White House Office of Science & Technology Policy, 25th Anniversary Symposium (pt.2) MIT

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SKOLNIKOFF: I just want to add my voice of appreciation to Bill Golden for all that he's done for this field and this subject and this position. There's a wonderful article-- I think you've seen it-- in The New York Times today about him. And he's one of those people-- indefatigable. It's incredible.

But the I'm sure others have had the experience of publishing something, books or others, and suddenly discovering a letter in the mail-- how come a copy wasn't sent to him. And how he ever saw it or where, I don't-- never quite clear. But and I suspect he not only asked for them but reads them all as well. It's a remarkable feat and a remarkable career.

I'm Eugene Skolnikoff, professor of political science, emeritus now here at MIT. I have had the wonderful experience of actually joining the staff of the original science office in 1958. The only person here today I think that preceded me in that office directly is David Becker, who some place around, who was the first staff person in the office.

I joined that office in 1958 and stayed through most of the Kennedy administration-- left in '63 and returned later as a senior consultant to the OSTP when Frank Press was a Science Advisor. And I spent about half time there every week.

I must say that first office at the very beginning was something of very unusual and great excitement. Because it was quite clear that this was a really quite-- seemed to be at least a new innovation in American government that was, obviously, the White House's, the science operation OSID idea under Vannevar Bush during the war.

But this was the first time this has been attempted in the civilian economy. And even though we were in the midst of the Cold War and that was the original motivation, in fact, it was a very special place to work with an office with very considerable influence at the time in part because of the weakness of the various departments in being able to deal with science policy issues. I had the great pleasure of working with Jim Killian, George Kistiakowsky from Harvard, and Jerry Wiesner from MIT again.

And just a slight personal anecdote-- the I was-- happened before that office was created. But after Sputnik, I was then-- I don't know what the right term is today, but I was dating one of Robbie's daughters in New York. Went to pick her up one day and was bombarded with questions from Robbie about Jim Killian with whom he knew I'd worked with at MIT. And I could not understand what was going on.

He just kept on pestering me with questions about what Jim was like in person, how he manage things, et cetera, on and on. Of course, within a week, discovered why when Killian was appointed to the new post. And then shortly after, I was asked to join him in that job, which set the pattern for my own personal career and scholarship later, working particularly in the science and international affairs area which is what I've been doing here at MIT since.

By the way, I should mention there is another existing Science Advisor, Senior Science Advisor in the US government today-- Science Advisor to the Secretary of State, Norman Neureiter, who was unfortunately unable to be here today, but who actually is in office. He was appointed at the end of the last administration but on a Schedule B appointment, which is a three year appointment. And he's still there.

And he, in fact, is proving to be quite an influential and very interesting person. And Jack Gibbons had a lot to do with his finding and selection and appointment at that time. Let me go on, and our panel today where this is being done chronologically. And our two speakers are first, Phil Smith subbing for Frank Press who is the one science advisor was unable to be here today.

But Phil Smith was Associate Director under Frank Press during the Carter years. And we'll follow with Jay Keyworth. And I'll introduce them both right now so not to have to interrupt afterwards. Phil has a long association with science policy issues.

In fact, he was on the staff of the IGY in the late 1950s. He worked in National Science Foundation, was director of polar research, polar programs and, in 1973, was the chief of general science research in OMB. I think Guy Stever's already mentioned that Phil worked with him at the National Science Foundation as assistant to the director in the White House role in 1974 and then became-- when the office OSTP was created, became the associate director both for Guy Stever and then stayed on with Frank Press through the Carter years.

Phil comes a doctorate from North Carolina State. And he's presently a partner in McGarry & Smith and holds a whole variety of other science related posts and activities today. Jay Keyworth followed after the Reagan administration started, was appointed in May 1981-- so about roughly mid-month.

So I guess there's still hope that we haven't reached the end of May in this administration. So that he also was in these terms a, quote, "late appointment," unquote. He was Science Advisor to President Reagan right through to January of 1986. Prior to his appointment in the White House, he was Director of the Physics Division of Los Alamos.

And he's presently chairman of the Progress and Freedom Foundation and of the firm that he started, the Keyworth Company, which consultants to industry, particularly on innovation and strategic planning to cope with new technologies and emerging technologies. Dr. Keyworth comes from Boston, glad to say, but not from MIT, studied at Yale, and has a PhD from Duke. Let's start off with Phil-- Phil.


SMITH: Thank you, Gene. And thank you, President [INAUDIBLE] and Professor Hastings, for organizing this conference. Let me start by expressing Frank Press' deep personal regret that he could not be here today. He extends his best wishes to all of his fellow science advisors and all of you.

I thought that I would divide my remarks into two parts today. The first part will be mostly focused on the operating environment for OSTP during the Carter presidency. And the second part will be focused briefly on some of the work that we did in the major issues that we worked on in the late 1970s.

I did do a longer written paper that may be in a colloquium about volume that discusses some of the interplay between the offices and the executive office, the White House staff, and work with the Congress and with the cabinet. You'll find, for example, a note that I have in that paper that describes the cabinet room budget session we had with the president and the Energy Secretary.

And the Energy Secretary didn't like our analysis. And he tried to dismiss it by saying, "Mr. President those arguments are the fuzzy headed thinking and analytical analysis of the MIT professors." And in that instance, at least, the president sided with his Science Advisor. Well, as we're discovering and we will continue to discover as we go through this morning session, each presidency is a kind of a remarkable collage.

A complex painting that starts with the campaign, the voters' decisions, the very early decisions that a president has to make that start immediately in dealing with the unexpected and unanticipated activities that forced their way into the presidency. And it's in this environment that each Science Advisor has to kind of find his way or, hopefully, someday her way into the operating environment and learn how to be an effective player in the White House staff.

Now, our transition from Ford to Carter was really the first test of the OSTP Act. And it was the first transition after the legislation was passed. We had a lot of good things going for us.

One of them was that Frank was appointed very early-- identified and actually appointed and confirmed. And so as a consequence, the whole participation in the machinery of the White House, the daily meeting in the Roosevelt Room in the morning, meetings with the leaders of the other executive office groups like CEA, the economic advisors, OMB and so forth. That all began to flow very early.

President Carter had a personal interest in science and technology as well as a deep understanding of the fact that science and technology is needed in a lot of decision making. So he would turn to us on technical and scientific questions. But he also would turn occasionally to us to ask a question that had to do more with his personal curiosity about science and engineering.

And he would sometimes, embarrassingly, so he would stop a cabinet meeting, for example, to get into some issue of basic research with Frank that caused all the other advisors to wonder what in the world was going on at that moment. Now, in addition to the fact that we had early appointments, another important thing that was valuable was the access. A lot of the press in the science community only thinks about the access to the presidency.

And in the old days, there used to be a kind of a measurement amount of how many times the science advisor saw the president. Access is very important, and Frank had good access along with the other senior advisors. And we got very fast turnaround on memos to the president, sometimes overnight. But equally important is the way in which the science advisor and his staff is able to begin to work with the other offices in the White House and bring technology and science advice together with the other kinds of advice.

The economic advice, the financial and budgetary advice that all has to be put together in what ultimately becomes a presidential decision. And so the early setup and the early operation helped us a great deal on that front. Another thing that was very important was that by the early appointment, Frank was able to participate in the selection of the R&D agency heads for most of the other R&D agency leaders of the Carter presidency. And that was a very important.

Now, President Carter decided that he did not want to have a science and technology committee. There was this committee that been put in place for the two year period to study the idea of the future of the organization of science in the government and the feasibility of a permanent committee. But President Carter felt that there had been a proliferation of presidential committee, standing committees. And he wanted to trim down the total number.

So as a consequence, we discharged the committee that just the matter of a year before I helped set up in the Ford presidency. And we operated with ad hoc committees, many appointed by the president himself. Many panels, we convened ourselves. And we also use the National Academy of Sciences on several quick turnaround studies.

Now, the science community and many of the congressmen who had been involved in the setting up of the OSTP legislation were, of course, angry about the fact that we weren't going to have a committee. But the reality is that if the president does not want to use a piece of the OSTP legislation, it's counterproductive to try to use it.

So we did not try to do that. There are on all presidents these unexpected events. Some of which have science and technology components. In our period, we dealt with mount St. Helens, the volcanic eruption with the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident and with a mysterious light fly show over the South Pacific that a satellite had picked up that could have been a nuclear explosion by a testing nation.

In those issues and many other issues, the president turned immediately to the OSTP and Frank and asked us to be the lead on working on those issues. Our staff number to 32 only. We had a science advisor, three associate directors, Ben Huberman, who handle national security and had a dual appointment with the NSC staff.

Gill Omenn, who's now a vice president at the University of Michigan for Health, who handled health and biomedical research. And I handled natural resources, energy basic research, and university industry relations. The four of us had White House Mess privileges. And for those of you who have not been there, you cannot appreciate the importance of The Mess as an instrument of policy making. It is very important

Now, we had some problems with the Carter presidency. And it's long ago enough now that it can be talked about, perhaps, a little more analytically than Jack or our Neal would be able to talk about the Clinton presidency. We had much strength, but we had some weaknesses. The first weakness was, as is in many presidencies, we had a number of people who were fiercely loyal to the president who had been in the campaign.

They were more loyal to the president than they were interested in governance. And they came in often-- many of them were young. They had come out of small state government. Some of them actually were in the first jobs they ever had.

They had been campaign workers and came to a job in the White House. And that was their first job. Some were ill equipped. For example, the first Director of White House Personnel knew nothing about the structure of the government, what the mission of the agencies were. So this required a good deal of patients and tact to kind of nurture and tutor these people.

Somewhat reminiscent actually of something Jack faced in the early part of the Clinton administration. I remember going to a meeting with Jack in the EOB about six months in. And our combined ages were equal to the eight other people in the room.


The enduring weakness, however, was a serious weakness. And it affected us on many things we were working on from setting up an International Institute, that I'll mentioned in a minute, to getting a structure in place to handle radioactive waste, which is still a problem. And that was that even though both houses of Congress were under Democratic control, President Carter and the Congress did not get along well with each other.

And this lasted over the whole four years of the presidency. And so when we would go up to the Hill to talk the committees and staff, we would frequently find ourselves being pin cushions for the first 5 or 10 minutes while people on the Hill were taking out their anger on the White House legislative staff on us. So you would sit there calmly and absorb that and then you would get on with your business.

Now, that unfortunately endured over the whole time. You have to understand that in part it was also a tension and a relationship that carried over from the Watergate period and the Nixon impoundment battles that he had with the Congress over the budget over a period of a couple of three years. So there was a great deal of hostility toward the imperial presidency that had been built up. And then when you had a president whose congressional relations were not as smooth as they should have been, it just sort of exacerbated the whole thing.

There were four big things as I look back now on what we did 25 years ago. And I'll mention one or two points about some of our successes and failures. The first issue was that we focused a good deal of energy on increasing funding for basic research not only for NIH and NSF but for all the mission agencies of the government. To Ford budgets had turned around the decline that had begun in 1968.

So we continued the build up of basic research in the mission agencies. We continue to program a guy had started in agriculture for competitive grant program and were frustrated there, as were many of our successors because Congress was not enthusiastic about that program. We had great success in the work we did with the Defense Department.

Bill Perry was the Director of Defense, Research, and Engineering. And we started a lot of basic research activities, for example, in material science that directly led to the kind of stealth technologies that saw their deployment in the Gulf War. There were concerns about the decline in American industrial innovation.

This was right after the bicentennial. And we were perceiving that Japan and the European countries and companies were rising. We organized an NSC-like review that involved all the cabinet officers of the government to review government policies on innovation. And out of that flowed a whole large list of administrative changes-- for example, a number of changes in the patent office, a change in the ERISA Act that allowed pension funds to be invested in venture capital, clarification of antitrust policy so that pre-competitive research could be undertaken.

Some of these matters required continued support in the Reagan presidency. And I'm happy to say that Bruce Merrifield, Jordan Baruch's successor, he was the point man on this in commerce for us. He carried on and Merrifield carried on and there were things passed then in '81 and '82, such as the Bayh Dole Act that now we look back on is ancient history.

We worked a great deal on the regulatory front and also on energy, science, and technology. By the late '70s, we had been 10 years into the regulatory and environmental regimes that had fallen into place in the late 1960s. And it was beginning to be apparent that the science base needed a checkout and an improvement. There were a lot of areas where we were really just simply making regulations on the basis of inadequate understanding of science.

So we put a lot of work in on that, had some cross agency teams that looked at a framework for assessing carcinogen risk. We spent a lot of time, as I mentioned, on nuclear waste, a lot of time on diesel emissions. Because that was a point when diesel emissions were coming into the fleet. A third area in which we put a lot of emphasis was on international matters.

President Carter was interested in building up the capacity of developing nations in science and technology. Our biggest pay dirt success may be of the Carter presidency was the mission Frank led to China of government leaders to set up the formal agreements that were signed by Deng Xiaoping and the president in 1979. When Frank was in China, he cautioned the vice premier that some of the students had studied in the United States would probably want to stay here.

Without missing a beat, the vice premier said, "Dr. Press, we have plenty more." The fourth area that we worked on-- we had one big defeat I should mention in the international area. And that was this organization that where Gene Skolnikoff worked very hard on as did others to set up something called the Institute for Scientific and Technical Cooperation. And it was to be an agency that would build infrastructure in developing countries and science.

The Senate Appropriations Committee did not like the idea. And so it did not come to pass. We did get some part of it built into aid later on, but that I can tell you about at coffee break if we want to. Let me make an observation or two in conclusion. One is that we benefited a lot in our time because of the work that had gone on with the prior science advisors and with people like Bill Baker, Sai Raimo, Saw Bucksbomb.

So there was a kind of a transitional-- and it's typical of science and engineering and policy. There is a kind of a bipartisanship. To be sure, there's some partisanship. But by and large, there's a kind of a continuity. Several speakers have mentioned that.

It carried on into the Reagan presidency. Art Biku was in the Reagan transition team, and I had known him when he was an officer in the industrial Research Institute. So I worked a great deal over the first months of the Reagan presidency with him as I was exiting OSTP on passing forward the mantle so to speak.

The second interesting thing, and this is a particularly this was it was very provocative comments by Ed point this up. The issues we worked on in that period of time in many instances are the same issues that are important now at the beginning of the 21st century. And somehow we still have this mismatch in our government between the longer horizons of scientists and engineers and the solutions required and the short horizons of the political process that makes for this rocky and erratic course that we go forward on anything like energy technology where a slow, steady sustaining course would probably be the course. Thank you very much.


We're running a little slow. But I think we have time for one or two brief questions if there are any. Yes, right here. Yes? Yes?

AUDIENCE: Yeah, if I could ask you a specific about nuclear waste. You mentioned that a lot of things-- asking about nuclear waste-- that a lot of the issues you dealt with then are still very much for today. What do you think a more permanent solution looks like for the United States as we try to deal with this?

SMITH: I'll tell you in a nutshell what happened. I didn't know that the timer was able to ask questions, but--


I'll be brief in answering the timer. The framework that we put in place that ultimately was enacted in '81 and '82 for high and low level waste was a very good framework. It had all the right technical parameters. For example, going forward with the exploration of a number of geologic media-- not just one-- confidence building with the state and local governments, so that you began to get more confidence in the fact that the process would in effect lead to a publicly arrived at decision that included the public.

What happened was that, as often is the case, succeeding Directors of Energy-- Secretaries of Energy-- utility companies-- they all get anxious to go forward quickly. So we immediately went back to the idea, by fiat, of declaring two waste sites-- the plant in New Mexico and the Nevada site.

So there was no comparative geologic investigation-- those two states felt that they had been singled out to be the dumping grounds-- so the process immediately broke down. It then got going again and variously, but meanwhile the public attitudes changed, and there was an increasing resistance to nuclear power. So that remains today an issue that we are a long way from getting worked out. And we, ironically, at this moment-- there is a prospect of nuclear power getting a restart for a whole lot of reasons, but we do not have the waste problem solved. And that's a big issue.


KEYWORTH: Well, it's good of MIT and of the Sloan Foundation, both, to sponsor this symposium, because clearly it is a timely topic.

Now the issue of just how science advice can be most effective to the White House remains a challenging one, probably not much less so than when the Congress first created OSTP 25 years ago. OSTP remains somewhat of an anomaly among executive offices-- viewed by some White House staffers as an asset, but by some others as an imposition. How a consensus among these diverging views emerges-- assuming it does-- will have much to do with how the office will be able to function.

And circumstances differ. Each of us has advised different presidents, at least at different times. Priorities varied, pressures were different, and personalities created very different relationships. In my comments today, I'm going to dwell somewhat-- primarily, in fact-- on some of the actual relationships that developed during my tenure. Because they, in fact, were essential to how I was able to be effective.

Now I joined the Reagan administration just about now-- in early May, four months after the inauguration and shortly after the assassination attempt. During the first few months, as well as during the transition planning, there had been a lot of debate over whether a science advisor was, in fact, needed.

The opposition stemmed largely from the perception that OSTP was created to represent the scientific community, while White House staff was there, in fact, to serve the president. In other words, a number of the president's closest and trusted friends and advisors viewed a science advisor as somehow likely to be different from them and likely to come with an agenda that might differ from the president's.

The countervailing view, which eventually prevailed, was simply that since so many of the administration's top priorities-- for example, defense, energy, and the economy-- were deeply rooted in science and technology, they would need a team member with competency in science. Without expertise on the president's policy team, the White House would be dependent upon the external agencies. And by the time I was invited to Washington as a candidate for science advisor, the debate was over and resolved. And I really felt welcome.

Now in its first term, the process of policy development in the Reagan administration was conducted in a somewhat more centrally organized manner than in some administrations, if not most. Edwin Meese, bearing the title of Counselor to the President, coordinated all policymaking-- whether domestic, defense, or foreign. This wide ranging power, along with Ed's real talent for the job and his uniquely close personal relationship with the president, led to him being referred to as deputy president.

One of the means Ed used to coordinate policy development was to hold meetings each evening in his office with leaders of each White House office involved in policy matters, including OMB-- a crucial one-- to discuss both tactical issues as well as strategic areas of opportunity. As a member, Ed Meese made it possible for me to, early on, develop a relationship with the president-- as I will explain-- and with the president's senior staff.

Now a president has, in fact, many assistants, but few bona fide advisors-- and only he makes the distinction. My relationship with Ronald Reagan began with his light reference to me as his personal Merlyn.


Ed Meese was to play a major role in how I and OSTP were to move beyond that simple perception.

In the summer of 1981, one of the Reagan children began to appear frequently in the press, in a parent's sympathy, with a number of anti-nuclear activists. Worrying about her being exploited, the president turned to Ed Meese for advice. Ed suggested that I might help. The president then called me to ask if I'd mind coming over to talk about a personal matter. I did. Sensing that she would probably not react well to his own counsel, the president simply asked me if I would go out to California and talk with her. And I did. And that became the first step in developing a relationship with the president.

Just a few weeks later, the president called unexpectedly-- also, I'm sure, at Ed Meese's suggestion-- on a Saturday morning, and asked if I'd mind coming over to discuss an issue that he was pondering. He put the question quite simply-- a lot of good people were suggesting to him that we commit a hundred billion dollars-- or lots more-- to this new technology called stealth. And he needed to know some basics before going along with that. In particular, he asked me, does it work? And if so, will it continue to do so?

Now this was a turning point for me, because I started to give an answer. And I suddenly realized that this wasn't exactly the kind of scientific dialogue I was used to at Los Alamos. You see, here there would be no opportunity to revise my first estimate. Fortunately, I deferred an answer until I could be more confident. As it turned out, it took several months. In fact, it took several man-years.

As a result of that simple question as to the viability of stealth and the challenge that responding to it entailed, we were able to develop, within OSTP, some substantial expertise in some of the more arcane and more sensitively classified areas of defense technology. In stealth, in anti-submarine warfare, in space-based surveillance, and other key technologies that underlay our defense modernization efforts, we became credentialed and, I think, a valued component of the president's team. We had been assigned a role in defense-- the administration's top priority. And as a result, I became a regular attendee of the National Security Planning Group-- the pared down version of the cabinet that dealt with issues of national security.

And one point worth noting here in passing is that some of the inherent constraints faced by OSTP's external advisory process, previously known as the PSAC and now PCAST and what we call the White House Science Council, or the WHSC-- now since it was unthinkable to obtain clearances for each of the WHSC members to many of the really sensitive areas that we were involved in, it became a real challenge for me to find a way to carry on a much needed dialogue with my respected advisors-- but to do so, within at least some reasonable respect for the rules. Perhaps Ed David or Allan Bromley may recall my discussing with WHSC in 1983 the idea that we just might have operational aircraft with certain hypothetical radar-evading capabilities-- that this was a chronic problem.

Now returning to a specific-- in the fall of 1982, finding a politically acceptable basing mode for the land-based MX missile had become a critical problem for the administration. As the final link in the administration's strategic modernization program, much hinged on solving this one lingering problem. Many options were reviewed-- a process in which OSTP played a prominent role. But finally agreement began to emerge, focusing on a highly arcane concept called Dense Pack.

However, a debate arose over just who would articulate the technically complex rationale behind the decision to the Congress and to the public. In an effort to resolve an impasse between NSC and the Pentagon, OSTP was asked to take on the task. And it took months of effort by a good portion of the OSTP staff and turned out to be a task where, to put it lightly, success was elusive. But with battle scars and all, we did acquire some more legitimacy, and essentially, we had begun to acquire some chips.

About this time, I began to learn some basics about how Washington really works. Fortunately, early in my tenure in Washington, an acquaintance had suggested that I refresh myself in the pervasive wisdom to be found in Machiavelli's writings, especially in The Prince-- perhaps the greatest treatise ever written on the exploitation of power. Unlike business, you see, Washington is much more about power than it is about process. Where we in OSTP most needed power was in the budget process-- and specifically in negotiation with OMB.

While the administration had agreed that funding for basic research, particularly in universities, deserved the protection that Vannevar Bush--


--with his term of a federal trust-- first defined, there was, of course, a range of opinion as to just what funding increases were needed.

Now the '70s had been a generally tough decade for basic research, especially with the high rates of inflation of the previous few years, and we in OSTP felt that some pretty heroic funding increases were required. And this is where we chose to cash in our chips. The annual increases in NSF's budget of near 20%-- the introduction of a number of new programs, such as the NSF centers and Young Investigator Awards-- new facilities not in agencies' budgets-- were each the results of negotiations where such chips were required.

Now while each of these trusts did represent administration policy, the individual initiatives were in fact obtained only because OMB knew that we were willing to let Ed Meese or even the president resolve differences of how to implement those policies.

Finally, let me come to the single issue that most shaped OSTP in the Reagan years-- certainly the one that had the most impact and which remains to this day the most controversial. From my very earliest days with the president, he often spoke to me about his concerns over the basic premises upon which nuclear deterrence is founded. After being briefed on the prospect of depressed trajectory missiles launched from Soviet submarines off our Atlantic coast-- reducing warning times to less than three minutes-- he asked-- and I will never forget this-- and I'm expected to make the most awesome decision anyone has ever made that fast and on the basis of what you call bits?

Most of all he understood the importance of measuring deterrence by the concept of stability, the all important condition that defines the likelihood of preemption. As did his predecessors, he came to understand the fundamental but largely unspoken implications for stability in the transition from countervalue deterrence-- where population centers were targeted-- and counterforce deterrence-- where the target is the opponent's retaliatory capability-- silos. He came to understand what many arms control advocates had chosen to overlook, and that was the erosion of stability that this entailed.

During his first two years, strategic force modernization and rebuilding the military was the president's top priority, and he was immersed in every aspect of this issue himself. In weighing the various options for modernizing our strategic forces and moving arms control from the salt framework to start-- and simply in trying to understand the Soviet Union's motives and intentions-- President Reagan grappled with all the intricacies of managing deterrence.

As a consequence of all this, he decided to embark upon a path that became SDI, or his Strategic Defense Initiative. Expressed most simply, he concluded that the stability of deterrence was eroding-- that it was wrong-- and that there had to be a better way, in the long term, to ensure our national security. And it never occurred to him that such a thing as a perfect defense did or ever would exist. What he did believe is that any incentive for a preemptive nuclear attack could be removed by even a rudimentary missile defense system, that the ABM Treaty was rooted in pre-counterforce deterrence, and that Soviet doctrine would be threatened by such a strategic shift by the United States. And assuredly, it was.

The SDI was President Reagan's idea. It was his initiative, and it was his faith in technology that drove it. My role was as a trusted advisor and to tell him what was possible.

Much has been written about the fact that the president's SDI speech was conceived in less than a week. In fact, the president began to articulate the rationale behind the speech in late 1981, 18 months earlier. The president wrote virtually the entire speech himself. I did advise him, I did help him edit the speech, and I offered him choices throughout it for restating key points. I did my best to explain the president's intent to other members of his staff and his cabinet.

George Shultz, in his book Turmoil and Triumph, argues that the president relied far too heavily on my advice. I don't think so. One need only reexamine how Ronald Reagan carried out his negotiations personally with Mikhail Gorbachev to see just how independent and determined the president could be. He had, from the beginning, a clear vision of where he was leading the country, and SDI was part of how to get there. I believe that he was right-- that he was courageous in undertaking SDI-- and it was certainly my privilege to serve him in that endeavor. But he and he alone made the estimates of the risks and benefits, and he never wavered.

From that point on, though, I did become-- no question-- a single issue science advisor. Those were my orders. The president asked me to be his spokesman on SDI, and in particular, while the diplomatic processes were trying to position SDI as a pawn in arms control, I was traveling the world carrying the president's message that SDI was never and would never be open for negotiation. Only much later, at Reykjavík, was his commitment to SDI established beyond doubt.

Now as you think of how things should be with science advice, I suspect that these experiences are not quite irrelevant. Thank you.



PRESENTER: Thank you very much, Jay. Any questions? Granger Morgan.

AUDIENCE: In Hedrick Smith's account [INAUDIBLE] he argues that the recent statement of the Catholic bishops played a very substantial and simple role in the decision. Your account, of course, doesn't mention it. Would you talk a little bit about the extent to which that political setting was a factor.

KEYWORTH: It did play a role. In fact, what occurred at exactly the same time was the whole nuclear freeze movement, which the president had lots and lots of folks-- in fact, he asked us to bring him lots of folks who had been spokesmen in that movement, because the cross-section of concerned parties was a lot broader than in most anti-nuclear movements. And there were a lot of very, very, very rational people.

But let me make a point. The president arrived at SDI for, really, one reason. That was because of trying to find a way to manage the intricacies of modernizing strategic forces to achieve a higher level of stability. Time after time, the president made comparisons to me between the decisions that JFK had to make with Minute Man when he could, with certainty, look forward to 20 years of a very stable condition.

Remember stability is defined as a condition in which preemption is inconceivable. And no matter what we were doing, it was becoming increasingly an action-reaction-- an offense-defense-- challenge-- much more complicated. And that is really the reason why we did SDI.

And Hedrick Smith does not say that it was-- I beg to differ. Go back and read it more carefully. He discusses it much more carefully than that. The Catholic bishops' move was a--

AUDIENCE: He doesn't say it's the cause. He said it was a factor.

KEYWORTH: It's a factor, and I agree it was a factor. I would not place it amongst the top 15 or 20 factors.


I would say that if you go back and look-- for example, if you go back and look at a visit that the president took before he was president to-- I think in 1978 or 1979-- to the Command and Control Systems in Colorado-- and beginning to really discover the window that one has to make a retaliatory decision-- if you really want to go back to the first factor that affected him, I think that's where it came from.

PRESENTER: I'm afraid this is a topic which we could go on for a very long time. Jay, thank you very much.



Change roles?

Yep, we're done.


MOORE: [INAUDIBLE] our next panel.

While we get going to the next panel, one thing I've learned in Washington is you take an opportunity to miss an open mic, which, of course, I don't have one.


[INAUDIBLE], because you never know when the next one's going to appear.

I'm Duncan Moore. I was the Associate Director for Technology under Jack and then Neal. And I just wanted to [INAUDIBLE] a couple things, because the last time I was in this room was actually for the Council on Competitiveness meeting. It was here on March of 1998, and I had just been really confirmed in my position.

And that meeting was very profound for me, because the council met to decide what was going to make or continue to make American corporations more competitive in the next 10 years and what were going to be the things that were going to limit the growth of the American corporation in America.

And what came out of that meeting was workforce-- that was a big issue. It had to do with K-12 education. And so I got very much interested in that whole issue as a matter of international competitiveness. And I just want to share with you a couple of viewgraphs that have come out of that that I think are kind of important.

One of the things that came out and we've all heard of, or may have heard about, is over the next decade, we're going to need 3 million-- oh, sorry-- we're going to need about 2.2 new K-12 teachers. We have a total workforce of 3 million K-12 teachers. So if you think it's going to be easy to recruit science and math teachers in the next decade, you're kidding yourself. It's going to be a very, very difficult task, and we really need to address that.

The other part is where people are going and what people are choosing for majors, and I have one viewgraph that some of you have seen. But it's one of my favorites, because it shows the history of majors in electrical engineering from 1986 to 1998. And the 1999 number continues along that linear path, and you see, it isn't one of those things that has ups and downs. It's just a straight line to zero. And at the current rate, we'll be at zero sometime in the year 2010.

That's a problem, but there is a major-- that, of course, Chuck knows all about-- which is my favorite major in the whole world-- which is buried behind here and then goes up here and now exceeds the number of electrical engineering majors. And that major is parks, recreation, leisure, and fitness studies.


Now, as I've told other college presidents-- and Dr. Shapiro would want to do this, also-- clearly electrical engineering is not a growth industry for you. A growth industry is this new major, and you better get on the bandwagon very quickly. But it points out something about our society. We think of the 1990s as being a highly technological society in our growth-- our economic growth being based on technology-- and yet that's not where students are going. They're going in the fields, and this is true of other physics-based engineering fields.

The only field that has actually seen an upturn-- and so the numbers for total engineering enrollments actually have turned around-- is because of biomedical engineering. BME is solely the one that's going up, not the physics-based engineering fields. And that is a real problem.

Now I want to compare that-- I want to give two graphs of international issues. The United States graduates more baccalaureate students than anybody else in the world-- a little over a million students. And I've given you the top 10 countries in the world. And the reason I got interested in this was actually the number under China.

You notice that China-- in the right hand column, they've normalized the number of 24-year-olds-- and what you see is only 1.4 percent of 24-year-olds in China receive baccalaureate degrees. And I was thinking, what does that mean for a country over the next 20 to 40 years? It has profound impacts on that. And so you'd say, oh, gee, China's not going to be very competitive, but let me show you one more of viewgraph, quickly. And let's order them by who grants the most engineering degrees.

This does not include physics, chemistry, and the other physical sciences. Because the way the data is structured, it's hard to pull that out. So if you include the physics and chemistry majors in China, you're going to get a number that's more like 60%.

Now you have to understand, in China, you're probably not going to major in political science.


You're probably not going to major in social science. And of course, like other countries-- like the former Soviet Union-- science and engineering was an apolitical major that you go into.

But this has a very profound impact, because notice the United States here is graduating about 40% of the same number of majors in engineering right now as China is. And so as a matter of public policy, this has a very interesting effect.

And then finally, my other viewgraph-- and if anybody wants these viewgraphs afterwards, just give me a business card that with the word data on it, and I'll email them to you. There's only two numbers I want you to look at-- the one of PhDs, which is 45,000-- the number of lawyers. There is almost one lawyer for every PhD being graduated in this country. So if you believe this is going to become a less litigious society over the next decade, they want to be employed, too. Engineers-- 6,200-- and as Chuck has mentioned, about 30,000 of those in that year were foreign students.

And then finally, that other number I want you to show is we think of this being information technology era. Look at the number PhDs in computer science. That is not a typo. It's 857.

The good news is it's only down 1%, and that's only eight people. But the problem is we have a critical workforce situation that's coming up over the next decade.

So now it's my pleasure to introduce the three advisors from the period of 1988 to 2000. The first is Allan Bromley, who was the advisor under Bush from 1989 to '93. Allan, of course, is very, very well known in the physics community. He received a National Medal of Science in 1988. He's a member of the National Academy of Science. He's been president of AAAS and the American Physical Society. He's won the Benjamin Franklin Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts in London. He's a founding partner of the Washington Advisory Group. And of course, the most important thing is he has a PhD from University of Rochester-- my home institution.

On a personal note, Alan was one of the people I went to when we both serving on the AIP board, when I was thinking about coming to Washington and going to work for Jack. And he really encouraged me to do that, and I really appreciate that recommendation.

The second speaker is Jack Gibbons, who was the first science advisor under President Clinton from 1993 to '98. Previous to that, he'd been at OTA for 13 years. He is currently President of Sigma Xi, he is a member of the National Academy of Engineering, and his PhD is from some small school down south called Duke.

Something that's not in his write-up that I think is important-- that he raises horses. He has a wonderful farm out in Plains, Virginia, and he's been very, very nice to people in hosting the OSTP family out there on his facility there.

GIBBONS: The parks and recreation.



You know, it doesn't-- oh yeah, it does say your PhD's in physics. It doesn't say parks and recreation.

On a personal note, though, he is the guy that hired me at OSTP back in 1997. And that had a very profound effect on me. It really helped me, and I grew in a very different direction. And I really thank Jack for that.

Then finally last but not least is Neal Lane, who succeeded Jack as Science Advisor in 1998 and served until 2000.

AUDIENCE: He's the latest, not the last.


MOORE: Oh, yeah-- the most recent. [LAUGHS] Good point. This is a tough audience here. [LAUGHS] Previous to that, he had been the director of the National Science Foundation, and previous to that, he was the provost at Rice University. He is now the only university professor at Rice.

Now Neal-- since I worked with him for a long time, I have lots of good stories about Neal. But I'll only tell a couple. I set Neal up three different times while he was director, and each time I promised it would never happen again. And each time it went something like the following.

Neal-- somebody-- and the sequence was Attorney General Reno, Secretary Shalala, and the third one was Sandy Berger. And each time I said to him, okay, you start your speech, and they will be here when your speech finishes. And the last words are for you to introduce them.

So he starts the speech with the person not in the audience, and every time they weren't there. And he had to go into a song and dance routine to fill out the material. And each time I apologized to him-- it wouldn't happen again-- and I guess it can't happen again now. [LAUGHS] So Neal is a wonderful person.

So Allan?


BROMLEY: Well, thank you, Duncan, and it is a great pleasure to have this opportunity to see so many old friends and colleagues. And I would, on all of our behalf, add my thanks to Chuck Vest and Dan Hastings for putting together this celebration of the 25th anniversary of the OSTP founding.

Now in the brief time that's available this morning, instead of trying to give you a laundry list of what went on during the Bush administration, I'm going to focus on three areas-- in two of which I think we achieved reasonable success and one where I think we could have been much more successful if we had managed things a little better.

One of my first tasks in the office was to respond to a request from the president for five or six items in areas in science and technology that fulfill three conditions. First of all, they were of national importance; secondly, they involved a significant fraction of the 20 some agencies that maintained research programs in furtherance of their own missions; and third, that they weren't of sufficient importance-- that they merited the attention of a president.

And so in order to select these, one of the real requirements was that we revitalize the Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering, and Technology-- a group that had the somewhat unfortunate acronym of FCCSET. And having pull this group together, we selected the following areas as being of importance enough to meet these criteria.

The first was mathematics and science education, for the simple reason that unless we were going to do something to improve our K through 12 education, everything else that we had hoped to do was clearly going to be doomed. This has been mentioned many times. It will be mentioned many times by other people.

Now the second item was advanced computation and communication-- that because we felt that the nation was not taking adequate advantage of the information revolution. And we established a group of grand challenges, which I must say, we thought it would take four or five years to even begin to accomplish-- it took something like six to eight months.

The third was global climate change. And the reason there was because that was a topic that had boiled to the top of the political agenda in countries around the world, and we in the US had interests both internal and external.

Material science and synthesis-- because in almost all cases, the efficiency of industrial processes are limited, ultimately, by the behavior of materials-- some materials, usually at high temperature.

Then biotechnology, because biotechnology is uniquely an American technology, reflecting the fruits of 40 years of generous funding of fundamental biology in the nation's universities-- the research universities-- and a field that holds high promise, not only in health-- where it's been focused thus far-- but also in agriculture and eventually in manufacturing.

Then advanced manufacturing-- because we believed that we were in the process of losing a lead which this nation had held since its founding-- and were losing it rather rapidly.

Finally, it was international science and technology-- and there because although we still had and now have the strongest science and technology enterprise that the world has ever seen, the fact is that by focusing their activities, other nations have been able to move up in particular areas to equal us and in some to surpass us. And this is not surprising, but what it meant was that it was very important for us to be informed and to have decent communications and cooperation with these other nations.

Now in each of these areas, under the fixed guidance, we pulled together representatives from all the involved agencies. They elected their own chairmen in each case, and in the following several months-- first of all, they made an inventory of what the government was doing in all of these areas, and in every case we were astonished to find that the government was doing vastly more than anyone had previously recognized. Secondly, they produced a budget for the coming year and in last detail, a budget for each of the five out-years.

This took an enormous amount of work. It involved something over 2000 federal scientists and technologists.

A rather amazing transformation took place during this process. In the beginning, everyone was very wary, and there was a lot of secrecy. And agency representatives kept their papers very close to their chest. But after a few months, we found that, in fact, we were getting much more communication, much more cooperation, and much more trust. Beyond that, each of the representatives was extremely loath to see their agency appear in a bad light among its peers, and they were very much taken by the fact that they, as individuals, were participating in developing programs for the nation in areas of major importance.

Now once these committees had agreed on the various roles that various agencies would play in these presidential initiatives, as they came to be called, OMB, working with OSTP, froze all the funds. And that was simply because we didn't want agency people to request funding for the presidential initiatives and then move them somewhere else. It's not that we didn't trust them. We just understood a perfectly human reaction.

Now one very key point-- whenever the recommendations of a FCCSET committee disagreed with the recommendations of an agency head or a department secretary, there was no question-- the agency head and the department secretary had the last word. And because we emphasized that from the very start, the question never arose during our four years.

Now each year, each of these committees produced a booklet-- well illustrated-- that was an appendix to the president's budget submission to the Congress. And we found out, after the fact, that these booklets had been translated into at least 10 languages, because the parent governments had decided that these were models for how a federal government should develop programs for science and technology.

In effect, then, the Bush administration had a two-tier budget structure program. First of all, there were a limited number-- some five or six-- programs that were presidential initiatives where the agency participation was very highly coordinated. For the rest of the agency's portfolio, it was, as always, built from the bottom up on the basis of proposals submitted from across the nation.

And because these special programs were recognized as presidential initiatives, each year we were able to convince the Congress to provide appropriation increases between 20% and 40%, and in consequence, of course, we were able to move these fields forward in rather striking fashion. And I feel that this activity, and this two-tier budget structure was a reasonable success.

Next item I want to turn to is that of technology. From the outset-- from the very first-- when I arranged to have one of our associate directors appointed for industrial technology, I was trying to send out two messages-- first of all, that the Bush administration wished to cooperate with the private sector in the development of generic or enabling technologies-- and secondly, that the Bush administration was interested in improving the rather unhappy relationships that sometimes exist between the federal government and the private sector.

As one of our first tasks, we undertook to try and find out exactly what the US technology policy was. And so in November of 1990, we published the first ever statement of US technology policy. It's interesting to note that it took us about a month to prepare that statement and nine months to get it through the legal thicket before it could be signed off by the president and published.

Obviously it involved technology, but perhaps even more important, it involved the other components that are important in a technology policy-- that involve taxation, regulation, the availability of capital, the availability of an adequately skilled workforce, appropriate intellectual property protection, and communication channels with other nations.

And I must say here that I just want to pay tribute again to Bill Golden, with whose help we put together the Carnegie group. This was and is an excellent group, because it enabled us, over the years, to convert international issues by backchannel telephone conversations before they became international problems. And that is still going on.

Now you will remember that our administration was the one where the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, Michael Boskin, was widely quoted in the national media as having said, quote, "A hundred worth of potato chips, a hundred dollars worth of computer chips-- what's the difference, and who cares?" Michael, of course, swears that he never made any such statement.


But the very fact that this quotation was widely distributed-- widely read-- in the private sector suggested to many there that might actually be the administration's point of view. And so we had to come up with some programs that would address this.

We recognized that the public was becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the return on its $25 billion a year-- roughly $25 billion a year investment in the National Laboratories. And we undertook a major program to bring them together with the private sector and in particular with small and mid-sized industries in that sector.

By the end of the Bush administration, as a matter of fact, we had more than 2,500 of the so-called CRADAs-- cooperative research and development agreements-- signed and in place. And in the middle of the Bush administration, we started what we, at the time, viewed as a pilot program-- the Advanced Technology Program-- that we based in NIST, because we recognized that NIST had a long history of cooperation and interaction with the private sector. And the idea was a very simple one-- namely, to develop cooperation between the federal government and these small and mid-sized companies and corporations that did not have adequate resources to do the research that would make them competitive on an international marketplace.

The results of the first year were encouraging, and so in the second year, we convinced the Congress to give us substantially increased appropriations. And throughout the election campaign in 1992, both Bill Clinton and Al Gore repeatedly noted that they liked the program and that they were going to increase its appropriations. And this they did.

But unfortunately, with the increase in appropriations came a change in the character of the program, and the emphasis moved from the small and mid-sized companies to some very large companies-- as for example, the three major automobile manufacturers in the program for a new generation of vehicles. And perhaps not surprisingly, this convinced members of Congress to label this program as corporate welfare on the assumption that such corporations-- these large corporations-- should have been expected to do the necessary research using their own resources.

And because of this corporate welfare label, which I think was unfair and only slightly reasonable, the funding for the advanced technology program dropped significantly in the latter Clinton years. And unhappily in the George W budget-- which has just recently been released-- funding for ATP has been terminated completely. And I happen to believe that in its initial form, this was a very important program and one that would still have major benefits for the nation, and it is worth considering again.

Lastly, let me turn to the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology. That council was the first in something like 30 years that reported directly to the president. It was part of a promise that George H W had made in October, prior to the election, where he said that he was going to do two things. He was going to raise the science advisor position to that of assistant to the president, and he was going to appoint a council of private citizens that would report directly to him and advise him.

Now as I mentioned earlier, it took us nine months to get the technology policy out, but we had noted that Eisenhower, nine days after he formed PSAC, had held its first meeting. And so we figured, well, it can't take that long, but it did. It took, in fact, nine months between the time we started, and we were able to get all of our members cleared and in place so that we can hold our first meeting of the Bush PCAST at Camp David, as the guest of George and Barbara Bush.

Now the fact that the president met regularly with PCAST in its monthly meetings--

--I can't see it, but I get the idea-- met roughly-- met with the PCAST group-- whenever he was in Washington-- when it met for its monthly meetings-- made an enormous difference. Because the members recognized that they were having input to the very highest levels of the nation's government.

When the members had first been appointed, we had asked them to be prepared to devote one week per month to PCAST activity. Unfortunately, as time passed, I and the other members of my OSTP staff, who were supposed to be working with the president in developing tasks that we would ask PCAST to do, found that we simply had so many competing activities that, over time, we let this part of our agenda slip away.

And although the Bush PCAST-- first of all, was comprised of extraordinarily distinguished private citizens-- it produced a whole series of really important studies-- it generated a whole series of reports to the president, which are still extremely useful-- it didn't and wasn't asked to do anything like one week per month of activity on behalf of the president. And in that sense, I feel that, in fact, we wasted one of the very major resources that was available to our administration.

And before I leave it, though, let me emphasize just how important I think it is to have a group of private citizens like this that would interact directly with the president.

Now I'll give you one example. Some of you have heard this before. In one of our monthly meetings with President Bush in the Roosevelt Room, he was waxing enthusiastically and eloquently about a new idea that he was thinking about doing something with. And sitting across the table from him was David Packard, and Packard was looking at him more and more seriously. And when the president finished, David said, and I quote, "Mr. President, that is one of the stupidest damn ideas I've ever heard."


And the president said, really? And the idea disappeared-- never heard from again. And it was really vital that we had people of the stature and competence and confidence to say something like that to the President of the United States, because believe me he rarely hears that sort of thing otherwise.

Now the typical time constant of OSTP is something like 15 minutes, and under the pressure of responding to issues as they flash through the transom, you frequently find that you and your colleagues forget the real reason you're there and the major goals for the administration and for the president. And so it is vitally important that on a regular basis-- in our case it was once a month-- we simply got out of Washington altogether and spent a day reminding ourselves what those goals were and what we should be doing about them.

Now let me conclude then by noting-- and I have, obviously, a major conflict of interest-- that I believe that OSTP can and should play a vitally important role in the central administration of this nation. More and more of the decisions of consequence in this nation involve substantial science and technology components. And it is important not only to inject the science and technology where it's needed, but also to recognize where decisions are potentially being made that can have a huge impact on science and technology that are not recognized because those involved in the decision making simply don't understand that particular issue.

I was delighted to have the opportunity a month or so ago to work with Ed David to track down and kill a rumor that was then current that the new administration was going to kill OSTP. And ultimately, I have to emphasize we succeeded, I believe.

Ultimately, the success of the OSTP director depends, first of all and to a huge degree, on the personal relationship between him or her and the president. There's nothing else that really matters anywhere near as much.

And secondly, vitally important is the relationship with the director of OMB, because we were able to work out a relationship so that our staffs worked together throughout the year, so that there were no surprises. At the end of the year, all the agencies involved got together in a room like this and made a joint presentation of their programs to OMB, so that everybody heard what everybody else was doing in the case of the presidential initiatives.

Unfortunately, in only one instance were able to make this work in the Congress, where we could bring congressional committees and subcommittees together to hear the whole program simultaneously. I think that's a goal that we need to follow up and work toward. Everybody in the Congress-- and we had several meetings in the White House relating to this-- everyone said, that's a great idea. Because we had these finely tuned programs, and when they went up to the Congress, they got taken apart. And the pieces were delivered to the dozen or so committees and subcommittees that had jurisdiction.

Unfortunately, although everyone agreed that that was a damn silly way to handle the congressional oversight, whenever we asked them, okay, who's going to volunteer to give up the first piece of turf, there was a deadly silence. And then all the members of the Congress decided they had other business back on the Hill.

So thank you, ladies and gentlemen. And again, thank you to MIT for making this meeting possible.



AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE] the influence that the panel activity and the report had on policy. What do you think that's a reasonable approach to infusing the policy process with information?

BROMLEY: That first report was a follow-up on our issuance of a technology policy, and Bill Phillips-- my associate director-- and a number of our staff worked very hard to pull that together. It was done with a high level, largely industrial group of advisors, and it, I think, played a very important role in focusing our attention and the intention of the administration on a series of technologies-- some of which were obvious, but some of which were not-- and where we were slipping behind in the international competitive race, areas that could be of real importance to the nation.

So that was the first one. The second one was made by a totally different group, and it focused on our relative status as compared to activity in other nations. It also was extremely useful.

Out of those discussions came the idea that what we really needed was an internal advisory committee that has been talked about earlier this morning. The RAND Corporation was the successful bidder when it went out for bid.

And well, I have to be very careful what I say about this. In recent years, I think that this has been of considerable use to OSTP. But in its earliest incarnation, the RAND Corporation looked on as a channel whereby it could really get into the White House and become a big time White House advisory group. And so the relationship between it and OSTP was not as effective as any of us had hoped.



GIBBONS: One advantage of coming later in the morning is that a fair amount of your subject matter is already covered, and I've been struck this morning with the commonality of issues faced by a variety of episodes in the White House through several presidents. But sometimes repetition has its own merits. So I may sound redundant, but I hope that's only meant-- will be able to underscore the commonality of our experiences.

I had the good fortune of having worked in government up on the Hill in a bipartisan office, the OTA, for a number of years before I was asked to join the administration. I had served for a year and a half in the Nixon years in energy matters, but this was a different job. And so I was able to come into the White House early, in the first days of the new administration, and had the advantage of being able to help in the identification of key people for technical positions all around the government. So I had a unique advantage that was not shared by most of the other folks you've listened to today.

I would say-- in a sense an echo of what Phil Smith said-- that traditionally, OSTP and science-- and to a degree, technology-- is treated in the White House political family as somewhat like a bastard at a family reunion.


First of all, we're seen as a bunch of nerds in a sea of presidential campaigners and professional rough and tumble political types. That's the nature of the White House. It has to be that way, or it wouldn't be occupied. But all of these people are daily immersed in a survival process.

I'm reminded of a comment made by the professor in SHU who told the editor-- he said, I've developed some planning, and I've got a long range plan and a short range plan. And the editor said, well, what's your short range plan? The professor says, to make it through the day. Well what's your long range plan? To put together a series of short range plans.


And that's the practicality of the nature of the White House-- of the staff meetings in the morning-- of the interactions between the people. It is strongly driven by political time constants, all of which are very short compared to most of the time constants in science and technology.

I remember one day trying to describe a situation with respect to plutonium management in the world, and I had to give a little essay about plutonium, which the chief of staff asked me to do. And I carefully put together a three minute, tight presentation of plutonium in the world economy and why it was such an important thing for the administration to understand and deal with. And at the end of it, there was a kind of a stunned silence. And George Stephanopoulos said, do we have to take an exam on this?


And I realized that I was speaking on an important issue but in the wrong audience at that particular time.

The other feature of science in the White House is that it is competing with embedded White House power centers that are very zealous of their authority and of their control of power. It's, again, the nature of the place, but it's one that one has to understand-- that while you must develop relationships with these other centers, they will be very zealous of anything that is perceived to begin to impinge on their traditional freedoms, authorities, and responsibilities.

And thirdly, about the OSTP-- initially, I'm going to try to focus on OSTP as against the assistant to the president for science and technology, which is a somewhat different job-- is that the OSTP is the result of a congressional act. It's subject to its own separate appropriations under HUD V and independent agencies. It's not even listed in the phone book as part of the executive offices of the president. So there's, in that sense, an advantage of being there by act of Congress, but also that puts you outside the otherwise tightly knit family within the White House.

So the assistant to the president, in the case of science and technology, is the only one of all of the assistants to the president that's also presidentially nominated, Senate confirmed, and therefore responsible to go to the Congress and testify on a number of issues. It gets a little tricky sometimes, because you have to wear two very different hats in those two different commissions.

The effectiveness as I saw it-- and I think as you've heard about it this morning-- the effectiveness of OSTP is it is dependent on the perceived relevance to the president's priorities and interests and to the perceived value to the other offices in the White House to what degree does OSTP enables these other offices to achieve their goals.

In turn, this kind of perception depends very much, as Allan Bromley and others have said, on the personal relationship between that person and the president, the vice president, and other key people in the White House group. That kind of personal relationship is absolutely vital if you hope to get things done.

Well, in the case of Clinton and Gore both are intellectual policy wonks. Gore had his epiphany up here at Harvard when he took a course under Roger Revelle. And it resulted in a fairly clear platform early on in the administration, which I sort of would describe as, first of all, economic growth-- with obviously a lot of technical issues involved in the process.

So economic growth not only depended on OSTP, but also on the Economic Council-- on the Council of Economic Advisors-- on the Domestic Policy Council-- all these other parts of the White House.

A second platform was deficit reduction. It began early, with the first Clinton budget, and it went on from there-- with the byline being, we're going to reduce the deficit, but we're going to do it very carefully and preserve those things that can help build the economy and do the rest. We're not simply going to cut government, but we're going to tighten the strings. And we're going to depend on productivity increases in order to make our gains more than simply budget increases.

The third area was health, and the concern about a national health insurance plan and other things, obviously, occupied maybe not enough of the administration's time. But it was an early focus-- national health being as important as education and other things that underscore our viability.

Fourth was comprehensive approaches to environmental issues-- for instance, tackling not just the salmon issues in the Northwest or endangered species or lakes or power-- but the whole of the Northwest region as an environmental system that needed to be approached comprehensively-- the same for the Mississippi River-- the hypoxia in the Gulf and the upper Mississippi water runoff from fertilizer-- the same for Florida and the subterranean water flow down the southern Florida-- the sugar industries-- all these things combining together to give a opportunity to approach, holistically, fairly major regions of the country. That, in turn, called for a lot of coalescing of capabilities that lay embedded around in different agencies of the government.

Well to work on this, we set up our OSTP very similar to what our predecessors were. One of the big advantages of this legislation was it creates four presidentially nominated, Senate confirmed assistant directors-- I think to the envy of many other of the White House offices.

And we divided our world into four parts-- science, which included education and agriculture and health-- technology, which included information technology and industrial activities-- environment, which included the full range of environmental issues--- and then finally one in national security and international affairs-- very similar sounding to what you heard in some of the other incarnations of OSTP.

Incidentally, today we have Kerri-Ann Jones here. Is she still here? Kerri-Ann, are you here? Oh, there she is-- over the corner-- who was our Assistant Director for National Security and International Affairs. We have Duncan Moore, who was a technology assistant director. Ernie Moniz-- where's-- where-- is Ernie here? There he is-- Ernie, I'm glad to see you again. Ernie Moniz, who was a key assistant director for our science and education work. And Cliff Gabriel is currently carrying on that capacity until the new administration finds someone to fill in. And Rosina Bierbaum, who is also carrying on down there still in a sort of a holdover capacity until someone comes in to replace her-- hopefully soon.

Well, to achieve these various overarching goals, science and technology was seen and stipulated as being highly relevant, if not essential, for the achieving of all of these goals-- a cross-cutting enabling capability, rather than a goal in itself-- and that was an important distinction. It served the overarching goals, rather than being identified as one. And that brought up and emphasized the notion of networking and partnerships as a mechanism for getting our work done and enabling us to assist.

Networking in the White House meant that we did-- and I think Phil Smith pointed out the importance of being over at the mess-- didn't you mention that, Phil The importance of being at the mess, because that's where you interact with the other people within the White House complex-- very important-- proximity-- It's not only real estate. It's location, location, location for the White House as well.

Joint appointments was an idea we had, and it worked out to a degree. I wish it had worked out better, but we devised a way to have a senior OSTP person jointly appointed to, for instance, the National Security Council as a-- I paid the salary bill, but that person-- in this case, Kerri-Ann, was also appointed as a senior director in the NSC. And that gave a coupling that was very, very helpful. We also tried the same with less success in other of the White House offices, but we tried to use this mechanism of joint appointments as much as we could.

We had joint policy actions. For example, in the first two months of the administration, we issued a paper on-- let's see if I can find the title of it-- it was essentially called "Technology and America's Economic Growth"-- that was released by the president and the vice president out in San Jose in late winter, early spring of 1993-- which spelled out the case for technology and its partner, science, as being the long term enabling factor underlying our economic growth.

We also issued budget guidance to the agencies-- to the executive agencies-- through a joint letter published in the spring, signed by both the director of OMB and myself, giving explicit guidance to the agencies in terms of science and technology priorities.

So joint policy actions were an outward and visible sign of internal attempts to link these offices together in a productive way.

So that was one kind of partnership. Another partnership was across the executive branch. To do this, we built on the very important earlier work that Allan Bromley talked about of the FCCSET activities and sort of raised it another notch in terms of its policy level within the White House. The president established the National Science and Technology Council, which had the added features-- not only was it chaired by the president, and members were basically the heads of 23 agencies, but it also was able to issue of presidential review directives and presidential decision directives-- which enabled, then, the force of the president to be put in coalescing these agencies together on common issues

The NSTC had a degree of convening capability which was very important. And I think all of us would say that one important role of OSTP was to serve the president in bringing together executive agencies around matters of mutual concern. It's much easier to bring them over to the White House and have a sit down, knockdown drag out session then to have them meet somewhere-- some neutral place in town-- or in one of the agencies. It's a magical capability that is important to use.

We use the NSTC as a means of developing a number of initiatives-- for instance, simple things like-- the Department of Defense had a whole weather satellite system-- and so, too, did NOAA. And after more than a little cajoling and more than a little time, we were able to get those systems converged into a single weather satellite system for the nation.

I also remind you that sometime later, one distinguished member of Congress declared one day that he was going to get rid of NOAA and their weather satellites-- because why do you need all these government weather satellites up there when you got the weather station on television?


He learned better later on.

We also resolved and had a presidential initiative on declassifying the Global Positioning Satellite System in order to enable it to move into the commercial markets as well as serve in a dual capacity for national security. This was a very important development, and it took a coalescing of defense, state, commerce, CIA, and I'm not sure who all else-- but you can see the kind of White House convening that had to take place to enable this to move forward.

We developed over-- in this case, it took two full year-- to develop an initiative on biomass research and utilization, because we had to coalesce-- would you believe it-- the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Energy into a single working group. And I have two minutes, is that right? And time is an essential element in bringing people together. But we were pleased that we were able to do that.

We resolved a bunch of conflicts-- conflicts between agencies on policy decisions and on declarations of regulations. Dioxin, MTBE, mercury, lead, particulate matter in the air-- all of these took a convening at the White House of different agencies that were stakeholders in these issues to resolve the differences between the agencies before they came to announce the results.

We had to approve the launch of the Cassini space probe to Saturn, because it contained a lot of plutonium-238, and it was going to go swinging around Venus and back around the Earth twice and on out to the outer system. And there were a lot of people, personally, lobbying the president on this, and it turned out that it was my job to make the decision on that launch or to refer it to the president. And in this case, it was very clear to me that I needed to make that decision and not try to lay that one on the president. So there are some of these funny, little side issues that pop up.

So the executive branch integration is one thing. Let me mention two others, briefly. Government and private sector-- bringing understanding, mutual self-interest on the part of the public and on the part on the private sector to achieve goals that have mutual benefits for both those sectors.

One of the largest was the partnership for a new generation of vehicles. And Mary Good-- where are you, Mary? Mary is a hero because she was at Commerce, and I was pleased to help recruit her to Commerce. Mary took on this task, at Commerce, and it included six federal agencies-- all three of the big three motors and others-- into a single well coordinated activity that still is extant and making good progress.

I won't mention the others, but it's this notion that if you can be like the old time barn raising cooperation between people-- where the whole can be greater than the sum of the parts-- then things can work better than by command and control.

International partnerships-- the shaping of the space station-- inherited from the Cold War and transformed to an international venture-- the largest peacetime international technology venture in history-- was an early activity of the administration.

And Chuck Vest-- are you here Chuck? Bless his heart. He agreed to chair this meeting, and I'll never forget. We had to do it quickly, and Chuck conceived of bringing the Russians in and doing all sorts of things. And at the end, writing this report up, Chuck spent the entire night and saw the next morning, while he was helping write this report-- I think it was the first time he had done that since he'd been a graduate student. But you were a hero, Chuck.

Changing the high energy physics situation from the disaster of the SSC-- the Superconducting Super Collider-- into a time in which we realized we needed to join the international effort in particle physics and become much more of an active partner over at CERN.

The global climate change issue, we carried on from where Allan had taken it, and we believe it is still moving forward.

A lot of bilateral work, particularly on the weapons control and nuclear weapons components and plutonium control with Russia, but other similar things with other countries in this case-- I worked very closely with the vice president.

And then finally the committees of the OSTP were very important. The PCAST, as Allan pointed out, can play a key role if it has direct access to the president. We did this with respect to the energy research and development-- to International energy issues-- to biocomplexity-- to plutonium control and nuclear weapons, where only 10 days went by between the time we briefed the president on that issue and when he met with Yeltsin and came to an agreement on plutonium disposition.

The creation of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission by the president, which was chaired by Harold Shapiro-- another one of our heroes-- that it took us a long time to put it in place, because Congress had failed to be able to create it in earlier years. And it tackled, very effectively, the issues of the use of human subjects in advanced biomedicine and has its-- I would say, its agenda-- cut out for it for about probably the next 50 years.

So ultimately, then, partnerships were a key word. But they began in the White House, and they ended up in our international work. We were trying to link our citizen governors to sources of specialized knowledge in effective ways, and I won't try to judge the outcome.

I'm reminded of a person who asked Mao Zedong once what he thought of the 18th century French Revolution. And he thought for a minute, and he said, it's a little too early to tell. Thank you.



MOORE: And I guess--

GIBBONS: That's going to Neal, and then maybe--

MOORE: Okay, all right.

LANE: No, no, I'm sorry. No, I'm just going up here and be ready when you're finished.

GIBBONS: No, no, no. No, you go ahead, and then we'll find out what questions there might be.

LANE: Answer a question-- one question that you have.

MOORE: Go ahead.

LANE: Jack will answer this question.

AUDIENCE: All right, Dr. Gibbons, could you speak just a bit about your role of advising both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue-- in the role of OTA and the role as a science advisor to the president-- the impact of both-- and why did OTA go out?


GIBBONS: Let's have lunch.


The OTA was a pleasant job, because we never tried to tell Congress what they ought to do. We tried to give them a good description of their options, and we were governed by a bipartisan, bicameral board. So I didn't have to really give advice so much as information that was condensed and policy relevant.

When I got to the White House, I lost a lot of friends, because I had to start giving advice. It's like that essay the young man won in the 8th grade-- he won the essay contest about one of the world's great men. And he said, my essay is about Socrates. Socrates was a great man. He gave advice to other people. He was poisoned.


MOORE: Neal?

LANE: Thank you very much, Duncan and Jack. It's always a mistake to follow Jay Gibbons, and here I am again.

It's a terrific pleasure to be at MIT. MIT's connections with science, technology and so many other things are so important to the nation is just quite extraordinary. But it gives me a chance to mention, explicitly, the many advisors that I had the great pleasure to work with on PCAST-- certainly Chuck Vest-- but also Mario Molina, John Deutch, Phil Sharp-- and Ernie Moniz, of course, worked with us in the White House before he moved over to Energy and was very important to that department and our ability to do some good things during some really difficult times with the Department of Energy. I should also say John Holdren served on PCAST, and he's from that sister institution up the road. It was very effective.

I also apologize for my voice and any incoherence that you may get. Mr. Porter had mentioned allergies earlier, and I think a lot of us have gotten serious allergy attacks. We need to put more money into allergy research.


It's a great honor for me to be here-- so many distinguished predecessors, quite an extraordinary occasions. Many, if not all of you, I've called on in my years in Washington for good advice. I'm especially indebted to Jack Gibbons, because he was my predecessor in the White House. And he had an important role in bringing me to Washington, to the NSF job, and bringing me over to the White House. And I am grateful for that. He gave me lots of good advice, as did Bill Golden.

Bill Golden, when I asked about how you work in the White House, you said, well, Neal, you remember when you were a little boy-- he always says that-- remember when you were a little boy, you did this experiment with a microscope and the slide and the Paramecium in the India ink-- and the Paramecium would come up and then back off and then go over here and then back off. And then finally it would make it wherever he or she-- I don't know about Paramecia--


--were going. And I followed that advice. I remembered that advice all the time, and I got some ink in my nose from time to time. But by and large, it is pretty good advice. And it's consistent, I think, with all else that we've heard about how you work in the White House.

Jack had a difficult task of selecting from a long list, and I will have the same problem. And I'm only going to mention a few areas.

I'll talk a little bit about the budget-- President Clinton's last budget-- a little bit about the government university partnership that we worked on about space policy-- if there's time, cloning, missile defense-- and if anybody asks a question, I'll talk about the Clinton-Blair statement on the Human Genome Project that had an impact-- a negative one-- on the biotechnology market. That's one of those surprises. It's one of those things you would like to have done a little better, but it was an important statement nonetheless.

First of all, the budget-- as Jack has said, President Clinton and Vice President Gore certainly understood, all along, the importance of science and technology and were champions of it. I didn't have the opportunity to work as closely with Vice President Gore, because he was busy, off doing other things. On the other hand, that allowed the president I think to spend more time thinking about science and technology, which he had generally wanted the vice president to work closely on. And of course, the vice president loved science and technology, so that worked really well.

But the president's last budget was unprecedented in many ways. It enabled us to get some focus on the balance issue, by identifying the 21st century research fund, to essentially all the fundamental half of the overall federal R&D budget, so that we could make the point that while your increase-- that's already been made here, very eloquently, by Congressman Porter-- that while you are growing the NIH budget, roughly tracking GDP over time-- which makes sense to me. It seems like the right trajectory for me.

You also need to build up the chemistry and the physics and the math and the computer science and the engineering fields-- so important. And you do that through funding the National Science Foundation, the science programs, and the Department of Energy, Defense, NASA, and the other agencies.

So we worked hard on that, and this budget gave us a chance to bring forward fairly significant increases in all of those important research programs. Congress was quite receptive to that, and I think it's very impressive it gave bipartisan support, generally, to this budget. And we did very well.

The reason that Congress supported the president is because many members of Congress understand how important science and technology are, even if they're not on the radar screen every day-- even if they aren't the things that members get elected or get sent home about. Still, it's very important, and many members of Congress-- all members of Congress, I think-- want to do good things for the country. So there is that bipartisan spirit.

But also, a lot of people worked very hard to put this budget together-- many in the White House-- many in Washington-- many out here. So we've got people in the audience that worked enormously hard to get the attention of members of Congress to explain this issue of balance and the importance of the increased investment in science and technology. And we're very grateful for that kind of effort.

Within that budget, there were a few important initiatives that I would highlight-- certainly a continuation of the new technology R&D investments to find better ways-- more efficient and cleaner ways-- of producing energy. Those programs started during my predecessor's time. Also, the Information Technology Initiative that had been started by the president a couple of years earlier on the recommendation of his advisory committee on information technology, PTAC, to increase the investment in long term, fundamental research in computer science and communication. And we continued that initiative.

And then a brand new initiative in this FY01 budget was that in nanotechnology, and Chuck Vest really helped us on PCAST by chairing the panel-- PCAST panel-- that looked at the program we were putting together, involving many agencies, on increasing the investment of nanoscale science and engineering-- and then recommending to the president what to do. And the PCAST role here was extremely important. The president was delighted with the Nanotechnology Initiative. I'd had the chance to brief him on it on more than one occasion.

And I remember in a budget meeting-- nobody else in the White House, or very few other people in the White House were familiar with nanotechnology-- and I remember a budget meeting the Roosevelt Room. We were going through the list of initiatives. You know, it's page after page of things people want to do-- more police on the streets-- more teachers in the classrooms-- very, very important initiatives-- but there's a certain competition there.

So when we got to nanotechnology, a lot of people table didn't know what it was. And they turned to me, thinking, this has to be Neal's fault-- he's the only nerd at the table, so he's got to know something about this. And I said, Mr. President, I think you know what this initiative's all about. And the president said, let's see-- nanotechnology is this tiny, little initiative.


A lot of people at the table did not get the joke, but--


I said, that's right Mr. President, but it will require some substantial money.


And so it did. Many agencies play important roles-- the National Science Foundation, NASA, DOE, NIH-- it's a highly multidisciplinary and extremely important initiative. I'd be excited to talk several hours about it. But I will not at this point. But it did go in the budget for a 60% increase in the federal investment in nanoscale science and engineering, when you put all this package together. The president requested more, but 60, 56% is not bad. So I'm hopeful that the initiative will get a positive consideration by the Congress this next time around.

I should say something we didn't do so well on. Another really important area is critical infrastructure protection R&D. I think Ed David commented on this. It includes cyber issues, but it includes the whole infrastructure-- banking-- I mean, the health sector-- everything that's increasingly dependent on information infrastructure.

So PCAST-- John Deutch was instrumental here-- PCAST had a look at this and said, what we really need is a non-government organization that can stay abreast of fast-changing technologies, work closely with industry-- very closely with industry-- and identify those areas that need researched and figure out how to get the information out to the private sector.

We put together what I thought was a terrific proposal, but for various reasons, the Congress did not smile on it this time around. It's an issue that's not going to go away, and I'm very hopeful that Congress will do something about it in this session.

The university-government partnership is extremely important for all the reasons that we all know. Chuck Vest and some of his PCAST colleagues drew our attention to the fact that some of these stresses that have been talked about over the years-- including academy reports-- have to do with awkwardness on the part of the universities in working with the Federal Government to support R&D. We have some rules that are not so easy to follow. We even have some rules that are, frankly, dumb. And so couldn't we have a look at those and try to straighten the situation out?

And so we did. We worked closely with OMB on the matter, and we ended up with, first of all, a set of principles that we hope in future will guide this partnership, and at least by looking at those principles, you'll know when you're getting ready to do something dumb or not. Then, in the case of specifics, A21 had some of these problems in it, and we were able to identify those.

And OMB indicated changes that should be made, and those changes are being made-- such issues as how you handle voluntary uncommitted cost sharing, which was sort of one of the dumb things that came out of the past.

The workforce has been mentioned, and I think the imperative of doing something about the future science technology workforce-- which I think we'll hear from [INAUDIBLE] about-- I mean, that, in my view, is the biggest challenge of all the different challenges that I talk about when I talk about barriers to progress in science and technology or challenges we need to deal with-- this workforce challenge is something that I think we don't know how to get hold of. And the numbers are scary, the demographic shifts are fairly rapid, and we simply don't know what to do.

So we've got to get at it. I think one way to think about it is that-- young people-- boys and girls all over the country, in virtually every community-- represent some of the potentially brightest talent available. It's there, we just have to get to it. Also, young people are very curious early on. That's why we really like science until we get to school.


And then we suddenly don't like science anymore, because the idea of inquiry somehow got lost in the classroom. Well, it's not lost to agency like NSF and to many quite exciting efforts in education underway.

Also, inquiry is what research is all about. It's what excited us and got so many of us into research careers. So it doesn't make sense. That's really the way to learn science, and shouldn't we be able to expose more young people to science? I, at least, believe that that is the case.

The other thing I would say is that some young people are turned on just by the excitement of intellectual discovery-- just a thought. They're curious, they want to learn more, and yeah, they're a little nerdy sometimes.

Other young people are excited about the thought that they will change the world. They want something to happen to solve some of these major problems of the world, and they'd like to have a career that does that. And they look at science and engineering, and they say, what's the point? Because they don't understand that science, engineering, and technology changes the world.

We've got to help them understand what's the point. Nobody else can do that but the science and technology community. I'm sorry, that was a little bit of a preaching, but I believe it deeply and will continue to talk about the concept of the citizen scientist. I think it is extremely important for us to think about as a new area of our responsibility.

I will skip space policy, except to say it was a big issue. We're proud that we were able to get the space station up-- off the drawing board and actually up there. And it's working, continuously occupied. I'd like to go up, but I don't have $20 million.


Okay, so. That my wife will let me spend for that--


--for that particular endeavor. [LAUGHS]

It also is an example of a wonderful partnership that has been difficult with Russia, because Russia has gone through such hard transitional problems in the economy and just in society in general. But it worked. It was very important to include the Russians as a partner. They brought technology and knowledge to the table. They brought Mir, which gave us experience for our astronauts we never would have had otherwise. So with all of its wrinkles and warts, it was a very important partnership, and we're very happy about it.

We've had some failures with our Mars program. The Faster, Better, Cheaper didn't work as well as we hoped with the Mars investments, but those failures still pale by comparison with the giant failure in 1993 of essentially the whole Mars program. And this is a better way, as Dan Goldin himself has said, we need to do it better. And we agree, and we were the White House oversight of the investigation of what went wrong with the Mars failures and the new plan to go forward.

[INAUDIBLE] was very involved in the political arena when Dolly was announced. It was clear, since we have no law on cloning of anybody-- people or animals-- that something needed to be done. The president turned to Harold Shapiro and NBAC-- the National Bioethics Advisory Committee-- for advice. They provided advice very quickly, and the president issued an executive order that banned the cloning of a human being. As you know, that's the-- I think-- the only thing on the table right now in the way of law. But Congress is looking at a number of steps.

Then right on the heels of that came the stem cell breakthroughs-- the research on embryonic stem cells that showed that you really could multiply these cells and develop whole lines. And so again, we turned to NBAC for its advice, and the president ultimately determined that it was okay for NIH-- based on its legal opinion-- to go forward to support research on existing embryonic stem cell lines, but not to derive stem cells from embryos.

Again, there are people on the Hill thinking about clamping down on that-- preventing NIH from doing that research. I think that's not a good idea. I believe the scientific issues, coupled with the enormous promise that this has for human health-- and finally, the ethical considerations that NBAC gave this-- suggest that this really ought to go forward.

Well, there's lots more I could say. We were involved in national missile defense. We were quiet outside, but we were not quiet inside. I know that our voice was heard on that matter as the president made his decisions.

Genetically modified organisms were very much around. And in my time, because of what went on-- in the UK, in particular-- and then throughout Europe-- people all over the world are scared about genetically modified organisms-- but less so in this country. And I think that's because of the confidence that they have in our ability to protect our food for our people and our environment.

But this issue has not gone away-- not going to go away. There'll be much more to do here, and there'll be many more issues that challenge our public's values, attitudes, experiences-- there'll be many more places in which science and technology is going to come into potential conflict with what people care deeply about. And the technology is moving awfully fast.

So a body like the National Bioethics Advisory Committee is very important, and consideration of more research activities and more sensitivity to ethical issues in science and technology, also, I think, must be an important criterion in the future for how we go about putting our programs together.

One more thing I'll just say-- all I really did was to come in after Jack. Jack put together an extraordinary Office of Science Technology Policy-- built a high level of credibility-- hired terrific people like Kerri-Ann and Duncan and Jeff Smith, who was our exec-- who was really our-- it's hard to describe what Jeff does and keep him out of jail.


He's the guy who understands how the West Wing works. He understands what campaign people do. He knows how Congress works. And I just can't say enough good about his contributions, but he's representative of the quality that Jack put together in OSTP.

My job was to come in and try not to mess it up, and with a few exceptions, I think I succeeded. Thank you very much.


MOORE: I don't know if you're going to get your question or not, but there you go.

LANE: Okay.

AUDIENCE: OSTP is somewhat limited by resources in its ability to commission analysis. I mean, the budget, as we heard, has not been growing. There is this new RAND, that we're relatively new RAND supportability. You can commission things from your executive branch agencies, but then you tend to get from through a filter of that agency. Is this is a serious problem? And if so, is everything to be done about it?

LANE: I think it is a problem. OSTP, first of all, now is not small. It has about 60 people, if you include people on loan from agencies like NSF and NASA and so on. So from the perspective of some of these other councils, it looks like a pretty big office. And so that's just sort of an internal problem of how do you go about getting the budget up.

But of course the RAND activities should be funded through OSTP in my view. I saw it from NSF's point of view, so I sat over at NSF. And I thought, what's going on? I mean, how do I evaluate this, given NSF's responsibilities? So it doesn't make any sense. It ought to be funded by OSTP.

The other thing is that there's very little funding for PCAST activities. A lot of what PCAST did-- that's why they're such champions. Well, there are a lot of reasons they're champions, but they did many of these things on their own hook-- institutional support-- company support-- maybe even Xeroxing out of their own pockets. We shouldn't be having to do that. And so resources are very limited.

Last thing I will say is the expectations are just going up. Science and technology is so much a part of everything else going on in the national agenda that to expect that that's just going to be done better and better and better, being stretched as thinly as we are, is, I think, a mistaken impression. So I believe the resources are a problem.