discovery and development is costly, it's long, and it's stochastic. At Merck, we are currently spending a record $1.9 billion in R&D-- 1998.

But to Dr. Henderson's point, it's not just the amount of research investment that maximizes innovation, it's how effectively we allocate those R&D resources that create a critical competitive advantage. So our strategy is specific, focused, concentrating on diseases with large patient populations. And then we want novel products that are potent, well tolerated, convenient to use, and with clinical results that are meaningful to physicians and patients.

And finally, managing organizational design appropriately is also critical to managing innovation. Here professor Henderson found that organizations typically choose to organize by function or to organize by project. Organizing by function ensures that the specialized knowledge necessary for long-term innovation is preserved, while organizing by project encourages rich communication across functions.

Observation-- the most successful pharmaceutical companies are never satisfied with one approach. These companies benefited from internal R&D spillover that resulted from a communication across both function and product lines.

So ideally, the individual pharmaceutical company must do three things to succeed-- keep connected to the scientific community, allocate scarce resources effectively, and manage organization design appropriately. And let's not forget-- these hold true for the success of other knowledge-based industries as well.

Now let's turn to the macro level. Here, we believe there are five enabling conditions for pharmaceutical innovation-- preserving the US free market, continuing support of basic research by the federal government, protecting intellectual property at home and abroad, streamlining our regulatory system, and creating a global business environment conducive to innovation.

The first enabling condition for innovation is to maintain a free market in the United States. A free market is clearly important to all industries because that is what attracts investment and rewards innovation. And for a high-risk industry like pharmaceuticals, a free market is critical.

Other countries have actually seen the chilling effects of policies that restrict access to medicines, control prices, or ignore intellectual property rights. It's actually very close to home. Take our fence-line neighbor, Canada.

In the 1970s and 80s, Canadian patent law allowed generic copies of existing patented drugs to be sold on a virtually unrestricted basis through compulsory licensing. The result of that was lights went out in Canadian labs as Merck and many of our other competitors significantly reduced investment in Canada.

Now contrast this with post-1987 and again in 1993 when the Canadian Parliament enacted legislation to protect patented medicines. Merck and many of our other colleagues responded. And for Merck, we responded through our subsidiary Merck Frost with a $63 million investment in a center for therapeutic research. The result for us-- our scientists discovered and developed Singulair, a revolutionary treatment for asthma for children and adults. But it didn't just benefit human health and it didn't just benefit the pharmaceutical industry, it boosted Canada's balance of trade and economy.

A second enabling condition for innovation mandates that the federal government's continued support be there for basic biomedical research. Again, there's a symbiotic relationship that we have to pursue here-- both basic and applied research are needed to drive innovation. It's a collaborative effort and each of us have special and distinct competencies in that regard.

Historically, as you know, government through grants to America's research universities exemplified by MIT advances basic research. And then in the case of pharmaceuticals, think about the advances it's been able to provide in understanding how the human body works, revealing pathways of disease, and developing other critical technologies.

Industry then weighs in and applies this information through our research investment to the next steps of research, discovering a compound and then carrying it forward through clinical trials, process development, manufacturing, and distribution.

Now I saw fantastic cover of the Boston Globe this morning, so I don't want you to totally misread my interest in the Boston Globe by the next comments that I'm going to make. But, unfortunately, there is a recent reference in the Boston Globe that illustrates the fact that the public's understanding of these complementary yet unique roles is flawed.

According to this article in The Globe, industry's use of government-funded basic research is, and I quote, "a pattern of scientists and universities cashing in on government-funded inventions." close quote. To illustrate the counter to that-- 97% percent of prescription medicines available in the US today came through the high-risk pipeline of the industry, not government-- and industry couldn't have done it, though, without the collaboration on the basic research side.

This lack of understanding of the government's role in science and technology, as we all know, carries over to Congress, where some would like to shift the funding focus to applied research-- such as product or process development. These are the areas where the pharmaceutical industry excels. And if Congress shifts priorities, the advance of basic knowledge could be slowed and our research system could be thrown out of balance with a resulting negative impact on the US economy-- not to mention patient welfare.

Chuck Vest underscored the importance of public funding of basic research in his testimony before the House Committee on Science in March. He said, "there is a generally accepted proposition that innovation is the principal engine of the US economy. Our present and future economic strength depends on an innovation system that has been, since the end of World War II, the envy of the world. I believe that government at all levels plays a crucial role in supporting that system, namely through encouraging and funding research partnerships between universities and industry."

Let's turn to the third enabling condition-- the need to protect intellectual property at home and abroad. Remember, patents is one of those three P's which are the cornerstones of innovation along with people and patients. We're fortunate to have a strong, strictly enforced patent law in the United States.

This gives companies like Merck an incentive to make the decade-long investments in R&D and also gives our shareholders a fair return. In fact, the World Bank funded the study at the University of Pennsylvania which estimated that without adequate patent protection, over 2/3 of new pharmaceuticals would never have been introduced.

And we've made progress in recent years, especially through the general agreement on tariffs and trade. But it's estimated that in some countries, including Argentina, India, Turkey, Egypt, patent piracy costs legitimate pharmaceutical companies $1 billion a year. And piracy can thrive even despite strong national intellectual property laws on the books.

Through our trade association, Pharma, the US pharmaceutical industry, works with the US Trade Representative and the World Trade Organization when countries fail to enforce or comply with the letter and the spirit of intellectual property laws. In South Africa, for example, the US Trade Representative placed the country on a watch list after President Mandela paved the way for parallel imports and violated patent rights.

Now the fourth enabling condition for innovation is a regulatory environment that is effective, efficient, and puts patients first. The US has long led the world in the discovery of important new drugs, but historically too many of these new medicines were available abroad before they benefited patients at home because of the delays in the approval process by the Food and Drug Administration.

It's critical, of course, that the FDA both protects patients and improves new medicines in a timely fashion. And in order to accelerate drug approval, the Prescription Drug User Fee Act was reauthorized last year mandating that the FDA reduce review time to 12 months or less. And the FDA has kept its word.

For example, returning to Singulair, the asthma medicine I mentioned earlier-- it was approved by the FDA in February of this year, 1998, exactly one year after our company submitted our new drug application to the agency. And the FDA also recognizes that because we are dealing with the health of people, there are cases that deserve special attention.

So the agency's accelerated drug approval process, new medicines that can mean life or death for patients, receive expeditious review. One such case was Merck's drug, Crixivan, for AIDS. On March 13th, 1996 the FDA approved Crixivan just 42 days after the drug was filed-- the fastest approval in the agency's history.

And now the last-- the fifth enabling condition for innovation is policies that help create a global business environment conducive to innovation. Many economists have pointed to the success that certain Japanese firms have enjoyed based largely on national industrial policies. But this success does not extend to the Japanese pharmaceutical industry.

A study conducted at Columbia University showed that US pharmaceutical companies are among the most innovative and competitive in the world, while their Japanese counterparts have remained among the weakest. The study showed that industrial policy works best in our industry when it creates a home market and vigorous competition that forces domestic firms to develop necessary competitive skills.

For the pharmaceutical industry, these so-called tough domestic markets are characterized by favorable pricing, significant public funding of research, and strict regulatory approval standards. In this kind of an environment, regulators must approve drugs not because of local protectionism, but because of the drug's global quality and innovativeness.

And countries that have engaged in these policies, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Switzerland have nurtured globally competitive industries like pharmaceuticals. And countries that have steered away from these policies, such as Italy, France, and Japan are now at a competitive disadvantage.

While the US economy is booming-- and, again, in the spirit of not resting on our laurels-- we must not forget what led to our present success. Michael Porter of the Harvard Business School spoke about the growing threat to American innovation at the National Innovation Summit here, again, at MIT.

His research shows that we as a nation are beginning to pay less attention to the fundamental factors for innovation, especially in research and education. After years of success, we are living off past investments and now risk becoming complacent. But here again, the pharmaceutical industry remains an exception as measured by the continued registration of new patents which support our innovation.

Likewise, the other enabling conditions that made the pharmaceutical industry one of America's most successful business stories are the same ones that will bring success to other knowledge-based industries. When in place, they foster an environment in which all knowledge-based industries can leverage their intellectual capital through investment and innovation. Leveraging intellectual capital through investment and innovation are the primary driver of how wealth is created in today's global economy.

Now I know I gave you three P's as the basis for success, but I'd like to close with a special focus on just one-- people-- and actually share a story with you that may sound apocryphal, but it's actually true. Recently one of our newer security guards at our research facility in Rahway, New Jersey was working the graveyard shift when a car drove up to the gate.

As he watched from the guard box, a man jumped from the car and ran to the lab. He was actually dressed in a bathrobe and slippers were flying around. And the guard stepped back and said, so this is Merck.

What this guard was actually recognizing is that innovation, first and foremost, is about people. It's people who carry the knowledge. It's people who aspire to discovery. It's people who translate the abstracts of enabling conditions for innovation to the reality of building wealth. And, clearly, MIT and those of us who have the benefit of time on this campus recognize this principle and strive to apply it in our daily lives-- both personally and professionally. I thank you very much and I look forward to the participation later on the panel.

DAVID H. MARKS: Good morning. Good morning. Good morning. I stand by-- I just realized I'm on-- instead of a coffee break, good morning. Do you know the difference between teaching undergraduates and teaching graduate students? It has to do with good morning.

When you come to an undergraduate class, half of them are there half of them are not there. No one's sitting in the front row. Some of them who are there are asleep or drinking orange juice-- or we hope it's orange juice. And you say, good morning, to them and they go, uh.

You go to a Sloan School class or to a leader for manufacturing class-- people who have seen total quality management and have been trained in the importance of communication-- and you say, good morning, and they say, good morning. You go to a graduate level science class and they're all there and they're all in the first row and their notebooks are all open and you say, good morning. And they write it down.

And you go to an audience like this and you say good morning-- and the audience of industry or alumni-- you say, good morning, and they say, that's easy for you to say in academia, you have tenure. Well, good morning. My topic today-- how do I start this? Can I have the first slide or is this a slide thing here? I'm a professor of technology. Paul, could you help me?

There it is, OK. Was this from my lecture? Oh, yeah. And basically, I'd like to give you a message here that could be half full or half empty. And following the previous two speeches, we are talking about wealth creation. Oh, thanks, OK. Forward.

But at the same time, I'd like to talk about global sustainability. And that is as we see a world population grow from our present five billion to a much larger world-- when, in fact, the activities associated with that wealth generation can create natural resource depletion and environmental impacts which could cause great problems for us all.

Exactly what will happen-- what are the business opportunities that will grow out of this? Because this is not just a half empty glass. I'm not here to tell you to hug a tree or to shower with a friend-- well perhaps not. But I would like to talk about the opportunities that come from these sorts of problems and, in fact, increased vulnerabilities as well and to give you some statistics which are probably a little different than what you have seen before.

My job at MIT-- I'm an environmental professional. One of about 5% of our students and professors and research are about environmental professionalism, but it's the other 95% of you who go out and create new products, decide what materials are in them, decide what those products will do or won't do, decide whether you will take them back, make decisions about where the resources will come-- which, in fact, are the ones who drive environment and sustainability problems.

And it is my job as well to worry about the literacy of these sorts of people. And I'm going to show you a slide now which was presented here by Joan Morbidow who is from Lucent Technologies. And it has to do with market potential for telephones.

And if you take a look at the upper right, over half of the world's population lives more than two hours travel time from the closest telephone. And Lucent's reaction to this is, hot diggity dog. The average woman in rural Africa spends six hours a day simply gathering the food, fuel, and water that the family will need that day. The guys are hunting or watching TV.

Tokyo has more telephones than all of sub-Saharan Africa. Four billion people of the five billion people presently on earth don't have a telephone. Hot diggity dog, let's sell them some telephones. What is it about that process by which they go from not having a telephone to having a telephone? What are the implications of that for natural resources? What are the implications of that for the environment? What are the implications of that for our educational processes?

And this, I think, is a problem that we are all wrestling with and what causes great problems. Because my premise is that business as usual and wealth creation will be very different in the 21st century, not just from a technical point of view-- and everybody has talked here about the rapid changes of technology-- but from a social point of view as well.

What does drive wealth creation? It's consumer preferences and consumers taking their wealth and investing it in your products. And we're seeing here an awful lot of people in the world who in fact don't have wealth. And in the process of the growth and development that will take place, will begin to have wealth. Will they go through the same cycle that we did of knocking down all our natural resources, creating pollution, and then becoming wealthy enough to remediate those problems?

Or will they, in fact, be able to jump start-- to do something in which they move to more efficient resource use without having to go through this cycle? Now consumer preferences in the United States, however, are not going to save the environment. I mean, you just have to look out at the SUVs that are driving around Cambridge with rhino guards on the front-- whose job are basically to go to the Stop and Shop or to pick up the kids at school at 10 miles per gallon.

And the United States uses 25% of the world's energy, and this is made possible by the other part of what drives wealth creation, which is government restrictions and innovation. And our government gives us wonderfully cheap gasoline to drive those cars and those huge SUVs and calls them trucks, not cars, because trucks have a much less stringent fuel economy requirement than cars do. So governments also influence this as well.

Where will the knowledge and the skilled employees come from to make this change? If we're going to sell telephones-- hot diggity dog-- to all these people throughout the world, where will that come from? As Lucent tries to sell telephones in China, as Ford and GM now are trying to build cars in China or in Thailand, certainly they're not going to import people from New Jersey or from Detroit to build those cars or to manage that process. They're going to be indigenous.

How is it that these global networks communicate and communicate in all directions, particularly the more efficient use of resources? Where will your customers be and who will your competitors be? They are a vastly different lot, I would suspect.

And, finally, what government concerns around the world will influence your business strategy? What new law where will make it more difficult for you to work? Should Ford or should Lucent be pushing for worldwide environmental standards or worker safety standards? Because that would mean that they don't have to change their product or change their processes throughout the world. Should they voluntarily try to do these things-- all major issues.

If you take a look-- as Glenn Urban of our Sloan School has pointed out-- if you take a look at the success factors of industry in the 90s, they all had to deal with globalization, trade barriers going down everywhere, and everybody going all over the world into markets they had not been before, sourcing more the international employee. We saw a tremendous emphasis on least-cost production-- really tightening the costs and trying to bring them down. An increase in total quality management, getting things right the first time.

We saw euphemistically right-sizing. Where is the corporate research lab now in many of these places? And where are the MIT programs that turned out PhDs for corporate research laboratories that no longer exist now? What does all this mean? We're seeing much, much more rapid technological change and sometimes much more risky technological change.

Andy Warhol once said you had 15 minutes of fame. Well it seems like products have 15 minutes of life. And the winners in one technology generation tend to be losers in the next. It's a much more risky business, which needs a much more flexible employee, a much more flexible organization.

These are the lessons of the 1990s. Environment and sustainability is not mentioned in here, or is it? Or is it? Actually the environment is really aided by this. If you want to be a least-cost producer, you don't want to pay for resources and energy that are wasted-- that come out labeled as waste and cost you 20 times more to get rid of than it costs you to buy.

You want to tighten the process. And the idea of loop-closing is really beginning to increase the efficiency of resource use, decrease the amounts of waste-- movement from waste management to waste minimisation-- from waste treatment plants to, in fact, tighter industrial processes.

These sorts of things are going on there and I think we're seeing some massive changes in all of this. Rapid technological change means that you go back to a clean sheet of paper each time. Which means in the paper industry, you're using chlorine now, it's very hard to retrofit to stop using chlorine and bleaching. But in the next iteration, you can begin thinking about a plant that doesn't have any affluence whatsoever-- it does total recycling. And, therefore, these issues go away-- why use something like chlorine? So all of this has been very good for us.

But now I'd like to come to what I think are some of the volatility issues that will begin to affect things in the future. One is the challenge of the megacities. These are a large set of cities which I'll show you a slide of in a minute-- largely south of the equator, which will grow very, very rapidly. And the reasons for their growth are not just that people within them are having more children, but, in fact, there is a massive in migration from traditional agricultural activities or land use activities which are no longer tenable.

And these are very poor people moving to the centers of wealth. What will that mean for markets? Future energy technologies, the price of fossil fuels in the world, and particularly the United States right now is just so low that even attempts at conservation are not bringing much payback-- much less looking at alternative energy sources.

We're going through a massive examination of climate change now that we don't have the smoking gun as to just exactly what will happen there-- whether CO2 is or is not causing global warming or even, in fact, if it is what global warming will mean to us. And yet, at the same time, we suspect that resource use is going on in creating some of these change issues in fact may be untenable for a lot of other reasons as well.

Human health and natural resources-- you can drink coffee today. It's OK to drink coffee today, it's not OK to drink coffee tomorrow. It will be OK the day after. In fact, we really don't know-- we really don't have the science to tell us what is going on. In world trade, the trade barriers have gone down all over the world. Will environmental barriers grow up between them to replace them?

Will we take some copper that comes out of Chile, which comes out of some of the worst environmental conditions in the world-- but that copper is very clean. And then it comes to the United States where the US competitors are superfund sites and are out of business because they have such liabilities. Will there be a barrier against clean copper coming into the United States produced in dirty conditions?

Let me just turn to the first slide on megacities. And I hope that comes out well. These are a set of cities in the south. And if you take a look at the set of cities, the first time I saw this slide there's at least three cities on there that I had never heard of-- which it turns out to have six to 10 million people in them.

And then you take a look at the projection of where that population will be in a few years-- say, in 2025-- and we see Tokyo not increasing very much but, in fact, Shanghai, Bombay, Jakarta, New Delhi growing tremendously. And we can say, hot diggity dog, more people to buy our goods and services, but you can also say these are basically poor people, a lot of them living under the bridges, living in substandard conditions and, in fact, perhaps destabilizing these cities.

We're talking not only about the growth of the cities, but the growth of the importance of these cities as economic powers even more than their states and having almost the inability to deal with these tremendous increases, which could lead to more instability.

Again, the number of very large cities over three million projected to go from 35 in 1970 to 160 in 2025-- most of these in the south-- in South America, Central and South America, and Southeast Asia. If you take a look at this graph, the top bar shows the GDP represented by the city of Shanghai. It is in the order of 10% to 12% of China's GDP. And then you see its population, which is much less than that. Bangkok with about 12% of the population of Thailand has almost 40% of the GDP.

These cities are enormous magnets. This is where the jobs are. This is where the wealth is and these cities are growing rapidly because of a tremendous migration to them. And start thinking about a city that grows that rapidly and how you provide water, and sewer, and clean air, and food for them, electrical power, communications, and, of course, mobility and transportation since they must be able to get to jobs.

This is a graph of car ownership per capita increasing from 1970 to about 1990. The top is the United States-- we're rapidly approaching 700 cars per 1,000 people. The bottom is Japan rapidly approaching 2,250 cars per 1,000. Now the Japanese are as rich is as we are, yet government policy has reflected in this difference between car ownership.

We have cheap gasoline. We have worked hard on a national highway system. Tolls on that highway system were very low. Car ownership-- there are very few taxes on cars themselves. In Tokyo, gasoline is very expensive. If you want to buy a car in Tokyo, you have to come with a certificate that says you have an off street parking place for it.

The average car in the United States at the end of 10 years has 120,000 miles on it. The average car in Tokyo at the end of 10 years has 30,000 miles on it. And an inspection system that makes sure that it won't come back on the road in Japan at the end of that 10th year but, in fact, we'll go somewhere else in Southeast Asia.

Now Thailand is way down at the bottom. Thailand is about 55 cars per 1,000. 0.05 cars on this graph. What's going to happen-- China is even less than that. What is going to happen when we redraw this graph in 20 years? Where will their car ownership be? Where is their investment in infrastructure for cars, in alternatives to cars in terms of other types of transportation? To what extent will information technologies remove some of the needs for transportation?

It was predicted when the telephone came that this would reduce the need for moving people around since the telephone could replace this. I don't think that's really happened. will. There be a massive use of information technologies to take cars off the road because we do not have to travel to knowledge anymore and knowledge can come to us? Interesting question.

I do spend a lot of time in Bangkok and a lot of time actually in a car in Bangkok. When you come out of the hotel in the morning in Bangkok, you have a choice of Mercedes limousine or a Chevy astro van. It's a very big van. And you generally take the van because it's got in it a portable toilet, a desk that's setup, extra power plug-ins so you can put in your laptop and your cell phone because, in fact, you're going to spend a lot of time in that van and why not get some work done?

The Japanese already have special vehicles-- they're preparing hybrid vehicles for these sort of congested Southeast Asian cities. Now these are speeds in kilometers per hour. And a simple little test would be do we multiply or divide by 0.6 to get to miles? And I'm sure that we can get a consensus on this-- I'm never sure.

But this is not very fast. And stop and think about the pollution that comes from those vehicles sitting there and from that energy use. If we take a look at transportation infrastructure, US cities, European cities, Asian cities, and Bangkok-- look at the very difference in population densities in the Asian cities.

These are cities in which the population growth took place before the automobile and before these massive transportation needs. And they are very, very dense. How do you now impose upon them transportation systems so that people can move around?

The road length per capita in meters in Bangkok is less than one meter. Of course, they can always float their cars in the canals or wait until the flooding season and float them that way. These are the sort of problems that are developing in these massive cities in Southeast Asia.

If one thinks about the energy sources and conversion processes-- can you make that a little brighter-- what's taking place in the center is the energy forms and what's on top and the bottom are different sources of energy that might deal with this particular problem. And right now, there is really only one thing that is working here and that is the fossil fuels-- gas, oil, and coal.

Nuclear is, in fact, decreasing in its amount. The energy companies-- the oil companies in the 70s when they watched the oil embargoes and watched the difficulties in getting fossil fuels, thought that they might become energy companies and that they would invest in energy alternatives. And they took a look at all these processes-- the biomass solar, ocean thermal, photovoltaics, wind-- that's all gone now. Cheap fuel has driven that out.

At a time-- the economists tell us that the invisible hand will automatically bring new technologies in this areas off the shelf or that it's just sitting in a research laboratory waiting to come off the shelf and be commercialized. I'm not so sure. I'm not so sure whether a glove has to be put on the invisible hand to deal with this. And then professor Thurow will come and tell me how I failed the course again.

But, in fact, I think this is a difficult situation. If you look at the present sources of world power-- and when you look at coal, which in many parts of the US is a four-letter word-- but in fact it is not in China. And half of the north-south railway capabilities in China bring coal from the north down to be burned at 5% or 10% efficiency, for instance, in Beijing and 450,000 different residential and light commercial boilers. And the resulting pollution from this very ugly coal is incredible.

Just a little bit of an increase in efficiency in that coal use could lead to major reductions in emissions in that area. Now how will this look in the future? The percentage of hydro is going to go down simply because I think most of the major hydro sites have been developed. The percentage of nuclear in the near hand probably will go down as well. There's a real reluctance to see nuclear power.

The people from EDF-- from Electricite de France-- have been here to talk to us about what will happen 10 to 15 years from now when their existing licenses in their nuclear power plants come up. In fact, public sentiment will not allow them to be renewed and they will have to switch from non-CO2 emitting nuclear fuels probably to natural gas.

Right now China is thinking about 50 new nuclear power plants in a privatized situation in which they will buy plants from Germany, from Italy, from the United States, from France, from Russia-- bringing with each their own approaches to these technologies and to regulation of these technologies. It's a frightening thought.

MIT is getting ready now to work with Tshingua University in Beijing and the Chinese government on simply thinking about a regulatory process for looking at the safety and efficiency of these new plants which will probably be built whether we participate or not. But if these plants fail, nuclear is out for the next 100 years-- all throughout the world.

Just for the basis of time, I do have several more slides here on energy use, but let's just come to this one, which is the relative commercial energy use per capita in 1992. And with the United States, it's 100% and we see India down at around 2% to 3%. Can someone make it more light? There's a request to dim the lights. Everybody listens to me here. Bear with me.

The one on top-- United States, the one on bottom, India. This is per capita commercial use-- one's 50 times the other. Let there not be light. Will this continue? Or will it not continue? Hot diggity dog, we're going to sell them all things that will increase their wealth. What will happen here in terms of energy use?

The United States already uses 25% of the world's energy. We've become rich on cheap energy. Will there be security problems if we try to deny-- or can we possibly deny India the right to move right up there with us?

And finally, CO2 emissions-- we see some negative emissions when you're not efficient in the former Soviet Union or in Eastern Europe. Those plants go out of business when you bring them under new regimes. And, as a matter of fact, Europe is depending on a lot of that CO2 reduction in those countries to trade off against their growth.

The United States probably will be increasing from its 1990 levels even though its efficiency is going up incredibly. Yet in Kyoto, the United States has promised that it will do a 7% reduction of these from 1990 totals-- doesn't look right.

Meanwhile, when we look at the Kyoto protocols, there's nothing in there about the third world and nothing in there about China or India or Mexico and what they will do-- nor no mechanism by which the first world can help the third world to make a transition.

And I think that one of the biggest issues will be this issue of the north versus the south-- in the energy use and in cleaner production. The north now has all the production, all the wealth, is making use of most of the energy. But we're talking about a world in which two billion of the five billion people are in two countries in India and in China.

Can we afford to let them develop in the way that we developed or will we have to work out mechanisms to help them do it in a better way? Who will pay for this? Who will regulate growth and activities? What sort of institutions will grow up to do this?

The population redistribution, the social change, and this transition from agricultural resource base to industrial base is actually quite frightening, I think, in terms of what it will mean to world security. We will see, in fact, tremendous emphasis on material bands, recycling content, product design-- but that is lowering per product energy use or per capita energy use and deals not with the question of the fact that the population is increasing.

We will have to deal with public perception and expectations. Can you eat an apple or should you not? Will using a cell phone drive you crazy or not having it drive you crazy? There's a great deal of contradiction here. And I don't think we will ever get the science totally right so that everybody will ever accept it. And even if we did, different parts of society will value that science differently.

And we have regulatory issues in which the science is pretty well-established, but different countries around the world draw different regulatory implications from it. And I think that will continue. The issues of sustainability-- which is I see the intersection between developmental and environmental concerns-- involve eco-efficiency-- trying to use resources more efficiently-- loop closing.

Equity-- we were going to have to deal with these issues of where things are built, how they are built, who gains the wealth. Will we see the south developing at the expense of the global environment? Or probably, what is more likely, at the expense of the northern standard of living? Futurity-- thinking about the future and resources, anticipating human impacts.

And finally security, which I think is an important issue. I'm a water engineer and the great American philosopher Mark Twain once noted that whiskey is for drinking and water is for fighting. And will we have a fight over the last drop of water in Mexico, over the last tree in Indonesia, and over people in great discontent in the environs of metropolitan Cairo?

If we consider some of the recent events to try and deal with these issues, the 1992 Rio conference, which was about sustainable development-- how the countries of the third world will develop in a sustainable manner. And the very recently completed Kyoto conference in 1997 about CO2 mitigation.

Both were small steps in the right direction. At least countries were talking to themselves or were talking to each other and trying to learn more about these issues. Neither of these dealt with population issues.

Technology-- I mean, this is a great institution of technology. We used to be the villains in all this and now we're the heroes. I mean, we can have all this wonderful growth and use all these wonderful resources and technology will protect us from lack of availability of future resources and will protect us from emissions. Isn't it nice to know that you're no longer a villain?

Well, I kind of suspected all along that I wasn't that bad. I'm not that comfortable with the hero role, and I worry very much about this. We have no mechanism for addressing equity and security issues. They will probably have to evolve over time and things probably will have to get worse before we will come up with ways of dealing with this.

It was very interesting to watch the United States' strategies at the Kyoto conference. I mean, they started with one, they switched to another, they switched to another. And, suddenly, a magic set of technology targets came out which, as an engineer, bothered me because I don't think anybody has any idea about how these technology targets will be set. And, certainly, I didn't see technologists involved in how they will be set. How will the public understand this?

And what strategy should an industry, a government, a university adopt? These are long-term issues-- prepare and invest for the long-term. A vision for the future, more flexible thinking, and institutions-- get the science right, better implementation mechanisms, better education of the public and of professionals.

And what does this mean for the Gray Lady by the Charles? You're wonderful alma mater. MIT is changing rapidly in this and a whole set of issues like it. We have to educate a socially literate and flexible professional. And the way we present these issues to most of these professionals-- we certainly have courses about the environment and sustainability, but we're working very, very hard to get within professional courses examples of these materials to give the correct message that these are important parts of professional concern, not some extraneous issues that you take if you think you're interested in it.

There's a lot more emphasis on distance education and cooperation at a distance in bringing these ideas. And we are trying to move towards greater flexibility. MIT is taking a step beyond an outreach to government industries and the public and education throughout the world. We set up a joint program on climate change, we have our alliance for global sustainability which works with partners all over the world on education, on research, and, more important, on outreach.

Not just thinking about peer reviewed publications that a few professionals in our own disciplines read, but thinking about how our students are educated, thinking about how we reach out to the world, and trying to bring about consensus towards better solutions.

And, finally, we're getting our own house together physically and organizationally and trying to be a more sustainable university in having the ability to build the Cross Institute faculty and educational programs that will deal with these problems.

Now the best and the most important slides in any lecture like this-- in conclusion. A smaller and faster developing world presents major challenges that will require very different technical, social, and economic response. Anticipate this and be prepared or be very vulnerable. And that's a message not just to you, but to us. Now you thought that a slide that was labeled, in conclusion, would mean it was the last slide. No.

Preparation will mean more flexible organizations and professionals in them. New alliances-- MIT is forming new alliances all the time. Faster technology changes-- in particular, we're trying to deal with the technology changes that are involved in distance cooperation and distance education.

Better strategic planning-- well, we sort of do that at this university I think. Well, yes, we do. Yes. My boss just told me that we do-- and much more risk-taking. And finally, in conclusion-- if industry and government sneeze, MIT catches cold. Our educational and our research programs and partners are changing rapidly as well.

If we are preparing professionals for a world that is changing so rapidly, we better know what's going on out there and prepare our students to do this. And finally, our willingness to take a step beyond normal academic roles is the key point for the next decade. Come on back in 20 years and let's see how this presentation will look. Thank you very much.

LESTER THUROW: About a year before the handover in Hong Kong, I was sitting in the business lounge of the Hong Kong airport and I was basically eavesdropping on two Chinese businessmen. In the first half of their conversation, they were boasting to each other about how they'd become rich moving back and forth across the boundaries between Hong Kong and Wandong and how they'd become wealthy men.

And they were basically describing that part of China as the economic garden of Eden. In the second half of their conversation, they were both bitterly complaining about having to go to Vancouver because the Canadians were basically selling passports to Hong Kong. You invest $200,000 $300,000, live there for six months, you get your insurance policy, you came back to Hong Kong.

And they were complaining because you can't make money in Vancouver. Now the question-- Vancouver is a much richer area than the Hong Kong area. Why is it that people who could make a lot of money in Hong Kong saw Vancouver as an economic desert?

Second puzzle-- is the last 10 years in the United States the best 10 years ever or the worst 10 years ever? We all know the story about the best-- even corrected for inflation, we've created more billionaires than we've ever created in the 10-year period of time. 10 years ago, there were 13 billionaires in America, today there are 170.

We have great show and tells-- biotech, the internet, the stock market has zoomed up faster than it ever has in a 10-year period of time, inflation's zero, unemployment's low, and for the first time in 30 years since Harry Truman, we have a government budget surplus.

How about the story that is the worst decade in American history? In the last 10 years the rate of growth of productivity, which is the ultimate wealth-- getting something by putting less in-- has been the slowest growing in American history-- 0.8% per year. In the decade of the 1960s, which was not the best, productivity was growing four times that fast-- 3.2%. And in fact in the Great Depression, productivity grew faster than it did in the last 10 years.

If you look at total factor productivity-- which normally we talk about labor productivity-- but if you look at total factor productivity, in the decade total factor productivity has been zero. If you look at real wages corrected for inflation over the last 25 years, 20% of us have done very well. Our real wages are up substantially. 60% of us have done very badly-- our real wages are down about 20% and another 20% have held even. That's the worst performance in American history.

And if you look at the median family income, the median family income in 1997 is precisely where it was in 1973 after you correct for inflation. We've never had a 25-year period of time when there's been no increase in median income and, in fact, it's worse than that, because women have gone to work and work many more hours per year in 1997 than they did in 1973. This is the worst decade in American history.

Or I'd like you to imagine that you're John Akers-- head of IBM. It's 1990. You've just had a decade-- the decade of the 1980s like no firm in human history has ever had. Over that decade, you have averaged profits between $8 and $9 billion per year.

To put that in context, last year the two most profitable firms in America with almost exactly the same profits were Exxon and GE and they both made about $8 billion. So over 17 years ago-- and for 10 years-- you made more money than the most profitable firms in America make in 1997.

You're the most profitable company in human history, the most admired company in human history, the best-known brand name in human history, and if anybody says, who do you want to work for, more people want to work for you than anybody else. And in 1990, you have profits between $10 and $11 billion. No company has ever made that amount of money before that and no company's ever made that amount of money since then.

And now God comes to you like Moses and he says, John, come up the mountain with me. I'm going to show you the promised land. This year, you're making not quite $11 billion. Next year, 1991, it's going to be zero, the year after that minus-9, the year after that, minus-9, the year after that, minus-5. And over the next four years, you're going to lose $23 billion dollars. And no firm in human history has ever lost $23 billion dollars.

The era of the mainframe is over. And now, John, it's your job to go down the mountain and persuade 420,000 employees who've just had the best year in human history, the best decade human history that they've got all rip it up and do something different. You think you could do that? I don't think God could do that. There is simply no way it can be done.

I don't think everybody is going to fall off a cliff the way IBM fell off a cliff, but I think everybody is going to have an IBM experience. And to drive that point home, I'd like to read a list of names for you. This is a list of names, and it's the 12 largest industrial firms that existed in America on January 1st, 1900-- the beginning of the century.

Two things interesting about the list, but only one is really relevant here. They're in alphabetical order, so I'll read them. The American Cotton Oil Company, the American Steel Company, the American Sugar Refining Company, Continental Tobacco, Federal Steel, General Electric, National Lead, Pacific Mail, Peoples Gas, Tennessee Coal and Iron, US Leather, US Rubber. 10 of those 12 companies were natural resource-based companies. But what's the second interesting thing? How many of those companies are alive today? One-- General Electric.

That's why people write books about General Electric. And every one of them died for the same reason-- including General Electric. General Electric's laboratories invented the transistor one day after the Bell Labs independently. General Electric was the dominant maker of vacuum tubes. There were five makers of vacuum tubes in America.

General Electric gave the transistor to the vacuum tube division. Guess what the vacuum tube division did with it? Spent three years proving it wouldn't work. There were five makers of vacuum tubes in America, not one of them ever successfully made a transistor or a semiconductor chip. Because, of course, the answer is you have to cannibalize yourself to save yourself. And who the hell can do that?

I'll make you a prediction-- even a little bet if you like. If we come back 30 years now, Walmart will not be America's biggest retailer. The other day I read in the paper that Walmart had opened up an internet electronic store, but had very carefully priced everything so it was a little bit more expensive in the electronic store than it was in its real store-- because it's got too much invested in people, land, and buildings. It can't have a cheap electronic store.

Because if it did, you'd either go to the real stores, look, and then buy it electronically, or you wouldn't go to the real stores. And two CEOs of Walmart would have to be prepared to lose massive amounts of money as they closed down this huge operation if Walmart were to be the leader in electronic retailing.

Can you cannibalize yourself to save yourself? The general answer is you can't. I think if you're interested in the issue of building wealth, you've got to think about managing some creative tensions. The first creative tension is between chaos and order. Too much of either is bad. And let me give you an example-- take Russia in the last half of the 19th century.

No society has ever been more creative. Think about the writers who all existed at the same time. Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, Chekhov, Turgenev, Gogol-- the list goes on and on and on. You can do the same thing in music, painting, anything. And their society is about to collapse. Lots of chaos, lots of creativity, but not the order to use it.

Or think of a different historical example of the opposite-- suppose a man from Mars came to the world in the 1500s-- the 14 whatever-- 15th century, 1400s. And was told some part of the world is about to conquer the rest of the world and make it into a colony. What part of the world is the conqueror? Obvious answer is China.

In the 14th century, China had all of the technologies necessary to have the Industrial Revolution that wasn't, in fact, going to occur for another 400 years. They had steel in the blast furnaces, gunpowder and cannons, paper, movable type, printing presses, compasses and rudders. They'd put an armada with 200,000 troops on the coast of Africa. Their biggest ships were five times the size of Columbus' ship. And, believe it or not, they knew how to drill for natural gas.

But the emperor said, order, and none of those technologies were ever effectively used. Question is-- can you manage the tension between order and chaos, because both are necessary to create wealth.

The second tension you have to manage is the tension between individual and community. Judy was talking-- why the hell are we leaders in biotech? The answer is somebody in 1960, who was either very smart or very lucky in the National Institutes of Health in today's dollars, started putting $2 or $3 billion a year into what was then called biophysics.

25, 30 years later we have a big, important industry. But somebody out there in society put $60, $70 billion worth of money into the research and development of building this industry before it became a private industry. But at the same time, those brilliant individuals and private companies are absolutely necessary to make this a success.

And the answer, of course, is if you're thinking about R&D that's going to pay off more than 10 years from now, that basically has to be a social responsibility. If you're thinking about R&D that can pay off in less than five years in profitable products, that can be a private responsibility. And if you're thinking about between 5 and 10, we have to think about creative ideas as to how you get both of them worked.

Third tension you have to manage is between investment and consumption. Are you investing the right amount in the future? And I think this is one of the places where economics is at fault. Because of course we teach that the only thing that creates value utility is consumption. And you have to ask yourself, is that really true or is mankind a beaver?

Beavers build dams and cut trees when they clearly have enough food for the whole winter and they know it. They're just built to build dams and cut trees. That's what they enjoy doing. And I think the answer is human beings are at least partly a beaver. And if in our society we throw out the beaver impulse and we become simply a consumption society, then we won't have a future.

In the United States, social investment in education since 1976 is down 50%. Investment in new infrastructure since the late 1960s is also down 50%. And the private savings rate is the lowest in American history. We are perfectly consistent in both our private and our public lives. And the answer is, you can't live off the past forever. If you're not willing to invest, you don't have a future.

And, of course, that's the fourth creative tension-- one things that makes human beings human beings is we have a history of present and a future. To the best of our knowledge, no other animal has either a past or a future. All they do is have a present. And the problem is if you think of our economic system-- capitalism-- it's myopic. It can't make the long run investments that it itself needs in research and development, education, and infrastructure.

And this is going to be put into a bad mix. By 2020 or 2025, the United States will have a voting majority of people over the age of 65. How do you get people who are over the age of 65 to vote to spend money to make the future better? It's going to be the big question that our society is going to have to answer.

The fifth creative tension is between competition and cooperation-- you need them both. Communism fell because it believed in cooperation. The idea was you would build the new man or the new woman that wouldn't be motivated by greed and individuality, would do social good for the community. It didn't work, but the opposite doesn't work either.

It's important to remember that Darwin borrowed the phrase, survival of the fittest, from a 19th century British economist by the name of Spencer. Because Spencer believed that the only way capitalism could work is if the fit drove the economically unfit into extinction-- and by that, he meant death, starvation. And, of course, everybody at that time believed that what was necessary to make capitalism successful. And it's why Marx predicted a revolution.

It didn't happen, of course, because Bismarck-- the great conservative-- invented public pensions and public healthcare and Winston Churchill, when he was chancellor of the Exchequer, invented unemployment insurance so that individuals don't starve to death when the economy doesn't want them because they're too old, too sick, or they're unemployed.

Now I think the right way to think about creating wealth is you've got to remember one of the reasons we're creating billionaires so fast today is we're in the midst of what historians 100 years from now are going to call the third Industrial Revolution. The first industrial revolution was the steam engine end of the 18th beginning, of the 19th century. And it's important to remember it really was a revolution.

Napoleon marched armies around Europe 2,000 years after Julius Caesar, but Julius Caesar could actually move an army from point A to point B slightly faster than Napoleon-- because they both used horses and carts and roads were slightly better in Roman times than they were in Napoleonic times-- 2,000 years of history and not a single improvement in land transportation.

But 50 years after Napoleon died, steam trains are already going more than 100 miles an hour. 8,000 years of agriculture is over and one country, Great Britain, has more than half its workforce out of agriculture and into industry.

The second Industrial Revolution is the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century and two things happened-- electrification, and the Germans invented the idea in their chemical industry of systematic industrial research and development where you push technology forward based on scientific principles rather than waiting for the inspired tinkerers of Great Britain. And, of course, it ended completely Britain's economic dominance in the world because, for whatever reason, the British could never shift to the German model a systematic, academically-based research and development pushing ideas and products forward.

But electrification changed everything. It didn't just change night into day. Before electrification, the most expensive apartment was on the ground floor and you put the servants at the top. With electrification, you get elevators, and the penthouse was the most expensive apartment. You put the servants on the bottom, right?

Factories-- you can go up to New Hampshire and you can see the steam factories-- kilometers long, big steam engine at one end, rotor belts, everything in a linear line. Took them about 30 years to figure out that the right answer was not to put a big electric motor where there used to be a big steam motor, but distributive processing. A lot of little electric motors on machine tools so you could organize them in very different ways on the factory floors and get a lot of productivity out of it.

We tend to act like the computer is new in terms of price declines and performance improvements, but it isn't. How much in today's dollars do you think the first light bulb cost? More than $1,000. How many light bulbs you think you would buy if they cost $1,000 a light bulb? Not very many. And the first light bulb wasn't even thought of as a competitor with lamp oil for light.

The first light bulb was, in fact, used on wooden ships. Because wooden ships at night have got to have a little bit of light. And if you got a storm and a lantern, that means a wooden ship that burns down. And so the first light bulbs were used on wooden ships as a fire prevention device. And if they'd had a catalog in that day and age, light bulbs would have been listed under fire prevention equipment and not under light.

And, of course, that second Industrial Revolution produced the first generation of American billionaires-- Rockefeller, Morgan, Carnegie, Mellon, Kodak. Rockefeller, in today's dollars, had about $27 billion. Bill Gates has more-- about somewhere between $40 and $50-- but relative to per capita income of that day and age, Rockefeller was six times as wealthy as Bill Gates.

Now why do I say that we're in the third Industrial Revolution and that's why we're creating billionaires today? It's a revolution which is not sometimes called the information revolution. I like to call it the era of manmade brainpower industries. But it has to do with a set of industries that are all changing at the same time, which, like electrification, are going to change everything and the way everybody does everything.

The industries I think that would be on the list are microelectronics, biotechnology, the new telecommunication industries, new materials, computers, robotics, plus machine tool. And what's happening this time, of course, is in the previous revolution we went from local to national economies. This time we're going from national to global economies.

And one of the differences, of course, is when we move from local to national economies, we had national governments. Moving from national to global economies without a global government creates a problem.

What's the fifth-biggest Banking Center in the world? The biggest is New York, the second-biggest is Tokyo, the third-biggest is London, the fourth-biggest is Frankfurt, and the fifth-biggest is the Grand Cayman Islands-- 30,000 people. Nobody's ever been there. It's a place you bank when you don't want government looking over your shoulder.

Taiwan, for example, makes it almost 1,000% illegal for Taiwanese firms to invest in mainland China, and Taiwanese firms are the biggest investors in mainland China-- bigger than Japan, bigger than the United States, all done through the Grand Cayman Islands coming back in through Hong Kong.

These industries are going to change every other industry. In the 1950s when I was a high school student in Montana, we had what we hoped was going to be a big oil boom which proved to be a minor oil boom. But in the 1950s, the oil industry was like the James Dean movie, Giant-- luck and brawn. Punch a hole in the ground and have a 5% probability of hitting oil. You've got about 30% of the oil out of the ground. And the people who worked as roustabouts on the oil rigs were literally illiterate.

Last summer, I spent some time doing some consulting for Saudi Aramco-- the biggest oil company in the world. You'll find three supercomputers side by side. They're doing three and four-dimensional acoustical sounding. The hit rate's 60%, the extraction rate's 80%, horizontal drilling. Norway was supposed to be out of oil by now. Instead, it's the second-biggest exporter in the world after Saudi Arabia because they can drill oil in water that's two miles deep. This is now a manmade brainpower industry.

Still makes oil, but the process is so different. It's a completely new industry. And you can tell stories-- and we could take a long time to do them-- about how many of our conventional things are going to change. If you look at at electronic retailing, it is very clear that we have all the technology necessary to close every retail store in the world. And 5,000 years of going to your local store may be over.

I don't think it is, because people like elbows in the ribs. We're a social animal. But the big thing in retailing is entertainment retailing. You pay 20% more, but you have it getting fun. Because if all you want to do is buy good stuff cheap, it's always going to be cheaper electronically because you don't need the expensive people, the expensive real estate, and all the things that go with it.

And if you want to see that part of the future, maybe it's LL Bean-- a store in rural Maine that now sells $350 million worth of clothes in Japan and it doesn't have a single employee in Japan. There's a 90% probability if you bought an Easter Lily, the Dutch made the money. They didn't grow the Easter Lily, they didn't sell the Easter Lily, but they control the logistics system. And 90% of the flowers in the world go through the Dutch flower auction. And all of the money is in the logistics-- anybody can grow, anybody can sell, but to get an Easter lily? To you on Easter that's blooming on Easter, that's the trick. And that's what the Dutch know how to do.

And these things aren't going to just change economics. The French have coined a term called, the ultra power-- militarily. A superpower is somebody with missiles and nuclear weapons that can blow up the world. An ultra power-- and they think their only one is the United States-- is a power that commands the information system-- can see everything, can shut everybody else's eyes and ears off. And warfare is completely different because you shoot at things over the horizon that you can't see.

And it is a difference on public television here in Boston, they've been replaying the battles of World War II. Recently I watched the battle of Leyte Gulf. Two giant Japanese and American armada just steaming at each other and they get within 20 miles of each other before either side knows the other's there.

Today, we know where every big ship in the world is within 8 cm at every moment in time off the GPS. Remember Peter Arnett in Baghdad? Solar cells off the satellites-- that device cost $500,000 in 1991. Guess what it costs today-- recently I got an ad and it's less than $5,000. And if you don't need the solar cells, you can plug it in, you can get it for $2,500.

The problem with being able to see the world is everybody becomes more sensitive to military deaths. Here you've got the ultra power and eight people get killed in Somalia, they're all professionals, we put our tail between our leg and we get out. And we're not peculiar, because there's a difference between reading about 30,000 deaths at Normandy and seeing one soldier die in real time on your TV set.

The problem in the next Persian Gulf War, you're going to have 1,000 Peter Arnetts in your enemy's capital and you're going to be bombing your own correspondents. Maybe that's a good thing.

Culture-- culture from now on out is completely different, because, historically, culture was older people telling younger people what the traditions of their society were or are. Today it's what sells. It jumps right across the generations. Recently somebody did a study in the United States among teenagers, how many minutes per week do you spend talking to your mother and father and how many minutes per week do you spend watching the TV set? It was 22 minutes per week on the mother and father and eight hours on the TV set.

Now who do you think has the greatest cultural impact? The rest of the world sees this as an invasion of American culture, but it isn't. It's a brand new culture. There's somebody in the economics profession who has written a book called The Winner Take All Society. Pavarotti makes more money than all the singers in human history combined.

His voice is not better than Caruso's probably, but Caruso was limited just singing in the concert hall-- 2,000 people, what can you charge them? On CDs, Pavarotti can sing to the world. And, of course, it means there is no market for second-rate tenors, third-rate tenors, or fourth-rate tenors.

We tend to forget it, but Joe DiMaggio and Babe Ruth were not the highest-paid Americans-- but Michael Jordan is. Because Babe Ruth was limited to how many people can you put in Yankee Stadium. Michael Jordan can play basketball for the world on TV and he makes a much bigger income relative to everybody else.

Now I think the thing you have to understand here is what I like to call a wealth pyramid. If you think about the pyramid being widest at the bottom-- the pyramid at the bottom here is, are you creating the basic knowledge that allows you to create the discontinuities that change history?

The reason those Chinese can't make any money in Vancouver is very simple-- they're very good at looking at what's happening in the developing world and moving it to the underdeveloped world in Guangdong. But you get them in Vancouver, they've got to have a brand new idea that nobody in the world's ever done. And they weren't geared up to do that. In Vancouver, there's nothing obviously missing. You have to think up something new.

One of the things I like to do is-- I don't know, let's call it imaginary history here-- counterfactual history. Suppose I'm a historian in the year 3000 writing a book about a people alive in the year 2000-- that's us. What do you think they're going to say about us? What do we say about people in the year 1000?

People who, let's say, were alive between 900 and 1100. Name me anything that anybody did in that 200-year period of time? We don't say anything. They didn't do anything. They're completely ignored. And maybe we'll be completely ignored, but I doubt it. I think what is going to happen is that historian in the year 3000 is going to say, these are the people who invented biotechnology.

And for the first time in human history, plants, animals, and human beings are partly manmade. And it's going to happen. Let's take human beings. First thing we're going to do is cure genetic diseases, right? But now I'm no longer just made by God.

Suppose I've got a son that's a dwarf-- that's a tragedy. If there's some technology that can make him into a normal sized person instead of being three feet tall, we should use it, right? So now he's four feet tall, but that's still kind of a semi-midget, right? It's a big handicap to be four feet tall, let's make him five feet tall.

Now if you're five feet tall, you're normal, but you're not a man's man. I want him to be six feet tall, right? Once he's six feet, just another foot he can be an NBA basketball player and make millions. You can like it or you hate it, but it's going to happen. It's going to happen.

We'll first start correcting defects and then we'll make bigger, smarter-- suppose you could add 30 points to the IQ of your kid. Wouldn't you want to do that? And if you didn't do it, your neighbors are going to do it and your kid's going to be the dumbest kid in the neighborhood. Of course you're going to do that.

The second thing on the pyramid is human capital. Are we, in fact, educating the whole population with the skills necessary to participate in the process? And we sometimes look at India and we say, they're doing what economists call the enclave strategy.

200 million Indians are going to be educated and move into the first world, and 800 million Indians are going to be illiterate and stay in the third world. One, I don't think it's going to work, but isn't that what we're doing in the United States?

We've got 20%, 30% of the population where the greatest thing that's ever happened to them is globalization. I make more income than I ever made before. And we've got 60% of the population where it's the worst thing that ever happened to them-- their income's down 20% despite the fact that the economy is up 40%. And the answer, of course, has to do with their human capital.

The third thing on this pyramid is entrepreneurial skills. A lot of entrepreneurial skills have to do with new technologies, but we shouldn't think that's the only thing. Think about Starbucks-- one of Forbes billionaires is the Starbucks founder. It's genius-- he persuaded Americans to pay $3 for a cup of coffee when he used to pay $0.50, right? That's why he's a billionaire.

What you have to have as you think about entrepreneurialism skills is not just the right individuals, you have to have the right environment for them. If you compare Europe and the United States, for example, the Europeans have some problems. And I'll tell you what the problem is-- if you take the 25 biggest companies in America in 1997 in terms of market capitalization, you'll find that six of them didn't exist in 1960 or were very small-- Microsoft, Intel, Walmart didn't exist-- Hewlett Packard had less than 1,000 employees.

If you take the 25 biggest companies in Europe in 1997, they were all big in 1960. They have been completely unable to grow any new, big companies over this 30-year period of time. But it doesn't have to do with they aren't just as smart as Americans. Fact is, they're probably smarter. They're better educated, certainly.

It doesn't have to do with the fact that they're behind in technology because, in some fundamental sense, they're not. The question is, have you created the institutions that allow those entrepreneurial skills to come out?

The next part of the pyramid is what I call natural resources dash environment. And I hope that 20 or 30 years from now we don't think of them as something different. I mentioned to you the revolution in oil. One of the problems you've got is hey, good news thing, right?

A few months ago I was down at the world offshore oil Congress in Houston, Texas-- 36,000 people. And one of the geologists for one of the big oil companies came up to me. He said, Lester, we know where all the oil the world is going to need for the next 100 years is with this new technology. The greatest oil play in the world at the moment is under the Caspian Sea and there may be more oil in and around and under the Caspian Sea than there is in and around and under the Persian Gulf. And there's some signs that there's even a bigger pool of oil off the north coast of Siberia and Norway.

Traffic congestion-- here's a case where you need both social innovation plus the technology. London recently did a study about how many roads would they have to build to solve London's traffic problem. The answer is you have to tear London down.

But when I can put a barcode in every car and a sensor on every street corner, I can do congestion pollution pricing and I can let people buy cars. And, at the same time, run a city that's congestion free, pollution free. But it requires social organization, because people have to start paying for something that they now get free. And the question is, who's going to be good at doing it?

Next, going up to the peak of the pyramid, is physical capital. And as Americans, we ought to think about something-- all the evidence shows if you've got major cities between 1 to 400 miles apart, the right way to connect them in terms of people is not roads and it's not planes, it's called high speed rail.

12 countries have high speed rail, 16 countries are building it, and the United States is not in either category. Now there are either two possibilities-- they're dumb or we're dumb. They're wasting a lot of money or we're stupidly not spending a lot of money and not doing the right things.

And despite the train wreck in Germany a couple of days ago, the answer is the rails saves lives, saves fuel, saves pollution, and is the right way to do it. The question is, can you get yourself organized to do it?

And if you think about those parts of the pyramid, at the top you get financial wealth created out of those disequilibriums. Think about Bill Gates, $50 billion-- I bet he's never saved a penny of his income in his entire life. He didn't get rich by saving his money. He got rich by playing the disequilibriums as you shift from one technology to another.

People weren't dumber in the 50s, 60s, and 70s, yet we didn't create the billionaires. We didn't create the billionaires because the environment wasn't right for creating the billionaires. And on financial wealth, obviously, one of the things you have to worry about is how do you widen participation-- something Bill Clinton was talking about yesterday.

Now when you look at the whole pyramid, I think the thing you have to think about is, do we in the United States and in the rest of the world have the concept of what I called the builder as opposed to the consumer? Are we interested in building? Can we take joy in building? Can we get utility from building?

Once again, when I was a boy in Montana, there was a railroad-- no longer exists-- called the Great Northern. Mr. Hill built it and the train that went across Montana was called the Empire Builder. He thought he was going to build a physical empire in the northern part of the United States. It never happened. But it was the right idea.

Can we have the empire-building mentality-- not in terms of physical empires, but in terms of intellectual empires. Hard facts and wild imaginations, and a hell of a lot of vision, a sense of adventure, and we'll all be economic explorers. Thank you very much.

CHUCK VEST: We have the real privilege of spending about the next 40 minutes really participating in a dialogue with everyone here. My understanding is there is a mechanism for getting cards out to those of you in the audience who would like to ask questions. We're going to ask that you submit them in writing.

And then, because they don't trust me with the primary function of a person in a role like this, Diana Park is going to select questions for me then to deliver to the group. Perhaps while we are waiting for that, maybe one of you would like to ask one of the others a question to get us moving.

Well, they're out of creativity. They're going to be in the dustbin of history in the first 20 years of the next century. Yeah, let's just take one while we're waiting.

AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE]

CHUCK VEST: Will Singapore be able to avoid the problems caused by real estate speculation running rampant that some of the other countries in that part of the world has run into-- is that a good summary?

TONY K. TAN: Well I think, as I said in my speech just now, one of the things we've been able to do was actually to prevent that type of property bubbles which happened in Japan. I think at one stage at the height of the property speculation in Japan, it was estimated that the market value of the property in Tokyo alone was more than that in the whole of North America.

So obviously that type of situation is not sustainable. In Singapore, there was a possibility that we could have a safe situation because between 1992 and 1996, the price of property essentially doubled. And if nothing had been done, then we could have the same situation that has happened in Malaysia, Indonesia, and in Thailand.

But the government took various steps in order to restrain property prices by imposing the amount of credit that is available for people to buy property. And I think that since then prices have come down by about 25% but in a gentle way So that they did not damage the real economy or our banking system.

So if you want to speculate in Singapore property, I would say that perhaps just wait a year or so. I think that would be a good time.

CHUCK VEST: Well, the real questions are now rolling in. And here's first one-- I think it's pretty intriguing. How will electronic cash affect wealth creation? Lester, you want to take a crack at that?

LESTER THUROW: That's one of those discontinuities. And see on most of these things, it's going to be sociology that determines what we do and not technology. For example, when it comes to the cashless electronic society, the United States is one of the slowest movers in the entire world in that technology.

And there's a very simple reason-- Americans love to kited checks. You write a check and you don't have the money there and three days later, you know you will have money that's illegal. That's a crime. How many people have never kited a check in this room? And with electronic funds transfer, you get an instant debit. And I think we're not going to electronic funds transfer in the United States unless the business world-- the banks-- are willing to say, we're going to do electronically, but we won't subtract the money for three days.

Otherwise it's not going to happen. Now if you can make it happen, there's a lot of money to be made, because it's very expensive to process all these checks, do all this paper bookkeeping. But you've got to look at it real sociology as to how people live. And you can't simply say, hey, here's a technology. It's a cheaper technology, we'll automatically move to it.

Because historically, you can point to lots of better technologies that were never adopted because of various sociological realities out there in the system. And it's exactly the same thing on retailing.

Everything is going to be sellable electronically, and I think we're going to be very surprised about what people want to buy electronically and what they don't want to buy electronically. Like in Boston, it's supposedly already true that about 20% of the cars have some electronic involvement. And there's a very simple reason-- everybody, when it goes to the car dealer, feels cheated because that's the only place we bargain. Basically he's a pro, I'm an amateur.

And even when I got a good deal, I feel like I should have gotten a better deal I've been cheated, right? And I'm perfectly willing to pay an electronic negotiator $100 to certify that I've got the lowest price in the metropolitan area. Makes me feel good and it's worth $100. And so on all of these things, I think the thing that you need to think about is not what's technologically possible, but what is the sociology in combination with the technology going to do?

And that's where the people make money-- when you can figure out both of those things together as opposed to just the technology.

CHUCK VEST: Here's a very topical and timely question, as opposed to some of the longer term ones. And, Judy, maybe you can take a shot at this. Dave wants to know if it's when is lunch? The answer to that is 12:30. How will the euro affect wealth creation?

JUDITH C. LEWENT: That's interesting. As Lester was speaking, I was almost going to try to take it in a little different direction. Because there's a theme in there in terms of at least reducing to a single currency. And I think there-- again, there's the promise of great economic wealth. Because if you can leapfrog in terms of trade barriers and tax barriers and other economic barriers to really foster a stronger European economy, you see great promise.

Whether that's doable because of the things that I just ticked off in terms of, again, reducing trade barriers, reducing the flow of employment, facilitating the flow of employment, as well as changing tax regimes becomes extremely difficult. It's sort of a variation on Lester's theme in terms of national priorities and national rights.

So I think there's a healthy degree of skepticism we have about the promise. But having said that, just giving an example for our industry, per se. Leaving aside, again, the advantages I think on the currency side in terms of maybe just coming up with more-- if you pardon the expression, tectonic plates because we're going to have just one large currency to deal with. And from a hedging perspective, tough to tell with the volatility, the correlations are going to be like, but that's a technical problem.

From a business standpoint, there's one great appeal and that is transparent pricing. I cited a little bit earlier the issue of parallel imports and that basically means a violation of patent rights where low cost payers actually permit product to be shipped across national lines to be sold by other parties where the beneficiary is not the innovator, but the beneficiary is the wholesaler or the pharmacist.

And what a single currency will do is basically force to single-pricing and transparency in pricing. So, from that standpoint, it may actually be a very beneficial effect on innovation and, again, the right kind of price competition and the right kind of economic environment.

LESTER THUROW: Let's see. Let me make a comment here that has to do with R&D. I think one of the big payoffs in Europe is going to be on the R&D front. If you drill three oil wells a year, you're in a risky business. If you're Royal Dutch Shell and you drill 7,000 a year, it's just probabilities.

And the same thing is true in R&D. Suppose I'm in Spain and I'm a government I've got an R&D budget. Where do I put my money? If I put a little bit and everything, it's all wasted because it's just such a small amount of money it doesn't pay off. But if I'm playing this game at the European level, I can afford to bet on all of the technologies if I do it right.

And I think-- for example in Spain where I've looked at it, I'd be willing to argue to the Spanish waste every dollar they put it into R&D, because they've spread it in such a way they don't get any benefits. And if they spent zero, they'd be better off, but the right thing is not to spend zero. The right thing is if you can really coordinate this in a bigger pan-European thing, then you can get some real payoff of European R&D that's now hard to get if you're in one of the small countries in Europe-- and maybe even Germany.

See, I don't even think the United States is quite big enough to play every technology these days, but we're close. And Europe, of course, will be a slightly bigger economy and so I think there may be some real payoffs in terms of European R&D if they can pull this off.

CHUCK VEST: Here's one that I'm going to answer-- what's the best way to start when you're young-- no capital, but good ideas. Listen very carefully, because this is the definitive answer. Be the first person in line for this afternoon's session on entrepreneurism.

Seriously, we're going to have a great session this afternoon with a lot of people who have been there and done it. And that's the whole intent of it. This one for Tony Tan. From the perspective of Singapore, has the present government considered the problem of an aging population in the 21st century? How do you think about that issue?

TONY K. TAN: We have. And I think that one of the surprising things about Singapore-- and it is statistically the most rapidly aging country in the world in the sense that the demographics of our society are such that we will move from a relatively young country because Singapore, as I said, was built by immigrants-- to become a society with a large number of aged people. More than 2/3 within, perhaps, 20 to 30 years.

And it is going to mean enormous changes in the way we regulate our economy and run our society. The way in which we have tried to deal with this problem of coping with an aging society is to look at it as a tripartite problem which has to be resolved not individually, but through the combined efforts of the individual, the family, and society.

For the individual, a certain amount of savings during his or her working life in order to prepare, to have the necessary means to sustain oneself when you get to 60, 65-- and very important to pay for your health needs.

And also, this truly second track and that is to emphasize, again, the importance of the family. We regard the family in Singapore really as a building block of our society. And the family unit is still strong in Singapore. Family members feel a responsibility to look after one another and we feel that this is of great value.

Because for an aging population, I think in addition to the physical needs, one of the grave consequences and the drawbacks which many people suffer from is a lack of social acceptance by the family. They feel neglected, they feel that they are not important and it is here that the family unit is very strong.

I think the difference between a family unit and other types of social organizations is that you can choose your neighbors, you can choose your friends, but you can't choose your family. I mean, you are born with a family and we will regard that as something which is worthwhile keeping healthy.

Finally, of course, the government and society as a whole, we are trying to put into place national schemes to provide essential safety nets. But that alone will not be sufficient. And we do not know whether we have the right answers. We have looked at what is being done in the United States and in Europe.

It is a problem which we know will come onto us in 20 to 30 years time. And we believe that, by looking at this problem early and trying to devise a type of organizations and strategies, that will help us to cope with this problem. We hope to be able to deal much more effectively than if we were just to neglect it.

LESTER THUROW: See here is a perfect example of where you get both a threat and an opportunity. Because when we're talking about the elderly, we mostly talk about it from the respective Tony's just talked about it-- the problems of government and how do you pay for healthcare and those things. But it's also a tremendous opportunity.

If you take those 170 billionaires in America, five of them own cruise lines. Now what do you think suddenly made cruise lines successful? This is a very old technology-- Cleopatra had a cruise boat 2,000 years ago. The answers the elderly-- time, money, you don't move, we move you on, we wheel you on, wheel you off, don't feel good, stay in your state room. The perfect vacation for the elderly.

And if you lived in Boston last summer, you would have seen the reality of that because there was a cruise boat-- it was cruising the Canadian maritimes headed to New York and it stopped on an emergency basis in Boston because flu epidemic had broken out.

Now if a flu breaks out and you got a bunch of 18-year-olds, no big deal, right? But on this boat, more than 70% of the people were over 70 years of age. And if they were all going to die, they wanted them to die in the Mass General Hospital and not on the boat.

It's made a big market for elevators in two-story homes where older people want to convert their house into a one-story house. They don't want to move to a new house and so you've now got a market for a type of elevator where there just wasn't a market for 30 years ago.

And so at the same time, you've got a social problem. Some people have become rich basically on this shift in demography.

CHUCK VEST: This is just a warning-- just a Warning to the panel that there are several questions in here about your views on the Microsoft antitrust matters. I'm going to ask it before the day's over. Right now, Dave Marks. How is the problem of providing food for the world going to fit into our economy and our responsibility?

DAVID H. MARKS: Oh, I think this is-- if you watch, for instance, Monsanto and Dupont-- Chuck sits on the Dupont board-- you're looking at two big what were formerly chemical companies now largely moving towards agricultural and food companies. Food is going to be one of the biggest issues-- but, in fact, I don't think it will be in terms of traditional agriculture.

What we're looking at, as Lester suggested-- man-altered foods-- new foods that can be developed and with less land resources, less water, less energy. And the difficult problem will come in the competition between food and other types of resources. Are we going to use land for food that might be used for solar or for transportation purposes, other sorts of things.

But, in fact, the big fortunes in the future will probably be made in the food industry and you're already seeing world industry betting on this. The critical issue in the food industry is water availability. And water has never gone through the tightening, the squeezing that oil went through when we saw the oil shocks in the 70s.

We still have people growing rice in California. You have no business growing rice in California and using six acre feet of water per acre to produce that. And you're going to find much more efficient resource use in agriculture to keep up with the food supply.

However, there is one estimate that I've seen that came out of the World Watch Institute that predicted that if the Chinese move to a habit of one six-pack per week of drinking beer that, in fact, it would use up all their water resources. I'm sure that we can find some alternatives to this.

CHUCK VEST: Next question was actually addressed to Lester. But I think everybody on this panel is in a position to have a view on it. And I think, in at least the near-term in the United States, it's a really important question. Could you comment on the fact that much more innovation is taking place in small startup companies than large companies that have tremendous resources? And will this trend continue or do you foresee a reversal? Judy, you want to start it off, actually?

JUDITH C. LEWENT: Well, I'll start it off close to home, because--

CHUCK VEST: I thought you might.

JUDITH C. LEWENT: I might. Looking actually forward to the opportunity to maybe editorialize on what Lester touched on earlier about the genesis of the biotech industry and cannibalization-- a willingness to cannibalize one's own.

Actually our industry is an example of a couple of things, including the fact that we're willing to cannibalize basically because we don't have any choice. We lose a patent protection, let's say, in a 10 to 12-year period and with generics-- which, by the way, we totally support the advent of generics-- but we lose basically all of our product.

So if you want to be a going concern, you have to think long-term to replenish that product lifecycle. And therefore, the whole part of our R&D is regeneration. So in order to be active in regeneration, what the pharmaceutical industry has been able to do, I think, differently than the vacuum tube and the transistor is to adapt, to change, and to basically metamorphosed as technology has changed.

And biotechnology is a prime case in point. And actually, again, I may be in the wrong economic pew here. But what we've seen as the models evolved is that biotechnology has been an excellent laboratory and an excellent environment for a certain approach and a certain entrepreneurial approach to capitalize on individual ideas.

But what it doesn't have is global scale to really develop those ideas and maximize the return on those ideas. And what has evolved over at least the last several decades is a unique kind of symbiotic relationship between biotechnology and big pharmaceutical companies, because we have the scale and there are very few examples of biotech companies that have really grown into quasi-full fledged big pharma companies.

But I think in the end that's not necessarily a bad thing, because we continue to have demand and we continue to stimulate through capital investment as well as research collaboration investment and transfer of scientific knowledge to actually increase productivity and foster the biotech industry at the same time that the larger scale industry serves its purpose and incorporates innovation.

So it's an interesting kind of a model that fosters the small, fosters the entrepreneurial, and actually has taught us a lot of things too that we want to bring into our own labs. Because, again, for us, the entrepreneurial spirit is key if we're going to continue to have high R&D productivity, which is our lifeblood. So it's a very interesting case in point.

CHUCK VEST: Comments on this?

TONY K. TAN: Can I make a point?

CHUCK VEST: Tony, certainly.

TONY K. TAN: I think this point about growth coming from small companies rather than large companies in our view is a very fundamental one. Because it goes back again to how national wealth is created in the country.

And we feel that that essentially is the key question which many countries have to decide on. If you look at the recent economic crisis in our part of the world, which country has actually weathered it best-- the answer is Taiwan. Its currency has gone down about the same as Singapore. Its stock market is still resilient.

And I think the key difference between Taiwan and the other countries in my part of the world is that there is a very large number of very small entrepreneurial companies in Taiwan, which has managed, I think, to build on this knowledge-based economy, which all of us are talking about.

And with the type of knowledge industries which we feel will be dominant in the 21st century, I think that a lot of opportunities really for young people to build small startups because you don't require a large amount of capital or resources which you need to go into oil or into larger industries.

The problem for a country like Singapore is that we have been very effective at mobilizing capital and people in certain directions. And to move into this new strategy now where we have to encourage small industries to encourage a more entrepreneurial spirit requires a major shift-- not only in our economy, but also possibly in our social systems.

Because you don't get entreprenuership or innovation without some degree of messiness in society. And we have been used to order in Singapore-- which is not bad-- but the question is, how can we marry the two. I think this is one of the tensions which Lester is talking about. And it really is a matter of trying out various ways, which we are doing in Singapore.

And hopefully, come 10 years time, we have had to reinvent the Singapore economy several times from a trading hub to a technology hub to a financial hub. And now we've got to transform it into a knowledge hub. It's not easy and there are no guarantees of success in anything which we do.

But I think that when one sees that the direction is clear and the government is prepared to make the necessary transformation, the chances of success are probably more.

DAVID H. MARKS: It seems to me that there's a strategy in between here. And The Globe reported on one recently which is, it's not just is the big industry going to do it or are the small industries-- startups going to do it and then become big industries?

But it seems to me that there's a trend now in which the big industries are watching the small startups. And you start off in the basement with two friends and some savings and 18 months later, before you have a product, before you have sold anything to anybody, before you have accepted even any venture capital, you become an instant millionaire as you're being bought out by the big companies and then have a set of golden handcuffs to keep you with that company for a while.

This is the sort of trend that we're seeing now-- not taking it all the way but, in fact-- and the big companies not keeping their big research portfolios and big research laboratories, but improving their antennas so that they can watch the new emerging technologies come out and pluck them before they're too expensive to write.

CHUCK VEST: This next question I'd like to encourage some sort of quick, succinct answers. It's, again, rather topical and it's a question that gets asked with great regularity in every boardroom in America. Is the increasing use of stock options in lieu of salary a good or bad thing for companies, workers, investors, and the nation? Anybody want to give a quick answer to that?

JUDITH C. LEWENT: I'll start.

CHUCK VEST: Judy.

JUDITH C. LEWENT: Yes and no.

CHUCK VEST: By the way, it says, and why?

JUDITH C. LEWENT: Oh.

CHUCK VEST: Good MIT.

JUDITH C. LEWENT: I thought you wanted a succinct answer. No we've actually been one of the companies on the forefront of going deep and broad in terms of the use of stock options judiciously. And I say that for the following reasons-- I think the advantages-- I do believe strongly you align the employees' interests with the shareholders' interests and that's a good thing for everything that you want-- productivity and anything else.

The counterbalance is one has to be very cognizant about the fact that these are expensive compensation tools and accounting standards notwithstanding, there is a real cost to using options. And I think companies like Merck have a pretty acute sense of understanding how to value those so that we can look at a total compensation package and make sure that we are appropriately compensating people and know what the value of options are.

But in that scheme, I think options have a very, very positive effect in terms of aligning employees-- particularly long-term-- with the objectives of the company.

CHUCK VEST: I'm particularly interested in this topic because I'm thinking of moving to stock options at MIT in lieu of salary.

DAVID H. MARKS: I'll take five, sir.

CHUCK VEST: Here's, again, one that is pretty tough, because we can spend hours and hours and hours on it. But it's addressed to Lester. Given your vision, what should primary and secondary education be like and how should MIT's undergraduate education change? In 20 words or less.

LESTER THUROW: I think this is one of those cases-- you know, if you look at the American secondary school system-- or the total school system-- the thing to remember is we're simultaneously the world's best and the world's worst all at the same time. At age 18 we're all behind-- even if you've got the highest IQ in America, none of us could pass the French baccalaureate. None of us could pass the German Abitur. None of us could pass the Korean or the Japanese exam.

But then we go to college and we work a little harder than the rest of the world and we kind of catch up because you go to the University of Tokyo, it's sandbox for four years. And so by time you're age 22, we've caught up. And then 15% to 20% of us go to graduate school and most of the rest of the world, they don't even have graduate schools. What they call a doctorate in Germany is kind of the equivalent of a master's degree in America.

So 15%, 20% of us at the end up being the best educated in the world. On the other hand, if you take-- we got 25% of young Americans who don't finish high school. That's third world, right? It isn't a very tough high school and they don't even get out of that very easy high school.

And I think one of the issues is how do you really make sure that you're delivering some education to the bottom? Now we know how to do that. We can do it by simply looking at the countries who do it well. You've got to put some resources there, some focus there, and some reorganization. It'll never happen as long as you have local school boards.

How do you flunk your neighbor's kid and get elected to the school board? You don't, right? School boards won't set standards, it's just that simple. But on the other hand, school boards are Thomas Jefferson, right? It's very hard to reject local school boards.

So you need some changes in organization. Now I think one of the things you were talking about is a more entrepreneurial environment and those can be created over time. MIT's proud of its history and it should be proud of its history. But I think the fact of the matter is MIT today is more entrepreneurial than it was 15 years ago and a whole variety of things have changed that.

I'll just give you a couple of examples-- I'd love to take credit for it, but it wasn't due to myself at all. When Jerry Wilson was dean of engineering and I was dean of management, some students came to us from engineering and management and said, how would each of you guys like to put up $5,000 and we'll have a $10,000 competition for the best business plan?

I'd love to tell you we thought that was a good idea, but I think the answer is we gave them the $10,000 because it was easier to give them the $10,000 than explain why we were not going to give them the $10,000.

Well then later on, I meet a business man who's willing to up it to a $50,000 competition, which was held here in April. Now it's a big event. You got a lot of students who are thinking about this. Some of them go into business immediately, some go into business later. But, see, I think one of the things you have to understand here is a lot of sociology-- here, again, at a national level plays a difference.

If you start up a new high tech company, eight out of 10 times you're going to go broke-- or go out of business. Not necessarily broke, but go out of business. Now your company's failed and you've got to get a job. So you've got to put on your CV-- Lester Thurow, started a company, went broke. Now does that make it easier or harder for me to get a job?

The great thing about Silicon Valley or route 128 is probably going to make it easier. People are going to say he's got energy, he's aggressive, he's got good ideas. I know that eight out of 10 fail for no particularly bad reason on a personal level. I'd love to hire that guy.

We've had some of our Japanese students who get the entrepreneurial bug and go back to Japan. They set up a company and fail and what happens? They're branded for the rest of their life across their forehead-- failure. They never again get a good job. You can't afford to be entrepreneurial in that kind of an environment in Japan, because the risks are too high.

And the question is, do you have the kind of-- you can get people taking too many risks. But here, again, it's one of those tensions that you have to think about socially. It should be risky to set up a new business, but it shouldn't be the kind of thing that's the equivalent of economic suicide if you try.

And so I think these things over reasonably short periods of time can change. Because I will confess-- next fall I will have been here 30 years. And this is a more entrepreneurial today than when I came 30 years ago.

CHUCK VEST: I'm going to read two questions that were independently submitted-- you'll see why and then turn the whole panel loose on them. One questioner asked-- what should we or our government do to improve our transportation infrastructure? That is speed is the measurement of-- I'm sorry, the speed of the movement of people and goods within and between cities.

And the second member asked Dr. Tan specifically-- the initial spark for Singapore's rise after independence was a massive growth of infrastructure. Can you comment on how the investment capital for this undertaking was raised and successfully managed?

Maybe we could start with Dr. Tan, then ask the somewhat broader infrastructure question, including transportation in the US.

TONY K. TAN: I think the short answer to that is through national savings. What we did in Singapore was to essentially start a fund called the Central Provident Fund to which every employee contributed a set amount of his salary every month. It's a compulsory fund.

And this is matched by a similar contribution from the employer. And this was put into a retirement fund where the employee, when he retires at 65, could draw on it to defray expenses during his or her old age.

But in the meantime, of course, these funds were available and the government was able to lend these funds to various statutory boards. And we used them to build housing boards. And the other main component was that we were fortunate to have a period of very rapid economic growth, because world trade was conducive to growth. At the time, it was expanding at more than 10% a year.

And because the economy was doing well, this created a great deal of wealth not only in the corporate sector, but also in individuals. And this provided the necessary amount of finance for Singapore to be able to build roads, apartments, airports, and seaports without having to borrow externally. Which of course, is a very fortunate thing-- in view of the collapse of regional currencies in the last 12 months. I hope that answers the question.

CHUCK VEST: Other comments in generally, Dave.

DAVID H. MARKS: I think that what the American government should do is-- if it really wants to be successful-- is to do the exact opposite of what it's presently doing right now. If Lester's historian of the 3000 comes back and looks at this last part of the 20th century and asks, what was the greatest impact on American society, it will probably be the interstate highway system-- the national defense highway system-- which was-- Eisenhower rode on the Autobahn in '52, thought it would be great if we could move military vehicles around the country.

The car manufacturers and the auto manufacturers thought this would be a good idea and now we have the wonderful interstate system, which has led to the demise of the railroads to people with cheap gasoline being allowed to live anywhere-- to off ramps on the interstate system no matter whether you're in Kansas or California or New York that look exactly identical and a dispersion of people around the country dependent upon the automobile-- cheap automobiles, cheap gas-- who can now not be reached by public transportation.

It also led to the demise of the inner city and to the paving over most of the downtowns. Now this was government policy-- government policy, cheap gas, government policy, cheap roads that would come out of the tax funds. It doesn't have to be this way.

And simply a more relevant policy about what the price of energy should be for transportation would singularly change what is going on here along with reinvestments in the type of logistical infrastructure that we had before World War II or even after World War II in terms of public transportation and the ability to move freight-- not in trucks, but in other types of vehicles.

A third area may well be the way that information technologies will, in fact, begin to cut into this market for the need to move goods and services great distances, but allow them to produce more locally, assembled more locally and using information technologies.

CHUCK VEST: Here's a question submitted by Lester Thurow's publisher. Lester, what do you think the fourth revolution will be?

LESTER THUROW: Well, the thing to understand here is if you take these breakthrough technologies, the people who invent them usually don't have a clue how they're going to be used. The steam engine was invented because they had reached the limits of conventional mining in Europe and they had to have a way to get water out of the bottom of the mines. And that need was what led to the invention of the steam engine.

Now of course we use the steam engine to pump water out of mines, but that's not what it did. It created the transportation revolution where you went from the horse to the train and all of a sudden, you could go much faster.

I think you're going to see the same thing at the internet. Now the thing you remember about the railroads-- and this comes back to this business-- you both have to have the private and the public sector involved. Every railroad east of the Mississippi River was built with private money. Every railroad west of the Mississippi River was built with public money.

Why? The answer is if you're connecting pre-existing economic nodes like Chicago and New York, private industry can very profitably do that and they should do that. If you're opening up brand new territory-- the west of the United States-- Los Angeles didn't exist, San Francisco existed, but was very small-- then the time lag before you can make the money is so big that you have to have a heavy government involvement.

And so you see that in the internet. For the first 20 years, it's the Defense Department. For the next 10 years, it's the National Science Foundation. Now it's eminently supportable as a private transportation medium. And I think it's going to change lots of things.

And so here, again, the question is, do you have the right mix as opposed to being all one or the other? And you know here-- it may very well-- how much are we going to travel in the future? Well, globalization will make us travel more, electronic travel make us travel less. We don't know which way that's going to come out, but it's already true in my life. About 10% of the things I used to go to physically, I now go to electronically.

And here again it's going to be more of the sociology. And I think the thing that where it makes a difference is people my age say something that isn't true. What we say is, well, that's a nice trick, but you'll never sign a business deal that way. Our kids will sign a business deal that way, because it to them it'll feel perfectly comfortable.

They've used it their entire lives, it's perfectly natural. You don't have to have your wife in the same room with you. You can hook up on the video, and it's all the same, right? There's only one thing you can't do electronically.

CHUCK VEST: Well, I promised I would ask it, because I think it's been posed by three or four different people here. So here it is-- will breaking up Microsoft and Intel help ingenuity and innovation?

LESTER THUROW: You're addressing that question.

CHUCK VEST: Judy, you want to start it?

JUDITH C. LEWENT: No.

CHUCK VEST: Judy doesn't want to start it. Dave, do you?

DAVID H. MARKS: Don't start with me.

CHUCK VEST: Tony? Lester.

LESTER THUROW: The problem is that it makes sense to use one standard, even if it isn't the best. Because for example, if you take Microsoft, it's got a lot of competition. Personal computers are only about 8% of the computer market and a lot of operating systems for non-personal computers. Even on a personal computer, there are half a dozen operating systems. Some of them clearly better-- like Apple's.

But the fact of the matter is-- the fact of the matter is it makes sense for us all to use the same standard even if it isn't the best. It's like the typewriter keyboard, which is a rather inefficient keyboard, but it makes sense for us all to learn the same typewriter keyboard.

And I think the problem is if you broke up Microsoft and succeeded in creating confusion, we just-- it might not be Microsoft, it might be some other company-- we'll all focus in on one because it makes sense for us all to have a technology that we can use even if it isn't the best.

And I think the other thing that's happening is this is an area where technology is moving so fast, it's not obvious that an antitrust case, which takes at least 20 years to settle, can solve this kind of fast, fast moving technology. So I'm not a big believer that the Justice Department is going to solve a problem or that there is a problem here.

Because place a little bet-- suppose you came back 30 years from now-- will Microsoft-- there is no antitrust case, will Microsoft have its current monopoly? I think it's very unlikely. Bill Gates almost blew it on the internet.

He was at MIT about a year before he switched, saying the most negative things about the internet you can imagine. And if he'd been two years later before he made his discovery that it's, in fact, a good thing, Microsoft would not have the position it has today. And it's hard to make that kind of a transition when you're 41. It's impossible when you're 61.

And I just don't believe-- I think technology is moving in such a way that it's virtually impossible for somebody like Microsoft to keep a lock on it. Remember, they don't have the best stuff, it's just that we all have an incentive to use the same system, even if it isn't the best system because that's the most efficient thing to do. And we're going to do that no matter what the Justice Department does.

And so if you break up Microsoft, there'll be somebody else who'll become the new Microsoft and we'll all use their personal computer operating system because it makes sense.

CHUCK VEST: Thank you. Now I suggest in closing that since we believe very deeply in equal opportunity around here, that you folks can go this afternoon and ask Bob Metcalf the same question. If you didn't like Lester's answer, you can take Bob's. We're a little past time and we're going to now adjourn and go across the campus to have lunch together.

However, in doing that, I'd like to throw two questions out for you to think about and suggest that, rather than panel questions, these might be questions that could stimulate some conversation around your lunch tables today.

There are two of them-- one-- how can we as MIT alumni and alumnae ensure that all Americans at every socioeconomic level are included in the developing third Industrial Revolution?

And the second question, which, in some sense, is related to this-- there is only one woman on this panel. What do you think will happen to the traditional roles of men and women in the years ahead? So if that doesn't give you enough conversation to carry you through until the formal program, I quit. Thank you very much and thanks to our panel.